


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What the Bankers' Convention Accomplished

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New York, Monday, October 9, 1922

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Vol. 20, No. 508

NEW YORK, MONDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1922

Ten Cents

What the Bankers' Convention Accomplished

We believe that the time has come for the Government of our country to formulate the principles on which it will be able to co-operate with other nations to

bring about rehabilitation of European countries and peace in the world." With this resolution the great American Bankers' Association concluded its program. Our relations with Europe constituted the central theme of the convention. It was clear that the assembled bankers regarded no topic more important, and action with reference to no other matter more urgent.

For many decades the American Bankers' Association has been a leading influence in formulating American economic policies. The first resolution ever passed by the association, adopted in 1875, demanded the resumption of specie payments on our depreciated greenbacks. The association fought strongly for the gold standard in the years preceding 1896, and was one of the most powerful instrumentalities in preserving the gold standard. Under the leadership of its Currency Commission, headed by the Hon. A. Barton Hepburn of the Chase National Bank, it supplied the driving force through the period which followed the panic of 1907 for the banking and currency reform which culminated in the Federal Reserve act. The Federal Reserve act, as originally drawn, was not to its liking. It had preferred a single central bank. But it withdrew its opposition to the Federal Reserve act when the provision was inserted which authorized the Federal Reserve Board to compel one Federal Reserve Bank to rediscount for another, thus accomplishing that pooling of gold reserves which constituted the essence of the central bank idea.

The American Bankers' Association has stood as a bulwark against unsound monetary and financial proposals throughout its history. It sweepingly condemned the stabilized dollar proposal of Professor Irving Fisher at its meeting of 1920. One of its resolutions just adopted declares: "We disapprove emphatically the attacks made upon the Federal Reserve system and the members of the Federal Reserve Board individually." Another resolution declares: "We regret to see that some of our people have not learned from the experience of Russia and the Central Empires of Europe that a sound currency system based upon a gold standard is absolutely essential not merely for the orderly conduct of the business of the country, but even for the maintenance of civilized life."

The Right Hon. Reginald McKenna

The most distinguished guest of the convention was the Right Hon. Reginald McKenna of London, Chairman

Benjamin M. Anderson Jr. Ph. D.,

Economist of the Chase National Bank of New York

of the London Joint City and Midland Bank, Ltd., formerly First Lord of the Admiralty and Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. McKenna spoke on Wednesday morning. His fine, clean-cut British face, his

should admit his obligation without further discussion. He excused himself, however, by saying that England had the ability to pay, and that he could unhesitatingly assert her determination to



JOHN H. PUELICHER

President of the Marshall & Ilsley Bank of Milwaukee, who has just been elected President of the American Bankers Association

easy, graceful but impressive delivery, his clear-cut thought, and his moderate, reasonable manner of statement, all contributed to make a most happy impression upon the assembled American bankers. His opinions on "The Problem of Reparations and International Debts" (the title of his address) will undoubtedly make a very real impression upon American public opinion. Mr. McKenna observed that it might be bad form for him as a member of a nation (Great Britain) which is one of the debtors of the United States to speak freely to an American audience upon international indebtedness, and particularly to discuss the origin of the debt and the economic consequences of international payments. A creditor may, if he likes, open up questions of that kind, but a debtor

honor her bond in full. That granted, he felt justified in asking his American audience to consider with him the question of the remaining international debts as one in which America and England are equally concerned and in which both have the same interests as creditors.

Analyzing the one supposed precedent for the payment of great international debts, namely, the French payment of indemnity to Germany in the seventies, he declared that this did not constitute a real precedent for existing conditions. The war between France and Germany had been short. France remained with unshaken credit in the world; her industries were intact; above all, her large holdings of foreign securities were intact. A small part of the payment she made by increasing her industrial activi-

ties and creating an export balance, but the bulk of it she made by borrowing from abroad or by borrowing from her own people funds which could be converted into foreign currency by virtue of the fact that the foreign securities of her people could be sold abroad. The amount of the indemnity, moreover, was one well within France's ability to pay. When the present situation is compared with that of the seventies, Mr. McKenna holds that Great Britain alone has sufficient foreign securities to make it possible for her to pay her intergovernmental indebtedness. The Continental countries have largely disposed of their good foreign securities.

Mr. McKenna thinks that the main payment which Germany will be capable of making in the near future must come from the foreign assets now held by German nationals, including their balances in foreign banks. He thinks it would be a perfectly practical proceeding for them to sell these assets to the German Government, which, in turn, could hand them over to the Reparation Commission. He insists, however, that it is an essential condition to such a transaction that the owners of the foreign assets should be willing to sell them. No German Government could force a compulsory sale. This consent could be obtained if these assets could be sold for an assured profit to the holders. These assets represent, in considerable part, the proceeds of the sale of marks which have been flung by Germans on foreign markets under the well-founded apprehension that the pressure of reparations payments would rapidly depreciate the mark. If this pressure were relieved, Mr. McKenna thinks, the mark would rapidly improve, and German holders of foreign values would, in that case, have a clear advantage in selling their foreign holdings for marks to their Government.

He estimates the total of these foreign assets at not less than \$1,000,000,000, and he thinks Germany could pay this, provided the fall in the mark was arrested. Beyond that, however, he does not think she has the ability to pay anything, at all event for some years, and he thinks that it should be a condition of this payment that no more be demanded for a long time to come.

Mr. McKenna emphasized that he was looking at the matter simply as an economist and banker, ignoring political considerations, and he insisted that no solution of the problem was possible unless political considerations were subordinated to economic facts.

Great Britain, he maintained, still owns sufficient foreign securities to cover her debt to the United States two or three times over, but neither France nor Italy has similar reserves of wealth, and he thinks that neither of them has sufficient to meet more than a trifling part of her foreign debt.

Mr. McKenna does not believe that much can be done in the way of paying these foreign debts by export of

goods. He does not rest this view on the ground that France, Italy and Germany are incapable of producing an exportable surplus, but rather on the ground that the rest of the world, particularly the United States, is incapable of receiving a large import surplus. He says it was easy for the United States to export at high prices a large surplus of goods to meet an abnormal war demand, but that in times of peace any such large export surplus would be exceedingly difficult to get out of the country and exceedingly difficult for the United States to receive. Mr. McKenna was courteous enough not to chide us upon the grotesque inconsistency of demanding payment and at the same time putting up tariff walls which prevent our receiving payment in goods, but he did advert to the fact that France had not had to face tariff difficulties when paying her indemnity in the seventies. Even under these conditions, however, his figures show that only a very minor part of the French indemnity was paid by export of goods.

It is at this point that the present writer finds himself unable to concur fully with Mr. McKenna's analysis. He recognizes the difficulty of our receiving payment in goods from countries which are consuming more than they are producing, and which have import surpluses instead of export surpluses. The present writer recognizes that there would have to be in the debtor countries a very great increase in production, with consumption held down, if any considerable payment in goods is to be made. He recognizes, too, that if we persist in our present tariff policy payment in goods would be difficult in the extreme. Bearing in mind the great difficulties under which France, Italy and other of our Continental Allies labor, he would be disposed to cancel their debts to our Government as part of a general program which involves drastic financial and currency reforms on the Continent of Europe, a rational settlement of the reparations questions and other things needed to get Europe on her feet¹. Assuming, however, a rational tariff policy on our part, and assuming a great increase in productivity by Europe, he has no doubt of our ability to absorb all the imports that Europe could possibly send up, and he would welcome a large import surplus sent in payment of Europe's debts to us.

There has been a very great deal of misapprehension regarding this matter. When goods are sent from one country to another in payment of international debts, they do not lessen the ability of the receiving country to consume its domestic products. The imported goods pay for themselves. If France, for example, should send us \$100,000,000 worth of goods, sell the goods in our markets for dollars, and turn over the dollars then received to our Government in payment of her debt, it would be possible for our Government to lighten the burden of the American taxpayer to the extent of \$100,000,000. American taxpayers would then have an additional \$100,000,000 to spend for domestic productions. A creditor country, like a private capitalist, can afford to consume more than it produces by its own labor and for precisely the same reason².

If the country which has the payment to make will tax its people in such a way as to create a fiscal surplus, this automatically reduces the ability of the people in that country to consume as much as they produce. A surplus of goods available for export is thus created. The producers of these goods find their prices falling, since buying power of the people of the country is reduced by taxation. On the other hand, the country which is receiving the payment, lightening the burden of taxation for its own people, leaves its people with increased spending power. Prices in the country receiving payment

thus tend to rise. The goods are then automatically drawn from the low-priced paying country into the high-priced receiving country. As the process goes on, prices rise in the paying country and fall in the receiving country until they come into equilibrium again. The equilibrium point is reached when the fiscal surplus in the exporting country has been matched by the export surplus, and when the people in the receiving country have spent all the proceeds of the payment.

Disagreeing with part of Mr. McKenna's reasoning, the writer is nevertheless in general harmony with his conclusions. He believes that the United States and Great Britain, as creditors, should jointly face the Continent and should propose to lighten the debt of the Continent on conditions which will assure reforms on the Continent. He believes also that immediate and drastic relief from reparations payments by Germany is called for. He is, however, strongly inclined to doubt the advisability of demanding any considerable part of Germany's foreign balances at the present time. The exhaustion of Germany is extreme, and such foreign balances as she possesses will be needed urgently to buy the necessary foods and raw material during the period in which she is set going again.

The Branch Banking Fight

The climax of the convention was reached on Wednesday morning when the fight over branch banking was staged.

No small part of the interest in the convention, and much of the large attendance at the convention, was due to the knowledge that this question would come up and that it would be definitely fought out. The recent extension of branch banking in several sections of the country, and particularly the effort of a great national bank in St. Louis to establish branches in that city, even though State institutions in Missouri are not allowed to establish branches, had led to a very intense interest. Prior to the meeting of the American Bankers' Association, action had been taken by certain of the State banking groups adverse to branch banking, notably in Missouri, Connecticut and Illinois.

The branch banking issue was not a simple one, several questions being involved. Arguments hinged first around the general question of the comparative merits of a system of individual banks such as we now have in the United States and the system under which a few great banks with branches scattered all over the country dominate the situation, which characterizes Great Britain, Canada and the Continent of Europe. The second issue related to branch banking limited to large cities, with all branches confined to the city of the head office; the third was as to whether national banks might not be permitted to establish branches in any given State on the same basis that State institutions were permitted to establish branches in that State. The fourth issue, growing out of the St. Louis episode, was as to whether national banks might not be permitted to establish banks in large cities, even though competing State institutions could not do so. The fifth issue was as to the extent to which there was danger that any legislative encouragement at all might not give impetus to the tendency to extend branch banking and constitute a further "driving in of the wedge."

The cleavage in the convention was not, as some seemed to think, between great city banks and country banks. In so far as there was group division, it was rather between national banks and State institutions. The issue from the standpoint of the national banks seemed to be primarily a desire that national banks and State banks should be treated alike in the handling of the problem, or, at all events, that national banks be not unduly discriminated against. There were a good many national bank men who voted against the resolution, which was finally passed, who were none the less opposed

in principle to any considerable extension of branch banking. The resolution finally adopted by the convention read:

Resolved, by the American Bankers' Association, That we view with alarm the establishment of branch banking in the United States and the attempt to permit and legalize branch banking; that we hereby express our disapproval of and opposition to branch banking in any form by State or national banks in our nation.

The leader of the opponents of branch banking was a veteran scholar and banker, Andrew J. Frame, Chairman of the Board of the Waukesha National Bank, Waukesha, Wis., whose speech was undoubtedly one of the high lights of the convention. It was much more than the plea of the country banker protesting against banking monopoly. It was the reasoned analysis of a scholarly man, deeply versed in the history of banking, not only in the United States but also throughout the world. Sitting immediately behind Mr. Frame as he delivered his vigorous attack against banking concentration sat Mr. McKenna, Chairman of the largest bank in the world, and a bank with branches scattered all over England. Mr. McKenna had just delivered his exceedingly able address on the problem of "Reparations and International Debts." In his introductory remarks, however, in discussing the difference between British and American banking, he had made one statement which impressed the bankers' convention and especially the country bankers quite as much as anything he had said upon his main theme. He had referred to the fact that there remain now in Great Britain only 39 banks with 9,000 branches, and of these 39 banks, 5 banks alone control nearly 6,000 of the 9,000 branches. In his person, therefore, he embodied the great fear which the individual American banker faced in connection with the extension of branch banking. The country banker had heard Mr. McKenna gladly; had been impressed by his wisdom; had given him a cordial welcome and admired and respected him; but the country banker had no disposition to allow any American banker to gain such power in the United States as that wielded by Mr. McKenna in Great Britain.

Mr. Frame's argument dealt primarily with the broad issue of individual banking versus branch banking. He maintained that the local banker, in intimate contact with local needs, served the community best. He contended that branch banking meant that the cream was skimmed from rural and suburban districts; that the head office drew funds from its branches to be employed for head office purposes. He declared that the danger of unsound banking was intensified under the branch banking system, and that, when failures came, the results were far more widespread and disastrous than any failure of an individual bank could be. He drew illustrations from the history of crises in England, pointing to several failures of great banks, with numerous branches in Eng-

land and Scotland, in the last sixty years, which, he said, had involved much greater loss to depositors than all the failures of national banks since the inauguration of national banks in the United States. Mr. Frame was evidently the hero of the majority of the convention, who gave him an ovation at the conclusion of his speech.

The main speech in defense of branch banking came from Waldo Newcomer, President of the National Exchange Bank of Baltimore. His discussion was addressed to several of the more technical problems, particularly to the equities as between State and national banks. Another defender of branch banking was F. O. Watts, President of the First National Bank of St. Louis, whose efforts to establish a few branches in that city have precipitated part of the burning interest in the problem. Mr. Watts is an old and honored member of the American Bankers' Association and has a host of friends among its membership. He is one of the ablest speakers among American bankers, and was a gallant figure as he attempted with good-humored satire to plead an unpopular cause. He rested his argument upon the additional services which a great city bank could extend to a community if it opened branches in outlying parts of the city where local bank conveniences are inadequate. Another distinguished St. Louis banker, John G. Lonsdale, President of the National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis, took part in the discussion to the extent of proposing an amendment to the resolution. Mr. Lonsdale apparently was on the side of the country banker and opposed to branch banking. He wished, however, to have national banks and State banks treated alike. His amendment to the resolution made it apply to State banks as well as to national banks, and made the resolution take the form of condemning branch banking by any American institution, State or national.

The present writer does not hesitate to avow that his sympathy and his judgment are on the side of the country banker on the main issues involved. He believes that the extension of branch banking, with the elimination of the local banker, in various foreign countries has definitely meant that less funds are available for local industries than were available when the number of local banks was larger. He believes that it is inevitable that, if a great New York bank should establish a branch in an interior town, replacing the local bank, the temptation would be to withdraw funds from employment in the local community for use by the depositors at the head office, with whose interests and needs the head office authorities were more intimately acquainted. He believes that the individual country banker has been, and is, a powerful force making for industrial progress in the United States, and also a powerful force making for political stability. He would view with great concern any development of country-wide,

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1. These matters are discussed in detail in Volume II, Nos. 1 and 4, of the Chase Economic Bulletin, issued by the Chase National Bank.

2. This analysis is elaborated in the Chase Economic Bulletin, Volume I, No. 4, called "Procedure in paying the German Indemnity."

Gathering of Bankers a Record One

By Carl H. Getz

THOSE in charge of the forty-eighth annual convention of the American Bankers' Association, held in New York last week, anticipated that, at the outside, there would be a registration of not more than 7,000. Previous to this year the largest attendance at any A. B. A. convention was 4,600, in Chicago in 1909. Advance registration figures for the last fifteen conventions were compared day by day with the advance registrations this year. This year's advance registration was below the average. Despite this the Convention management planned to take care of 7,000 persons. But, what happened? Nearly 12,000 registered. Not only was this year's convention the largest ever held in the history of the Association, but it will undoubtedly be the largest held for another twenty years when New York bankers will again play host to the bankers of America.

Why was there such an extraordinary increase in attendance?

It can be said, with truth, that New York is New York and that any convention held here attracts hundreds who would not go to some other city. Again, nearly every banker in the country comes to New York at least once a year to transact business and hundreds this year undoubtedly combined the Convention trip and their annual business trip. Times are better, too. All this contributed to increase attendance to record figures, but the chief motive which brought so many of the nation's bankers to New York was the seriousness of the problems which the bankers of America face today. They came to New York, the centre of world finance, to listen to leaders in international banking discuss the great economic problems of the day. They looked to them for guidance. From them they hoped to find some way out of some of their difficulties.

Take branch banking as an example of the sort of problem which is giving the bankers grave concern, although to the public in general it seems a topic entirely of internal economics.

There are today three general types of banking systems: First, the continental plan of a few banks with branches, and with one strong institution having note issuing power, holding the reserves and rediscounting paper for other banks, acting as fiscal agent of the Government and representing the country in its various international financial affairs. This is the type common to England, France and Germany. Secondly, there is the branch bank system as developed in Canada and Scotland, consisting of a few large banks, each possessing note issuing power, with many branches scattered throughout the country. Thirdly, in the United States, we have a banking system which consists of many independent banks, each with separate capital, individual officers and directors chosen from the leading men in the community in which the bank is located, placed at various points of vantage throughout the entire nation, and supervised through a rigid system of government examination.

In his address to the convention the Right Hon. Reginald McKenna, Chairman of the London Joint City and Midland Bank, Limited, pointed out that in the whole of Great Britain there are but thirty-nine banks.

"But with us the branch system is so highly developed that these few banks have no less than 9,650 branches, of which 6,800 belong to five banks alone," he explained.

Canada today has seventeen banks with 4,831 branches scattered throughout the country.

The branch bank system of expansion

is a centralization of money power in a few hands.

The American system is one of decentralization of money power, but with centralization and mobilization of resources available to all.

The one has been described as a system of centralization; the other a method of co-operation.

Those who favor branch banks point out the increased responsibilities and capabilities of large banks which maintain branches. They point out the economy of operation of branch banks. Finally they make much of the fact that the increased facilities of large banks make it possible to give a much more comprehensive banking service than small banks can.

Those who oppose branch banks contend that branch banks destroy the interest which each community takes in its own institutions. They take away the benefit of having banks under local control to build up local industries. They cause economic waste. It is said, too, that the greatest resources that any city can have are its human resources—its able men. In other words, an appeal is made for the local banker.

FINALLY, the opponents of branch banking describe branch banks as monopolistic.

In 1916 the American Bankers' Association went on record as opposed to branch banks. This year the attention of the Association was again focused on this perplexing question. The extremists urged that the Association repeat its opposition to branch banks and that, in addition, it ask those banks which are now conducting branch banks to close those banks or else withdraw from the Association. What the Convention did, however, was to adopt a resolution which merely strengthened the Association's opposition against branch banks. The resolution read:

Resolved, by the American Bankers' Association, that we view with alarm the establishment of branch banking in the United States and the attempt to permit and legalize branch banking; that we hereby express our disapproval of and opposition to branch banking in any form by State or national banks in our nation.

Resolved, that we regard branch banking, or the establishment of additional offices by banks, as detrimental to the best interests of the people of the United States. Branch banking is contrary to public policy, violates the basic principles of our Government, and concentrates the credits of the nation and the power of money in the hands of the few.

Such a resolution will probably have no effect upon branch banking other than further to crystallize the opposition.

Metropolitan bankers, as a group, believe in branch banking. Consolidation of capital is, in their opinion, economically sound. The country banker, the man who has to compete with a branch of a metropolitan bank, naturally opposes the branch bank.

Guy E. Bowerman, Chairman of the Federal Legislative Committee of the A. B. A., and President of the First National Bank of St. Anthony, Idaho, who was executive manager of the A. B. A. during 1920-21, in his report, summed up the attitude of the country toward branch banking. He said:

"Personally, I have two well-established convictions; the first of which is that it is supremely selfish and unworthy of us and just bordering on cowardice to deny national banks the privilege which their competitors, the State banks, enjoy; second, that just ordinary business prudence and foresight as well as our own protection in the future prompt us to direct our effort toward circumscribing branch banking to cities of one hun-

dred thousand population or more and limit them to this field.

"Again, I feel sure that the city banker, in his espousal of branch banking, does not seek to monopolize the banking business of the country but is actuated by the sincere desire more effectively to serve his community and, if we will aid or, at least, not oppose, this worthy ambition, I have sufficient confidence in the fair-mindedness of this class of bankers to believe that they will respect our wish in return and leave undisturbed the field now occupied by the smaller banks."

If it were possible to obtain it would be interesting to take a poll of the officers of the A. B. A. on the question of branch banking. Chances are that the resolution adopted by the Convention does not represent the point of view of the officers.

Walter E. Frew, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Committee of One Hundred, which entertained the out-of-town bankers, is President of the Corn Exchange Bank, which maintains fifty-one branches.

There was a time when the country banker was concerned with local problems only. Not so today. Today his sphere of interest is actually world wide. That is no exaggeration. The local manufacturer and the local farmer are affected by the conditions of international trade, and the inability of the nations of the world to buy our goods, because of the great war debts and irregular exchange, has affected the small producer. The realization of this fact is one of the reasons why so many small-town bankers came to New York to hear McKenna and Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co., discuss war debts and their cancellation or reduction.

THE convention personnel was impressed with the fact that delegates inquired whether the entertainment interfered in any way with the business sessions. The bankers were here to have as good a time as possible, but they were also here for serious business.

Advantage of the opportunity was taken to interview a large number of bankers from all parts of the country. This is what was learned. Metropolitan bankers were almost unanimous in their opinion that the allied debt must be either canceled or reduced. A large number said that they thought that the money spent by the United States previous to this country's entry into the war should be repaid but that the money spent after the United States entered the war should be canceled. The city banker seemed to have little interest in whether the Allies ought to pay their debts. He took the position that the Allies, with the possible exception of England, simply could not pay.

The country banker, especially the banker from west of Chicago and St. Louis, took the stand that the Allies should pay. They, too, recognized that the Allies probably could not pay but insisted that America should remain the creditor nation if for no other reason than that this country should possess some means to require certain nations of Europe to do certain things such as balance their budgets and increase taxation if necessary.

The thousands of country bankers who attended this year's Convention are returning to their homes with a clearer understanding of the position of the metropolitan banker who advises cancellation of the debt. There is no way of telling exactly the influence of this year's convention, but it is safe to say that steps have been taken which will actually lead to the reduction of the debt.

In talking to bankers from every State

in the Union, the writer was impressed with the confidence of the country banker in the complete ability of the United States to see a way out of the present difficulties which confront the nation. When asked whether or not the United States should participate in European affairs the banker would shake his head as if to indicate that he wasn't quite sure of the answer but then he would add that whatever the United States did would be the sane and sensible thing to do.

IT was Lincoln who spoke of "the ultimate justice of the people," and who asked if there was any "greater or equal hope in the world." That same spirit was evident at this year's convention of the bankers.

Officers of the American Bankers' Association are especially pleased with the way this year's convention was handled. They feel profoundly grateful to the New York Committee of One Hundred which handled all details and arrangements. But what they feel more pleased about is the way that the door to New York's heart was opened to the banker from out of town. Never before did New York banks throw open wide their institutions to the country banker. Out of this year's convention will come a greater interest in the association and a greater participation in the affairs of the association by the metropolitan banker.

The convention, in the months to come, will undoubtedly prove to have been a great democratizing influence. It will help to bring about a more uniform sentiment toward certain international problems.

Officers for the coming year were unanimously elected as follows:

John H. Puelicher, President; Walter W. Head, First Vice President, and William E. Knox, Second Vice President.

Mr. Puelicher is President of the Marshall & Ilsley Bank of Milwaukee, Wis., where he was born in 1869. He went into the bank in 1893 as a discount clerk after a public school education. Mr. Head was born in Adrian, Ill., in 1877, received a normal school and business school education and was a public school principal in DeKalb, Mo., before becoming cashier of a bank in that city in 1903. He is now President of the Omaha National Bank, Omaha, Neb.; President of the Omaha Safe Deposit Company and the Omaha Trust Company; Vice President of the American National Bank of St. Joseph and Vice President of the St. Joseph Life Insurance Company. Mr. Knox is President of the Bowery Savings Bank in New York. Born in Ireland in 1862, he came here as a boy and was educated in the New York public schools, afterward becoming a junior clerk in the Bowery Savings Bank in 1885.

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OCT

Consequences of the Shop Strike Taking Shape

By Benjamin Baker



NDER the accepted rules of the game the leaders of an unsuccessful strike are entitled to make any explanations of their failure, or any inflated estimates of the salvage from it, that they can "put across"; but that is no reason why the public should consent to be misled by such pronouncements as Bert Jewell's circular of last week regarding the "settlement" of the railroad shop strike. Its misstatements and evasions involve points of such importance to the public that they deserve detailed scrutiny.

First in importance—and in falsity—is the assertion that the peace on the railroads now in process of patching up is the result of a split among the executives of the roads. There was no split. The strike was essentially beaten by the united resistance of the executives to the "national settlement" which Mr. Jewell now wishes the public to believe is under way. Defeat was tacitly acknowledged by Mr. Jewell when he consented to negotiate with individual roads. It is possible he had some vague hope that he might be able to repeat the success of the coal miners in the game of "follow the leader" that the miners imposed upon the operators; but that is quite improbable. Mr. Jewell was too little hopeful of the shop strike, even before it was voted, to miss the fact that in late September it was utterly hopeless.

Moreover, the "Baltimore plan," announced as a victory for the shopmen, was in its terms a thoroughgoing admission of defeat. The three purposes of the strike were (1) cancellation of the Labor Board's wage reductions; (2) abolition of contracting out by the railroads; (3) restoration of certain working rules. Defeat on all three of these issues had been acknowledged by the unions when they consented that their men should return to work on the sole condition of preserving their seniority in their old positions. The "Baltimore agreement," as signed by the Baltimore & Ohio and by the President of the System Federation of Shopmen, explicitly accepts the reduced wage, omits the other two original issues and leaves the matter of adjusting seniority and other disputes for final action to a commission on which the railroad can have its own way if it wants it. On one important system which signed the "Baltimore plan" the company's instructions to its superintendents as to how these important passed-over matters are to be settled show that it intends to make no inconvenient concessions to the returning shopmen; and the text of its agreement with the unions shows that the latter will have to accept

Some Points in Shop Crafts' Agreement

Rates of pay to be those prescribed by the Labor Board, or others mutually agreed upon.

Foremen who went on strike to be taken back only as craft workers, not as foremen.

Foremen and regular members of wrecking crews to be exempt from strike orders.

Graded wages established. This point is perhaps the most striking abandonment of the contentions of the shop unions. As this arrangement is typical of private industries in the Eastern region and has been essentially duplicated on other Eastern roads, which fought out the strike, Section 9 of the Erie agreement is given here in full:

9. Mechanics in all shops and of the several classes shall be of three grades, A, B and C, and will be paid the following rates until Oct. 1, 1923:

GRADE A.		Cents Per Hr.	Cents Per Hr.
Machinists	77	Carmen, pass.	70
Blacksmiths	77	Carmen, freight.	63
Boilermakers	77		
Carmen, pass.	77	GRADE C.	
Carmen, freight.	72	Machinists	65
		Blacksmiths	65
GRADE B.		Boilermakers	65
Machinists	70	Electricians	65
Blacksmiths	70	Sheet metal workers	65
Boilermakers	70	Carmen, pass.	65
Electricians	70	Carmen, freight.	60
Sheet metal workers	70		

Section 10 of the Erie agreement provides that any dispute as to which grade a mechanic belongs in shall be settled finally by the regional adjustment committee. All appeals to the Labor Board are done away with.

the company's action, whatever it is. Far from being, as Mr. Jewell's circular intimates, proof of the willingness of some of the executives to negotiate a settlement on a national basis, the Baltimore plan is an explicit abandonment of every "national" feature of the shopmen's claims. The sole appearance of the national officers is in the provision for their naming half of the commission to pass on disputed matters under the plan. And as has just been pointed out, the railroad members of this commission can prevent any action by it. Early in the course of the strike the shop leaders would negotiate only on a national basis, directly with the Association of Executives; now they leave their men on each road to make such a bargain as is possible.

There is therefore no surrender by roads which signed the veritable Baltimore agreement. Their action in doing so was presumably dictated by the circumstances in each case. Many of the shorter lines simply abandoned all attempts at repair work when the strike broke; they now "settle" by restoring substantially the *status quo ante*. Some lines lie in sections of the country where there is a very small reservoir—or none—of skilled mechanical labor to draw upon in the event of a strike. The towns in which their repair work is done are mainly railroad towns, with no physical accommodations for new workers from a distance, even if the population were not also hostile to "scabs." It is the practicable thing to do for such lines to take back their old men with as little dislocation as may be, and that is what some of them have done. Others in the same territory, however, having fought the strike from the beginning, are now in position to refuse official recognition of the shop crafts; and thus, even in the Southeast, there are roads which have definitely cut loose from dealing with Mr. Jewell's unions as organizations. There has been also a large movement of striking shopmen between railroads, and in some instances settlements on the Baltimore plan would be little more than getting back the old union employees in place of the new union workers.

Mr. Jewell's statement that companies representing some 65,000 miles of lines and employing about 125,000 shopmen have settled on the basis of the Baltimore plan is probably nearly enough correct as to the numerals involved; but on

a new "Baltimore" signer is accompanied by the statement from President Felton of that road that the agreement was not the Baltimore agreement, but "one mutually satisfactory to representatives of the strikers and the management."

WHAT Mr. Jewell's announcement really means is that out of a mileage of about 234,000, roads representing 65,000 miles (under one-third) and formerly employing about one-third of the shopcraft members, have now consented to re-employ these as union men, under agreements with the unions practically *on the companies' terms*. His "eighty-three railroads" can have been counted up only by reckoning in all the subsidiary companies of the larger lines involved; by this method the Baltimore & Ohio could be made to count five railroads and the New York Central System fourteen, and so on up.

To set against Mr. Jewell's 65,000 miles which have re-employed their striking men on their own (the companies') terms, there is the very striking total of 63,786 miles in the Western region alone (48.5 per cent. of the Western region total mileage), represented by eight powerful companies, on which the company union or organization of shop workers seems sure to exclude Mr. Jewell's organizations, as such, altogether. The list is worth giving:

Road.	Miles.
Union Pacific	3,381
Santa Fe	8,862
Southern Pacific	8,310
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy	9,389
Great Northern	8,266
Northern Pacific	6,656
Illinois Central	4,799
Rock Island	8,123

Of these roads, the Union Pacific, the Southern Pacific and the C., B. & Q. have already their own company organi-

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Cash and due from banks	4,323,131.72
U. S. Government Securities	10,711,562.30
Customers' Liability a/c Acceptances & L/C	27,680,166.39
Loans, Discounts and Investments	9,475,883.20
Total	\$52,190,743.61

LIABILITIES

Subscribed Capital & Surplus	\$15,250,000.00
Capital paid in	10,250,000.00
Reserve & Undiv. Profit	868,287.17
Due Banks and Customers	11,358,063.79
Acceptances and L/C Outstanding	29,714,392.65
Total	\$52,190,743.61

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zations of shop employees, with which they have negotiated agreements on wages, working conditions and methods of dealing with disputed issues. The best information available in official sources is that all the roads of this group will soon be on the same basis of dealing directly with system organizations of their own workers. The figures for this Western group of roads are given in this connection because the position of these roads forms such a striking counter-balance to the substantially equal mileage which has consented to deal with the old shop unions. The fact has other and larger meanings, however, which will be pointed out later.

As an illustration of what "a settlement on the Baltimore plan" may mean in practice, the agreement of the shop crafts with the Erie (which is included in the list of settling roads) is illuminating. Its main points are these:

1. Returning strikers to preserve relative seniority as between themselves.
2. Rates of pay to be those prescribed by the Labor Board, or others mutually agreed upon.
3. Foremen who went on strike to be taken back only as craft workers, not as foremen.

4. Foremen and regular members of wrecking crews to be exempt from strike orders.

5. All disputes, including those now before the Labor Board, to be settled (a) by local shop conference committees, if possible, otherwise (b) finally, by a regional adjustment committee of two union and two company members. No appeal from this committee's decision.

6. Contract shops retained at three points.

7. Graded wages established. This point is perhaps the most striking abandonment of the contentions of the shop unions. As this arrangement is typical of private industries in the Eastern

region and has been essentially duplicated on other Eastern roads, which fought out the strike, Section 9 of the Erie agreement is given here in full:

Section 10 of the Erie agreement provides that any dispute as to which grade a mechanic belongs in shall be settled finally by the regional adjustment committee. *All appeals to the Labor Board are done away with.*

The documents of comparatively few railroad shop reconstructions are actually before the writer, but on the basis of those that are, and of dependable information in other forms, it is possible to get a fairly clear view of the general character of this reconstruction.

THE New England roads have long been severely hampered by union restrictions, and they have made the most of this Summer's opportunity to work their way free of them. Owing to the slack work in private mechanical plants in that section, there were many skilled mechanics available to take the places of the strikers—men of real quality, who needed comparatively brief instruction and experience to make them efficient in railroad work.

The New England roads, therefore, set about building up new, permanent forces of picked men. This they have done. They are no longer dependent on the mechanics of the shop unions. They have organized their own unions. They have refused to deal with the striking unions. New England is practically a closed field to Mr. Jewell's organizations. This course in New England is typical of the general attempt of the companies to get clear of the power the shop unions exercised to impose burdensome, uneconomic and unreasonable restrictions on the operations of railroad shops.

Further, the New England readjustment, like that embodied in the Erie agreement, marks a return to the meth-

ods which prevail in surrounding private industry. The New Haven road, for instance, not only has graded rates similar in principle to those of the Erie, but it has in addition provisions for payment on a bonus or production basis. The eight-hour day is preserved, of course, as this is necessary under the Federal laws; but aside from this, and from the features like seniority, &c., which have long been typical of railroad work, the general tendency is plainly to put railroad shop work more nearly on the same basis as similar work in outside industries. This is entirely reasonable. There is no reasonableness in allowing mechanics uneconomic privileges simply because they work in railroad shops, on railroad material. Some features of railroad custom are proper as incidents to generally continuous employment in one place over long periods of years; but, in general, there is no reason in not holding the railroad mechanic to the requirements of efficient production as closely as the mechanic in other employment. The whole purpose of the Railway Employees Department of the Federation of Labor has been to secure for railroad mechanics exceptional privileges and exemptions simply because they work for railroads. Failing the refuge of Government ownership, this purpose was bound, in time, to meet successful resistance. On that side there is nothing for the public to lament in the new order in the railroad shops.

TURNING again to Mr. Jewell's figures for mileage of "settled" roads, we may see in them (looking at them from the side opposite to Mr. Jewell's) the real and momentous meaning they hold. Allowing something for the fact that the shop readjustment has not been completed on all roads, Mr. Jewell's mileage figures really mean these things:

Two-thirds of the railroad mileage of

the country has so entrenched itself as a result of the strike that it does not have to deal with Mr. Jewell's unions as organizations.

Two-thirds of the country's mileage, by agreement with its own employees on a method of settling grievances, has made very remote, and in most cases impossible, the bringing of railroad shop disputes before the Labor Board as disputes between carriers and the national officials of the shop workers.

Of the one-third of the country's mileage represented by Mr. Jewell's settled roads, the greater part has also cut out the possibility of being brought before the Labor Board to face the national officials of the shop unions.

And all this means that the national officials of the shop crafts have very little left to represent. Their union of ambitious leaders has been severely restricted; and for this the country has good reason to be thankful.

The defeat of the shop craft leaders is in fact the self-destruction of an ambitious course so arrogant and so inconsiderate of the general rights that it over-reached itself. It is the breaking and dispersal of a wave which began to rise in 1916, when the Federation of Labor began its attempt to take in the train service brotherhoods and to secure the dictatorship of the vital service of the railroads, from which it could lay down its terms to the whole country. Adopted by the Railroad Administration and given for two years almost a free hand with the railroads, this federation movement became so self-confident that it could not endure the thought of anything but an advance to still greater control. It could not realize that the war was over and that deflation was as inevitable as time. It was not wise enough to compromise with the inevitable; and it is meeting the invariable fate of all those who so refuse.



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BUILDERS OF SUPERSTRUCTURES AS WELL AS SUBSTRUCTURES

OCT

What the Bankers' Convention Accomplished

Continued from Page 348

State-wide or even county-wide branch banking. On the other hand, he is convinced that, within limits, branch banking in large cities, where branches are limited to the city of the head office, has certain very real advantages. Our own experience with the seven branches of the Chase National Bank in New York (all of which are within a fairly short distance of the head office) makes it clear that the senior officers at the head office can really give their minds to the individual problems of the small borrowers in the branches and can work in close co-operation with the officers of the branches. How easily, however, we could do this with a much larger number of branches is not so clear. Branch banking, even though limited to single large cities, should certainly not go so far that one or two institutions largely dominate the situation, and should certainly not go so far as to interfere with the existence of a very substantial number of individual, small or moderate-sized banks. Anything approaching a monopoly of the banking situation in a large city, or anything approaching the domination of the banking situation by a few powerful institutions, would be indefensible. Sound public policy requires the maintenance of competitive banking conditions.

It is not easy to reach perfectly definite conclusions as to the equities between State and national banks in this matter, but it seems certain that national banks will be ill-advised to seek any legislation at Washington that would force branch banking into a State which did not desire it, and it is probably that national banks will be well-advised not to ask for as many privileges as competing State institutions in a given State might enjoy. The branch banking question should be settled on its own merits and not as an incident to competition between State and national banks.

Thomas B. McAdams of the Merchants' National Bank of Richmond, Va., President of the American Bankers' Association, in his Presidential address, painted on a large canvas. He exhibited the intimate interdependence of American and European conditions, and he dealt with a wide range of domestic problems. The unifying principle of his treatment of domestic problems was a protest against the encroachment of governmental authority on private initiative, or a protest against "paternalism," as he phrased it. He pointed out that Federal authority had encroached on the authority of the State and local Governments to an extent undreamed of by Hamilton, Webster or John Marshall, to say nothing of Jefferson and Calhoun. He emphasized the tendency of the Government not only to regulate business, but also actively to engage in business, and he protested against the growing tendency of special elements in the population to seek sustenance and support from the Government.

Europe and America

There appeared to be a consensus of opinion among the speakers that very substantial headway is being made in the solution of domestic problems, and that, so far as domestic problems are concerned, satisfactory business is to be expected. There was, on the other hand, a very general recognition of our dependence upon European conditions, of the fact that European conditions are not working out properly, and that our own domestic prosperity is inevitably seriously interfered with by that fact. Emphasis was laid upon this by Thomas B. Lamont, Fred I. Kent, James S. Alexander, John McHugh, Alvin W. Kreh and Thomas B. McAdams, while the impressive analysis of reparations and inter-

allied debts by Mr. McKenna also bore upon this theme.

Mr. Kent, speaking on Wednesday morning, gave a statistical résumé of the situation in Europe, and of the debt and credit relations between European Governments and the United States Government and among European Governments. In an interesting series of charts he exhibited the tremendous growth of internal debt in France, Germany and other countries, contrasting the policy of adequate taxation of the United States and Great Britain with the borrowing policy of France and Germany. He showed also the immense dependence of American industries upon European markets in a very realistic way. Mr. Kent emphasized the need of radical reforms on the Continent of Europe, and thought that the time would come when America would be able to exert influence toward the accomplishment of these reforms. He agreed with other speakers in maintaining that a substantial part of the interallied debts would have to be canceled or modified in some way. Mr. McHugh, in speaking with reference to the cancellation of the interallied debts, said:

"If any portion of the debt be canceled eventually a direct benefit may result to us, even though at first it would look as though American taxpayers were being penalized for the benefit of others. A partial cancellation would be a contribution to world stability on our part if it served the purpose of compelling an adjustment of the difficulties which now serve as a curse on Europe. Such a partial cancellation could readily be made contingent upon agreements as to the balancing of budgets, the curtailment of inflation, the reduction of armaments and the elimination of governmental waste."

The present writer has elsewhere (3) expressed his entire concurrence with this view. Cancellation of interallied debts which was not made contingent upon reforms in Europe would serve no good purpose, and indeed would do positive harm. It would create a temporary buoyancy in the markets, and especially the exchange markets, which would lead to further exports on open account to Europe, and to the growth of the floating debt of Europe to private creditors in the United States. This would cause a temporary flare up of the kind of "prosperity" we had in 1919, followed by inevitable reaction.

In general, the present writer is disposed to feel that the interallied debt problem is receiving undue attention at the present time, when viewed as an isolated problem. Some of the speeches at the convention tended to give the impression that the existence of interallied debts constituted the most serious obstacle to European revival. The fact is, however, that no payments are being made on the interallied debts and no exchange is being drawn in connection with them. Their existence doubtless has a certain depressing psychological effect, but has little practical bearing on the calculations of traders in exchange. An exception is to be found, no doubt, in the British debt to the American Government, since it is expected that some payments are soon to begin. The real disorders at present existing grow out of the irredeemable, fluctuating paper money of Continental Europe, the great and steadily growing public debts, the inability of Continental Governments to balance their expenditures by taxation, the trade jealousies and trade barriers which Continental countries have erected against one another (and the new trade barriers which we have just enacted against Europe), and the failure of Europe to attain political peace and tranquillity. The German reparations debt has produced extreme demoralization, both because of its great amount and because actual payments have been demanded, expected, and, in some measure,

forcibly collected, but the interallied debts have so far had merely a psychological effect. It would be a mistake to treat them as an isolated problem, or to feel that a settlement of the interallied debt problem removed the really serious difficulties from the present situation.

Interallied Debt

There is a considerable range of proposals for dealing with the interallied debt and a variety of reasons given for modifying or canceling these debts in whole or in part. These reasons are partly economic and partly political and sentimental. There are those who question the justice of the debts in whole or in part. Thus, Fred I. Kent, speaking a year ago, made a sharp distinction between the debts contracted for war purposes and the very considerable part of the interallied debt contracted after the armistice. The part contracted during the war he proposed to cancel. The part contracted since the armistice he recognized as legitimate commercial debt. Mr. Lamont suggests that the \$5,000,000,000 of interallied debt contracted in the period of about a year, from the time we entered the war until the time our soldiers appeared in force upon the battle front, should be canceled.

Mr. McKenna's analysis rested solely on economic considerations. He raised no questions regarding the justice of the debts, but considered solely the ability of the debtors to pay and of the creditors to receive payment. The present writer's willingness to have the debts of our Continental allies to our Government canceled, as part of a comprehensive program which would involve reforms in Europe, with resultant rehabilitation of Europe and revival of world trade, is again purely economic. Recognizing the great difficulty of collecting these debts, he would use them for what they are good for, namely, as bargaining points.

The question as to how the debts should be treated has many answers. Some would cancel them altogether. Others, as Mr. McKenna, refrain from definite proposals, but imply clearly that large-scale reduction, if not cancellation, is necessary. Alvin W. Kreh, President of the Equitable Trust Company of New York, suggests "a holiday of ten years for our Continental allies, during which the debt would be considered as non-existent. After the ten years have elapsed the question of the cancellation should be taken up again." To the present writer this suggestion looks very much like outright, permanent cancellation. He would not be in sympathy with it except as part of an adequate, comprehensive settlement. It is probable, however, that Mr. Kreh has something similar in mind. The general spirit of his address, "Keeping Faith With Europe," which was delivered before the convention on Thursday afternoon, emphasizes the contention that Europe must help herself before she can expect help from the United States.

Labor

The labor problem received prominent attention at the convention. L. F. Loree,

The labor problem received prominent attention at the convention. L. F. Loree, President of the Delaware & Hudson Railroad, after urging legal measures designed to make labor organizations sueable and to bring them under close public regulation, threw out the following interesting suggestion:

"The eight-hour day and the six-hour five-day week have never been subjected to the test of experience. What we can say with confidence is that the spread between eight and ten hours is sufficient to take up, if properly utilized, all the

fluctuation of good and bad years; to stabilize labor and insure continuity of employment; and to avert the growing demand that we again open the doors to a flood of unrestricted immigration."

Frank A. Munsey advocated a change in immigration laws, asking for a policy of selective immigration. America does not produce its own labor supply. Mr. Munsey held the educational system of the United States responsible for this, inasmuch as it divorces itself from the pick and the axe. If we are to have a sufficient supply of common labor and skilled mechanics, it will be necessary to repeal our present drastic immigration laws, based on a policy of restriction.

James S. Alexander, the distinguished President of the National Bank of Commerce in New York, manifested a distinctly sympathetic attitude toward labor, and urged upon both laborers and employers the necessity of breadth of view and tolerance. He held that further wage readjustments were necessary, but urged that it was disastrous to the community for the employers to take advantage of slack business periods to reduce wages and working conditions unduly.

Governor Henry W. Allen of Kansas delighted the convention very much by his humorous account of the labor situation in Kansas, growing out of the Kansas Industrial Relations Court. Such issues as freedom of speech versus the authority of the Industrial Relations Court, which to an outsider had seemed to be pretty vital issues, took on a less serious aspect under his genial exposition. It developed that he not only had the friendliest feeling for William Allen White, but also that he and Alexander Howat were not irreconcilable enemies, and might be perfectly capable of amicable discussions as an interlude between hostilities. It was not easy for the audience to imagine a bitter industrial war in Kansas when the Governor could treat the whole thing in this manner.

Governor Allen reiterated his well-known contention that the public interests are paramount to the interests of either labor or capital in industrial disputes.

Credits for Agricultural Speculation

One of the most interesting addresses was that of Eugene Meyer Jr., Director of the War Finance Corporation, on

One of the most interesting addresses was that of Eugene Meyer Jr., Director of the War Finance Corporation, on Monday afternoon. Mr. Meyer attributes a good part of the troubles of the farmers to inadequate credit facilities and urged various devices for giving them greater credit facilities. He proposed, for example, that paper based on farm products should be made eligible for rediscount by the Federal Reserve banks, even though it exceeded the six months' maturity which is the limit for eligible agricultural paper under existing regulations. Mr. Meyer's contention is that methods of marketing have changed, partly as a result of changes in agricultural methods and partly as a consequence of the war, and that farmers ought to be financed in the carrying of their crops, if necessary, down to the time of the next harvest. He holds that loans made to farmers and to farm organizations for the purpose of carrying their products are not loans for speculation but merely for orderly marketing. Somebody must carry crops between seasons.

Paper based upon the security of non-perishable commodities should be made eligible for rediscount for the length of time necessary to market the season's product before the next harvest," he insisted.

Various questions may be raised here.

Continued on Page 356

Germany's Ability to Pay

By Dr. R. Estcourt

THE belief is well founded that Germany can pay, if not all that is demanded, yet certainly a considerable sum. While, however, this belief is shared by business men in common with political men, the grounds on which it is based are different in the two cases. The political man bases his belief on a valuation of the possessions within the country. The basis of the business man's belief will be found in his inherent commercial instinct for recognizing a potential commercial proposition; that is to say, the income that can be obtained in the process of developing the assets into property. We are gradually coming to realize that property is essentially the capitalized value of the income that can be realized after payment of all outgoings and after making all necessary provision for renewals and effective maintenance with up to date equipment. Commercially regarded, possessions and property are two very different propositions. The business man can see that Germany with its people is a good commercial proposition, that even after being maimed for the creation of Czechoslovakia and other absurd political subdivisions, it still can be made into a going concern if properly handled. The politician and military-minded diplomatist still live in Roman times when possessions were the basis for calculating tribute, an attitude that survives only in the practice of the law of bankruptcy in relation to individuals.

Up to the present, business men have not been generally consulted and those charged with the arrangement of reparations have based their estimates of ability on valuations of the gross possessions within the boundaries of the German Empire before the war, or on a basis of recalculation of ability in terms of the supposed aggregate possessions at the present time remaining in the emasculated area of which Berlin is the ostensible capital.

A nation, an individual and a corporation can equally become bankrupt, but the method of dealing with the catastrophe is different in each case. In the case of the individual the personal motive intervenes and it will be found that a certain element of revenge enters into the business. Retribution is in mind. The offender is believed to have deceived his creditors and it is alleged to be in the public interest to put him out of business for the rest of his life. In that attitude it has become customary immediately to attach all his possessions of every description. As far back as history can take us in the knowledge of human laws one can find traces of the views that have obtained in this matter. The modifications have really been very few. The reason can probably be found in the fact of the individual having an existence terminable by death. No other consideration arises except to exploit his remaining years to the utmost for the benefit of his creditors. In old times his body was handed over to his creditors for utilization in slavery. Such modifications as have been made in the law have resulted more from humanitarian than economic considerations. Even today the earnings of bankrupt, during the period preceding his final discharge, are still subject to attachment for the benefit of his creditors. This is only an adaptation of the ancient conception of liability to slavery.

With a nation or corporation the case is different. Direct personal responsibility is difficult to locate, the difficulty increasing with the size of the undertaking. And yet there is undoubtedly some individual as responsible as if he had not acted under the cover of national or corporate life. The difference in treatment arises from the fact of the continuing existence of the nation or

corporation. In their case there is no immediate prospect of an event corresponding to death to put a termination to results. The distinction, however, is not absolute. Varying degrees of treatment can be observed in the cases of bankruptcy of nations and corporations. One end of the range quite nearly ap-

pears, although theoretically the debtor's condition closely approached that of a helpless individual, the practical fact was that the debtor was a large corporation whose affairs were closely interwoven with those of its creditors and it was not intended to combine it with any other existing undertaking, but to keep

sion was permitted to an extent that obscured the true economic issue. In the first place the nation was regarded as an offending individual instead of as a temporarily mismanaged corporation. To make this attitude more easy of adoption no effort was spared in reducing the economic strength of the aggregation presumably dealt with to an extent that would make the position more nearly approach that of an individual having nothing to attach except slavish services.

It is not yet sufficiently realized by fiscal administrators that taxes ultimately can be obtained only from accumulations of economic rent and surplus value, in other words from the income of pure property. However devious the methods adopted in the scheme of taxation, in the long run what is obtained by way of taxation must come out of that income the capitalized value of which constitutes property per se. Whenever State revenue is obtained otherwise, its incidence is equivalent to the antiquated process of killing the bees in a hive in order to obtain their honey. The destruction or weakening of the bees must militate against further production of honey, and in that way diminish the future income of the proprietor. Similarly, whatever is taken from capital or labor which diminishes their capacity for continuous and increased production must operate to diminish the income of property. It is, therefore, to the interest of property owners above all others to see that all taxes are provided for out of the income of property at that stage when future production will be least affected. The ultimate results of the efforts of the bees inure to the property owners and it is, therefore, worth while to suffer even a temporary reduction or even cessation of income if, in the long run, their position will thereby be improved. In the analogy of Germany the creditor nations occupy the position of the property owners, and the run will be very long. If what is euphemistically regarded as the "proper contribution" of capital and labor to the revenue of the State be taken from their reward in the form of a deduction which in the least degree reduces their efficiency, then their sacrifice is unavoidably passed on with added interest as a future charge against the income of property.

Federal Budget of the German Republic

	Marks
From taxes and duties.....	110,000,000,000
From sundry administrative receipts.....	5,500,000,000
	<hr/>
Total	115,500,000,000
 Disbursements:	
Interest on debt.....	29,000,000,000
Pensions and support of dependents of soldiers killed in the war.....	16,000,000,000
Payments to States as substitute for large taxes taken from them.....	22,000,000,000
Current expenditure of all branches of administration.....	32,000,000,000
Balance	16,500,000,000
	<hr/>
Total	115,500,000,000

proaches the treatment meted out to individuals. In such cases the same instincts are aroused as in the case of an individual bankruptcy. There is a desire for revenge and retribution, for an appropriation of the greatest amount possible of the possessions and of the subsequent services of the individuals comprised in the nation or corporation, especially the former. The restraints on this operation are what are known as political, arguments of representatives backed by concealed but known force. A strong nation or corporation can ride the high horse and almost dictate terms to its creditors. One could scarcely imagine the Steel Trust pleading humbly. Again, a weak corporation or nation may contrive to occupy a strategic position from which it can hint at interference of stronger nations on its behalf. An insolvent bank entrenched in very advantageous territory can play with its creditors through the knowledge that its position is desirable for annexation on advantageous terms by more than one powerful neighbor. Thus the treatment of an insolvent nation or corporation by its creditors depends greatly on its concealed strength, whether actual or strategic. A strategic position is closely allied to one of blackmail, within the law.

IT is essential to have these matters in mind to arrive at correct deductions in the case of Germany and accurately to understand why those charged with fixing the amount of the reparations and the methods of payment fell into errors which are leading to results that daily become more comprehensible. In the first place, at the date of the armistice, Germany occupied no strategic position and was practically so weak as to approach the capability of being treated on the lines of an individual debtor. To make this doubly certain her territory and population were trimmed and her most valuable natural resources handed over to petted groups likely to be useful to the victors in possible subsequent contingencies. Under the régime of the Roman Empire, on which so much modern practice is founded, this procedure would have been quite consistent as a preparatory step to complete incorporation into the empire. But no such sequence was in mind. As a consequence, the results that have ensued have been just what might have been expected from applying second century practice to twentieth century conditions. A diplomat always has one foot in the past, often too far in the past. He regulates his conduct by ancient precedent. A business man moves with the times. This was peculiarly a case for business treatment, it going for the benefit of its creditors.

This has been too tardily realized. Hence the trouble. To locate our position a brief digression is necessary.

In every economic organization there exist three contributaries to results. Possessions, capital and labor. The possessions are visible and can be appropriated immediately. The capital and labor are not so easy of attachment under modern conditions. An individual's capital and labor are in his body and brain and the tools of his trade. These he must apply to raw material. To produce any worthwhile results his body and mind must be kept efficient and active in the use of the tools of his occupation. Only the net results of his efforts can be localized sufficiently for attachment and this net result may indeed be very small. The quantity of capital and labor employed may be very large in proportion to the surplus produced, but few believe that this is the case with Germany. That it is believed not to be the case is the underlying reason for the faith of business men as to the value of the undertaking as a business proposition. But to realize that faith it must be treated as a business proposition. In their ultimate analysis the relations of debtor and creditor are purely economic and the best results for both parties can be obtained only by the complete elimination of passion. This is not an easily attainable attitude, because in the case of individuals passion is rarely suppressed, and in the case of nations it is directly encouraged by the proceedings that usually precede the bankruptcy. What has happened in the case of Germany in obtaining the order of Court is that pas-

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tributing to the abnormal demands of the army. Obviously this could be done only by the temporary measure of encroaching on the reward of capital and labor, diminishing the efficiency of the one and starving the other. Under such circumstances it should have been apparent that the output prior to the war could form no basis of what was immediately possible after the war. Capital and labor had to be reconditioned as a prime requirement if the country was to be preserved as a going concern.

An examination of the Federal budget of the emasculated German Empire, now known as the German Republic, yields the figures shown on previous page.

The current expenditure is only 52 per cent. of what was expended in 1913. The balance of 16,500,000,000 marks is carried to the account for carrying out the peace treaty. That account calls for 226,500,000,000 marks, or more than double the total expenditure on all other accounts. To meet the difference it is necessary to obtain 210,000,000,000 marks by other means. The payments on account of the peace treaty have to be met in foreign currencies. In words for which suitable comment is difficult to find the Finance Minister remarks that "the only possible way left is for Germany to purchase the foreign currencies abroad. The payment medium of the Reich is once more the paper mark." The due interpretation of these words is that an increasing volume of paper marks is to be sold in the United States of America, for other markets are about exhausted.

In one aspect of the case the issue of unsecured paper money is a form of taxation. The issuing Government adroitly transfers to itself a proportionate amount of the value of the notes in the hands of existing holders. These holders are in fact taxed, practically from hour to hour as the printing press emits its output, to the extent of the proportion that the new issue bears to the issues already afloat. Assume that there are in circulation 10,000,000,000 marks in paper currency and the Government issues another 5,000,000,000, then the total currency according to the Quantity Theory will be worth only two-thirds of its face value. In the process the Government has transferred to itself one-third of the face value of what had already been issued. The holders of those notes unwittingly have been taxed to that extent. Each subsequent issue adulterates the total similarly. The operation is that of accommodation bills of exchange, the loss on which is diffused over the whole community in proportion to the currency each member holds. The difference is that in the case of an individual or corporation the issue is soon checked by the bankers, whereas in the case of a Government there exists no power to stop the issue. The maxim that the King can do no wrong applies equally to any Government.

Each subsequent issue of uncovered notes adulterates the total still further. Up to a certain point the holders of the notes hoard them in the hope of a rise in value. The notes are regarded as savings for which they have indeed been substituted. Presently the public becomes wise to the situation and commences to sell the notes. The result is that the market is flooded with a stock of currency which for all practical purposes previously had been pooled. The effect of this unloading is that the yield to the Government ceases to be pro rata and the value of the mark falls disproportionately, as illustrated by the facts of the case. When the issue of paper marks amounted to 81,000,000,000 their valuation was only one-ninetieth of the interest on Liberty bonds, which should valuation was one-seventeenth of the same total in gold marks, but when the issue amounted to 178,000,000,000 the valuation was only one-ninetieth of the same total in gold marks. In other words, while the issue doubled the value fell to one-fifth.

The case of Russia comes to mind. The fictitious issue is greater there, but its incidence is entirely different. It simply affects the Russian people and is

capable of being righted internally. In the case, however, of the other European States engaged in this pastime, and especially of those countries paying indemnities, the matter is of urgent external concern. Russia is engaged in merely debasing her currency, the other countries are engaged in the commercial transaction of selling bogus notes in foreign countries, which is the commercial interpretation of "purchasing foreign currencies abroad" to provide for the payment of indemnities. The question is, Will the people of these United States submit to further taxation to provide the money for payment of indemnities by Germany? Certainly it is voluntary taxation, but it is actually just as much taxation for the use of Europe, the use of those who receive the indemnities, as is taxation for the payment of the interest on Liberty bonds, which should properly be met by European nations. The money cannot by any means ultimately come from any other source than the economic rent and surplus value of this country, the income of American property. We can calculate the amount of visible taxation payable on behalf of Europe, but the invisible taxation cannot be so accurately ascertained. None the less the invisible taxation is an indisputable fact. So soon as we decline to pay it, the bankruptcy of Germany will be fully recognized by all the world. That does not, however, signify that Germany cannot again become solvent, but it does mean that, for the time being, it is absolutely essential to relax the pressure that is driving the German State to what would be a crime in an individual. It means that in the interests of the property owners of the whole world Germany must be assisted to become once more a going concern and to that end treated as a corporation and not as an individual.

IN addition to the German revenue required according to the particulars already enumerated, 20,000,000,000 marks are to be obtained by means of internal loans, suggested "forced" loans. This large sum is required to provide for the extraordinary expenditure on the railway and telegraph systems. It is worth while considering how these items arise. After the armistice eight million soldiers had to be disbanded while, at the same moment, hundreds of thousands lost their employment through the cessation of government orders for supplies. To prevent a general revolutionary movement opportunities of work had to be created. The telegraph and railroad services were, therefore, wilfully flooded with superfluous workers who had to be paid for duties that would have been dispensed with under ordinary conditions. This had the incidental effect of keeping them under government control. Under normal conditions these undertakings have always been very profitable to the government. Recent visitors to Europe have hastily gathered the idea that these State undertakings do not pay, overlooking the existing circumstances. The finance minister believes that the transference of the armed forces to civil employment has by this means been successfully accomplished, and that internal conditions have been consolidated in a way to avert the danger of revolution "up to the present." Obviously the reticence underlying these last words is bound up with the assumption that another \$210,000,000,000 is to be obtained by the sale of paper marks. If, however, this money should not be obtained the position would be serious. Much depends on the willingness of the American taxpayers.

The German taxpayer appears to be carrying about all the traffic will bear for the moment. He is paying import and export duties, taxes on almost every variety of commercial transaction, income tax, corporation taxes on dividends and interest, tax on increment of capital, inheritance tax, taxes on excess profits and direct levies on capital, land and house taxes and taxes on motor vehicles. These are all taken by the Fed-

eral government. The local administrations exert their ingenuity in taxing what remains. In spite of the large number of untrained officials employed the total cost of collection amounts to only 4 per cent.

WHETHER superhuman efforts being made succeed in re-establishing this rump of a nation into a going concern remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the position is that of a corporation denuded of much of its plant, of most of its stock of raw material, almost without credit, yet striving to avoid openly declared bankruptcy. The existence of Czechoslovakia as an independent sovereignty explains much of the difficulty. To understand this we should picture a jerry-mandered "nationality" cut out of the United States extending from Detroit to Delaware with northern and southern boundaries twisted in such a way as to take in all that is valuable in coal and iron. With a ring of custom houses surrounding the favored locality and the privilege of supplying on its own terms all the rest of the States its financial administration would have to be indeed incompetent if some sort of decent showing could not be made. To congratulate its government on the progress of such a State compared with aggregations of the denuded localities surrounding it would provoke ridicule among business men. Yet this is what is taking place in Europe. The idea in setting up Czechoslovakia was to establish a petted group that could be utilized as an armed camp available for the emergencies of those responsible for the invention. It is now being recognized that the interests of those entitled to indemnities are identical with the interests of the property owners of the debtor countries and that by thus interfering with the production of economic rent and surplus value in the debtor countries the creditors are incapacitating the debtors from providing the fund out of which alone the reparations can be paid. Reparations, like taxes, can come out of only the same fund that provides property income. The creditor countries have adopted a position which makes their interests identical with those of the property owners of the debtor countries, by constituting themselves receivers for that property income. Their one aim, therefore, should be to make immediately possible the creation, or re-creation of that income to the fullest extent. So far they have done everything to hinder that result. This is no plea on behalf of the debtor countries. It is purely an appeal to self-interest.

In dealing with Germany and Austria the economic knowledge displayed was altogether out of date. If it was desired to treat those areas on the plane of an individual bankruptcy the whole territory should have been incorporated in that of the victors on the Roman plan. There was a time when the tribes on both sides of the Rhine were one nation. To make them so again would have involved no greater demand on ancient

precedent than the demand involved in the course adopted. The alternative was to treat the conquered territories as a corporation on corporation lines. For that purpose it is essential before all things to make possible the turning of their possessions into property in order to provide the income for payment of the indemnities. Every act depriving them of possessions militated against this result. It was equivalent to selling off the raw material in a factory and then expecting the factory to function. Ample raw material must be available. The next condition is procuring maximum efficiency in the workers and in the capital employed. The necessary surplus must inevitably result. It will not be forthcoming otherwise. It is economically impossible for any lengthened period to obtain indemnities or any sort of taxation from the abstinence of laborers, from the appropriation of capital or from the attachment of raw material. It is only the resulting property income that can be ultimately attached. To make this clear let it be understood that such a physical entity as a railway is not property. It is an aggregation of capital, labor and raw material. The property consists in the capitalized valuation of the right to appropriate the surplus developed in the working of the undertaking. Thus the property can be appropriated, but not the physical undertaking. What a railway shareholder buys is a share in the net income, never a share in the physical assets until those physical assets cease to constitute a going concern and are realized as junk. What the claimants to German indemnities should have aimed at was the attachment of property in this sense. They would then have obtained the capitalized value of the income resulting from the surplus values and economic rents of the country. The whole of this income could not have been appropriated by the creditors for the prudential reason that they could not, or did not intend to, substitute the Allies as the actual registered property holders of Germany. The Allies, however, could have established the property holders of Germany in such a position as to be able to bear taxation sufficient to defray reasonable demands. Those demands should have been graded to increase as the income increased which, under such conditions, it certainly would rapidly have done. The reasonableness of the demands can be properly estimated only from the amount of the property income, not on any account from a valuation of possessions. In denuding the State of raw material and capital and in reducing the efficiency of its workers the basis of property within the State has been crippled and the true interests of the creditors seriously interfered with. At the present moment a fictitious prosperity is observable but it results from quasi property holders deriving income from the privations of their fellow citizens, the most ruinous proceeding known to history. It is diametrically opposed to the true interests of creditors.

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What the Bankers' Convention Accomplished

Continued from Page 353

The carrying of commodities which are ready for the market is speculation, whether done by a farmer or a "speculator." The speculative carrying of products over from seasons of abundance to seasons of scarcity is one of the most legitimate and necessary of economic services, but, by proving it to be legitimate and necessary, we do not take away its speculative character. It is speculative because it involves the risk of changes in prices. The fact that *somebody* must bear these risks does not prove that the farmer is the one best qualified to bear them. The man who can most safely bear speculative risks is the man who makes it his main business to study markets, to read and interpret international news; who knows the technique of buying and selling; who has contact with special sources of information, &c. These are not qualifications which farmers are most likely to have.

The writer is particularly out of sympathy with the idea that the Federal Reserve banks should be expected to carry long-dated loans for the purpose of financing inexpert speculation. Agriculture already enjoys a very great preference at the Federal Reserve banks. Commercial paper, in order to be eligible for rediscount, must have a maturity of not more than three months. Agricultural paper may run for six months, the theory being that the production season for agricultural commodities is a long one and that the farmer thus needs longer credit than merchants do, or than manufacturers do, in connection with their "work in process." If, however, in addition to this longer credit for productive purposes the farmer is to have additional still longer credit for speculative purposes, there would be grave danger that the Federal Reserve banks in agricultural sections would find their liquidity very much impaired, and that they

would become parasites, from the standpoint of liquidity, on the other Federal Reserve banks.

Strongly opposed to Mr. Meyer's view was the view of the Economic Policy Commission, which was read by M. A. Taylor, Chairman, to the convention on Thursday morning. The report stated that the commission believes in the "correctness of the principles of those who have contended that the demoralization in prices of farm products was due not so much to a lack of credit as to a lack of markets. Assuming that this contention is measurably correct, the commission would oppose the hasty enactment of any ill-advised credit schemes, which, while possibly resulting in a temporary artificial stimulation of agricultural prices, would in the end react seriously on the entire industry." With this view the present writer is in hearty accord.

The ablest discussion of this whole matter known to the present writer is a memorandum by Dr. Jesse E. Pope, "Can the Farmer Realize Higher Prices for His Crops by Holding Them?" published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics of August, 1916. The article is a remarkably able discussion of principle, buttressed by elaborate statistical data and by Dr. Pope's well-known intimate first-hand knowledge of agricultural and credit problems. The statistical tables cover the ten years from 1903 to 1913. Regarding wheat, Dr. Pope says: "It is seen that during four of the ten years there was no month in which the farmer could have sold at a profit from holding, but that in each month during these years he would have sustained a loss of from 9 to 42 cents per bushel; also that during the remaining six years there were only from two to six months in which he could have sold at a profit, varying from 1 to 19 cents, from holding. During all the 110

months of the ten years there were only twenty-three months in which he could have sold at a profit from holding. The figures for the ten-year average show no gain in any month from the holding, and show losses ranging from 5 to 14 cents. It is to be remembered, moreover, that if we assume that the farmer will take advantage of the highest price each year, we assume him, unlike the average speculator, to be omniscient." His investigations also cover oats, corn and cotton. Dr. Pope refers to unpublished studies by Dr. H. W. Gilbertson of the Department of Agriculture, who has reached the conclusion that it will not pay the farmer, one year with another, to hold his potatoes, his hay or his apples.

It is possible, of course, that conditions have so changed since Dr. Pope's investigations that different conclusions might be reached, but sweeping, off-hand generalizations will hardly be convincing to those accustomed to more minute, technical studies of actual market operations, or to those convinced of the essential soundness of the fundamental principles of economics relating to competitive markets.

The Tariff Throughout the convention apprehension regarding the effect of our tariff legislation manifested itself. Alvin W. Kreh laid heavy emphasis upon this point, saying: "The question uppermost in my mind is, How long is impoverished Europe going to continue to take our goods, keeping in mind, besides, that our impoverished foreign customers will practically be forbidden the approach of the American market by the erection of our tariff wall?" Mr. Lamont said: "The tariff measure is of a somewhat different order. We shall be fortunate,

indeed, if we do not find that, in practice, it protects a lot of industries that do not require protection and cuts off from our farmers and manufacturers a lot of foreign markets that are ready to buy our commodities. Many of our people still fail to realize that the word trade means, in the final analysis, an exchange of goods or services. Many of us still cling to the idea that international trade, as the term applies to America, means that we can sell freely to all the markets of the world and in turn buy from them little or nothing. This theory, which seems to be the basis of much of our tariff legislation, will, if pursued, surely wreck a big part of our foreign trade. If there is any one motto which American producers and legislators should learn by heart, it is that oft-repeated one of the British merchants, who, over a century ago, declared that 'He who will not buy, neither shall he sell.' These passages are representative of the attitude of every speaker who discussed the matter.

There appears to have been no voice raised at the convention in defense of our recent tariff legislation. Grave apprehensions regarding the effects of the tariff legislation were expressed in the report of the Economic Policy Commission, and the formal sanction of the convention was given to these views in the following resolution: "There is no possibility of a healthy and normal situation in this country until the nations with whom we trade are able to pay us for what they import. As this can be done in the main only by the means of exports to us, we trust that the President will not hesitate to make use of the power granted him by the new tariff law to make such adjustments in the schedules as may be necessary from time to time for a restoration of our international commerce."

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The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

THERE was a distinct improvement in sentiment throughout business and banking circles last week, due largely to a better tone in foreign affairs. At the close of the preceding week it had been generally believed that only some slight indiscretion by the Turkish troops at Asia Minor might bring about a world conflict. It is probably incorrect to say that people thought that this would definitely come to pass, but at least they were fearful, particularly since the state of Central Europe is most uncertain and subject to upheaval because of the limited recovery which has taken place since the close of the war. The undertaking of negotiations between the Turkish and English representatives was, therefore, an omen of favorable portent, the effect of which was not lost sight of in the markets of this country.

That the situation is still tense and that it still requires the utmost exercise of keen diplomatic judgment is apparent. The Greeks look auspicious upon the loss of Thrace, and the close of last week were in a somewhat belligerent mood. However, the trend of events was toward a working out of the difficulties through diplomatic channels rather than by the means afforded through resort to arms, and therefore some sense of relief was felt in this country, and the course of events here followed in accordance with that which had been developing for some eight months. Prices rose in various security markets, and cotton, which had been under pressure, responded to the better European outlook. But even though the developments were reflected in definite price changes there was probably an even greater indefinable reaction in that intangible quality called sentiment.

While an upturn in prices is to a large extent a reflection of improved sentiment, still there can be in business circles a distinctly improved feeling that finds no actual position in market affairs. It was to be noticed last week that in contradistinction to the preceding week, business men were once again talking more hopefully; that they were displaying a greater feeling of security as to future commitments, and on the whole, that the entire status had changed. The fact that sentiment generally was improving was an underlying factor of the first order. There was less disposition to discuss the car shortage, and there was optimism that this would show a gradually diminishing effect upon business. Likewise there was satisfaction to be derived from the fact that several of the leading railroads already had eliminated freight embargoes, or were preparing to do so.

It must be remembered that the underlying situation in this country was by no means bad, that the business recovery was taking place along normal channels of improvement, and that the outlook was considered decidedly optimistic when the war scare in Europe developed. Therefore, it was not strange, with the amelioration to some extent of the difficulties in Asia Minor, that the progress of events here should once again take its course characterized by the same degree of cheerfulness that had previously been displayed on the part of leaders in various lines of industry and finance.

Word from different sections of the country in the last several days has been to the effect that production was once again being speeded up, and certainly there is every reason for the expansion to progress still further, since demand is high and there is no stock of goods on hand in most lines. To satisfy this demand the only recourse then is increased operations, and these can be undertaken more confidently even though there is still a handicap in the fact of a car shortage. It seems, however, that in so far as industry has been handicapped by embargoes on certain products, so that there might be a preferential right on fuel, a definite change is coming to pass. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad last week announced that it had canceled all embargoes, and in a statement to shippers along its lines said that it was in a position to handle traffic in a manner that would be on a par with normal.

Probably this condition does not exist on all roads for the reason that fuel supplies are in greater need in certain sections of the country than others, and in those particular sections where fuel is needed every endeavor has to be made to rush supplies there before the cold weather sets in and hampers delivery. This is particularly true of the Northwest. On the other hand, the fact that some roads which did establish embargoes have been able to remove them shows that progress is being made in tiding over the exigencies of the fuel shortage, and that before many weeks have passed it may be confidently expected that a decided betterment will have taken place.

It is interesting to note, in this matter of the car shortage, that loadings of revenue freight are steadily increasing. Carloading figures are perhaps one of the best indices to actual manufacturing conditions, and while due allowance should be made for the fact of the backing up of products several weeks ago as the result of inability to obtain cars, it is still worthy of note that the loadings for the week ended Sept. 23 reached 973,251 cars, the largest of any week since Oct. 29, 1920. Furthermore, this is approximately 96 per cent. as compared with the high point of loadings for all time, which was recorded on Oct. 15, 1920. The total for the week ended Sept. 23 was an increase of 27,372 cars over the previous week, and when compared with the corresponding week of 1921, it will be found that the loadings of this year gained 99,636 cars, an increase of 11% per cent. Loadings of merchandise and miscellaneous freight for the week ended Sept. 23 increased 11,202 cars over the preceding week, the total under this classification reaching 379,009 cars. There was an increase also in the loadings of grain and grain products, and likewise, livestock loadings increased. In fact, the only commodity which showed a decrease as compared with the previous week was ore, and it would be natural to expect such a decrease at this time due to the slowing up of operations at the mines in anticipation of the shutting down of lake traffic.

In connection with a car shortage attention may well be directed to the situation as to motive power on the railroads. There has been a fear that there would not be sufficient locomotives, or rather, sufficient power, to care for the heavy demands of the occasion, and, of course, a lack of motive power would be even more serious than a shortage in cars, for it would accentuate the former to a greater degree through a tying up of traffic at terminal points, and bring about a congestion which might react seriously upon the business of the country. Apparently there

is, so far as the Bureau of Railroad Economics is concerned, no difficulty to be feared in this direction. From this source it is learned that the capacity of equipment in this line has been gaining steadily during the last six years, and that the number of locomotives has increased during that period by about 5.9 per cent. The more significant fact relates to tractive power, and in this particular there has been an increase of 10.9 per cent. per locomotive, and the aggregate tractive power has increased 17.4 per cent. Likewise, the Bureau of Economics holds that while the number of freight cars has increased only 2.8 per cent., the average capacity per car has increased 3.9 per cent. and the aggregate capacity 6.8 per cent. The number of locomotives in service on Class I

are used simply as a means of boosting prices still higher, of inviting speculation and unhealthy competition. Looking at it from this angle, we cannot consider that we are in other than a progressive initial step in business recovery and far removed from a period of inflation, for which the corrective measures will no doubt be supplied long before the danger mark is reached.

But aside from the question of inflation, it must be recognized that the course of commodity prices is upward and this upward trend is not result of speculation. In the case of Bradstreet's index number as of Oct. 1, there was an advance of 3.5 per cent. as compared with Sept. 1, with practically every group of commodities participating in the upturn. It was particularly noteworthy

the course of prices. If there is a shortage of wide proportions then the present price appears to be one that is inadequate, and it may be that ultimately we will see the 30-cent cotton which was predicted in the early part of the season.

There is this to be considered, too, that the quality of the staple does not measure up to that which would be called high. In many sections it is short rather than long, and there is also some heavy deterioration in other respects. The Government's crop estimate of 10,135,000 bales, compares with more than 12,000,000 bales in 1920, and with 6,537,000 bales in 1921. However, the figure submitted by the Government in October, 1921, proved to be a most erroneous estimate of the crop, for the actual harvest amounted to 8,039,073 bales. Since 1915, with only two exceptions, the actual harvest figures have been in excess of the October estimate, and it may be that the same will be true this year, and that the harvest will approximate somewhere in the neighborhood of 11,000,000 bales. Certainly it is to be presumed that the estimate of this year, in the light of such an error as was made a year ago, will more nearly measure actual conditions than did the estimate of 1921. It has been noticeable, so far as the price of cotton is concerned, that the trade has been buying heavily on all recessions.

In the security markets last week there was a high degree of buoyancy. Stock market prices rose sharply throughout the early days of the week, and there was no reaction until Friday, when prices opened off, but rallied later. This upturn in securities was built upon the better character of the European news, and likewise, the upturn in the bond market was a reflection of this.

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railroads, for which tractive power was computed, totaled 60,900 in 1916 and 64,565 in 1921. Freight cars on Dec. 31, 1916, totaled 2,253,111, and on Dec. 31, 1921, the total was 2,315,700. Thus it will be seen that the tractive power has increased at a higher ratio than the increase in cars, and this eliminates at least the untoward condition which would be created by an excess of cars as related to motive power. The fact remains, however, that while the railroads are doing their best to handle all the business which is offered, there is not a high point of efficiency in moving products with relation to the demand for freight space.

Generally speaking, it might be said that the Eastern roads are in a position to supply about 50 per cent. of the proposed orders for box cars, and on the Western roads the range runs from 25 to 70 per cent. It is in the Central West that the chief shortage of cars exists and where nearly all of the roads have fewer cars than they actually own. In one or two sections, notably the Southwest, a surplus of cars has been reported, but, needless to say, under the circumstances no surplus will exist in any section for any long period.

In connection with the movement of freight and the car shortage, the subject of supply and demand, so far as goods are concerned, cannot be ignored. Unemployment is practically a thing of the past, except, perhaps, in some isolated instances, and there is no doubt that the purchasing power of the country has been greatly increased. The farmer and the cotton planter will once again be in the market with funds to supply their needs, and purchasing all along the line may be expected to increase. While the period of unemployment was in effect there was a distinct curtailment in the purchasing power of the country. Wages were falling and while prices were dropping, as the result of the process of deflation, there was no heavy demand for goods in the recessions. As a matter of fact, a heavy backlog in the way of demand was built up by the denial of purchasing, either through caution or the lack of funds which existed during the period of readjustment. Gradually this demand has been reasserting itself, and with the sight of rising prices in various commodities and forecasts as to higher prices to come, there has been a rejuvenation of buying in all quarters of the country which has swept business along to constantly higher operations.

Here and there reports are coming to hand of wage increases, and these, too, add to purchasing power, so that the outlook for a busy and prosperous winter is ahead. Business has been making steadily increasing demands upon the money market, although in the aggregate they have not been large as yet, and this expansion can be considered only in the light of normal "improvement." It bears in no way a relationship to inflation, although this word has been mentioned from time to time in the last two of three weeks as one of the dangers which was again developing in our business and financial structure. There is no sign of inflation, for inflation comes only at a time when there has been an expansion that is carried beyond the line of normal, and this line of normal cannot be held as developing until after production has reached the point of capacity and when further demands for capital investment

that in this compilation one of the chief factors in the advance was the rise in production, from which it may be inferred that living costs are once again mounting, and this would be a fundamental cause for a further advance in wages. For the first half of the year the Department of Labor's index number as to cost of living shows a steady decline. On Dec. 31, 1921, it stood at 174.3, in March of this year at 166.9 and in June at 166.6. These figures represent a sharp drop from the peak of June, 1920, when the figure stood at 216.6. It is to be noticed, however, that this decline is slowing up and from now on it may be expected that if the trend of commodity prices is upward the cost-of-living figure will advance.

No doubt some persons have been expecting to see commodity prices go still lower, for the reason that they are still decidedly high as compared with the 1913 level, which is the basis for all recent indices. It is not too much to say that probably the 1913 level of prices will never again be reached, at least it is certain that the 1913 level will not be reached for a number of years. Looking at the course of commodity prices over the long swing, it will be found that the line has been steadily ascending; that every sharp upturn, while it has been followed by a reaction, has been succeeded by a further advance, and that even though a previous low level may have been touched it did not long remain as a standard.

This is the situation in taking a broad view over a great many years. There are few who would say that the level of 1900 would ever again be recorded. There was a time when dollar wheat was considered as something approximately the unbelievable, and it was a price around which there ranged some of the glamor of the super-attainment: It was something about which stories were written in the press and the farmer of the Northwest thought that dollar wheat was the acme of his dream, but dollar wheat is a thing of the past so far as potential possibilities for price advances are concerned. Wheat has soared far beyond the dollar level, and now that figure is named in some cases as being ruinous to the farmer of the Northwest. This change in the course of commodity prices has been brought about in conjunction with the changes in the standard of living, with increased wages and the necessary increase in the cost-of-living products and materials.

So far as present conditions are concerned, a rise in commodities was to have been expected if for no other reason than as a natural rebound, following the sharp drop which took place in the readjustment period.

The cotton crop, in the estimate of the Department of Agriculture, last week showed a further decrease of 440,000 bales below the estimate of a month ago. On the present estimate of 50, the crop will amount to 40,135,000 bales, which, on the face of it would mean a shortage of some 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 bales. This, of course, is on the basis of normal consumption, and it remains to be seen what the actual demands for cotton may be. The purchasing power of Europe is not at high tide by any means and possibly curtailment in our export of cotton will be the important factor in determining

IN the week ending Sept. 16, the revenue receipts of the British Government were £12,500,000, while the expenditures were £9,500,000. As compared with the corresponding week for the year 1921, these figures show a decrease on both sides of the budget ledger. The revenues in the same period of 1921 were £20,000,000, while the expenditures were £12,000,000. Of the revenues this year, £2,000,000 were yielded by Treasury bills, while £7,000,000 were obtained by the sale of Savings certificates.

These figures, given by The London Saturday Review (Sept. 23), indicate that national finance in Great Britain is fairly satisfactory. But the country's great difficulty, unemployment, still continues. Commenting on the situation in this regard, the Saturday Review says:

At the end of August the number of workers on the "live" register of the Labor Exchange was 1,378,000. This figure is not truly indicative of the total number of unemployed. It does not include workers whose benefits have lapsed; the unfortunate who are not eligible; the sufferers of disqualification; the proud who will have nothing to do with the Exchange, until starving; and the numerous men and women who, out of a regular job, scrape a living together by desperate expedients. Still, the "live" figures are bad enough.

However, by comparison with last year and with the apex of unemployment reached in the coal dispute, these "live" figures of the Labor Exchange show something of an improvement. But at the same time,

At the end of December, 1920, the number of full-time unemployed was 757,000, and a year and eight months later the total is 621,000 greater. The decreased unemployment experienced within the last twelve months is probably the result of recovery from the coal dispute and a general process of industrial readjustment which has taken place.

In her foreign trade policies, Great Britain is still considerably perturbed by the possibility of "dumping" from Germany. In conformity with the numerous anti-dumping measures recently adopted by Great Britain, all British importers are now required to have a certificate of origin for goods which they bring in from any part of Europe. These certificates are issued by the British Consulates abroad, and a charge of 2s. 6d. is made for each certificate. It happens, however, that the British goods, exported from London, for which certificates of origin are required by the country of their destination, are supplied with such certificates for only 2s. 6d. The London Chamber of Commerce has taken up the matter of this difference of charges, while, as The Saturday Review puts it, "there is very great indignation amongst merchants at what is considered to be an exorbitant charge made by the Consulates abroad."

Certificates of a special character are required by the Canadian customs authorities to regulate the problems connected with currency exchange in the import situation. These customs requirements, as described by the British Board of Trade Journal (Aug. 31), are as follows:

There shall be attached to invoices of goods imported into the Dominion from countries with appreciated or depreciated currencies, a certificate of a Consul or Canadian Trade Commissioner resident in such countries or a certificate of a bank, showing the extent of such appreciation or depreciation, or the true value of the currency in which the invoice is made out as compared with the standard dollar of Canada.


Under recently issued amended regulations, these requirements do not apply to Great Britain.

The Canadian Department of the Interior has recently given, in its publication, *Natural Resources*, a very interesting study of Canada's commercial and industrial development in the two decades of the present century. The following tables, showing Canada's exports and imports for the fiscal year at the beginning and at the end of the twenty-year period, present a graphic story of the situation and of its more important factors.

The increase in the value of the total export and import-trade of Canada, as indicated in the above tables, is due, to some extent, to the general inflation of prices that exists all over the world today. But it is calculated that, even when proper compensation for this is made, the actual increase in the volume of Canada's foreign trade in the two decades under discussion has been fully 100 per cent.

Continued on Page 368

Curve of the Food Cost of Living



An index number is a means of showing fluctuations in the average price of a group of commodities. The Annalist Index Number shows the fluctuations in the average wholesale price of twenty-five food commodities selected and arranged to represent a theoretical family's food budget.

Financial Transactions

BAROMETRICS

The State of Credit

	Last Week	Fams Week	Year	Same Period
Sales of stock, shares	5,860,749	2,877,718	198,369,822	128,754,374
Sales of bonds, par value	\$85,564,200	\$90,019,450	\$3,305,704,257	\$2,453,548,405
Average price of 50 stocks	High 89.72 Low 85.89	High 85.73 Low 83.76	High 90.23 Low 86.21	High 73.13 Low 58.35
Average price of 40 bonds	High 82.05 Low 81.41	High 71.62 Low 71.45	High 82.54 Low 75.01	High 71.87 Low 71.00
Average net yield of ten high-priced bonds	4.470%	5.235%	4.586%	5.322%
New security issues	\$60,072,000	\$9,500,000	\$1,861,158,900	\$1,332,594,300

Potentials of Productivity and THE METAL BAROMETER

BAROMETRICS

The State of Credit

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES

	Last Week	Previous Week	Year to Date	Same Week
British Con. 2½%	37 956½	56½@56½	60 @48½	49 @48
British 5%	103½@103½	99½@99½	102½@91½	88½@88½
British 4½%	106½	97 @106	98 @83½	81½
French rentes (in Paris)	59.75@59.50	61.95@60.50	62.85@64.20	56.25@56.1
French War Loan (in Paris)	76.75	77.20@76.75	80.20@74.20	81.45

Measure of Business Activity

WEEK'S PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES

	Current Price	Range, 1922	Mean Price	Mean Price of Other Years
Copper: Electrolytic, per lb.	\$0.1400	\$0.1400-\$0.12875	\$0.134375	\$0.1275-\$0.1275
Cotton: Spot, middling upland, per lb.	2,150	2,373-1,645	.2010	.14725
Brick: Hudson River common, per 1,000	18.00	22.00	18.50	17.00
Cement: Portland, bulk, at mill, bbl.	1.70	1.70	1.70	3.35
Wool: Ohio & Pa. half blood combing, per lb.	.50	.50	.4375	.3250
Pine: Nor. Car. Roofers 6 in., per 1,000 ft.	34.50	34.50-28.50	.3150	.2750
Hides: Packers, No. 1 native, per lb.	.2225	.2225-1,200	.17125	.1275
Petroleum: Pennsylvania crude at well, bbl.	3.00	3.50	3.25	5.55
Fig Iron: Bessemer, at Pittsburgh, per ton	.3577	.3677-22.00	.2796	.4371
Rubber: Up river, fine, per lb.	.1900	.23	.17	.17375
Silk: Japan, Shinshu, No. 1, per lb.	8.10	8.10	6.10	6.25

AVERAGE OF WHOLESALE PRICES

	Last Week	Previous Week	—Range for 1922—	—Same Week—
Hogs, medium to heavy, per cwt.	39.2375	\$9.75	\$11.025-\$16.725	\$8.875-\$16.12
Steers, good to choice, per cwt.	10.725	10.725	7.525	7.675
Beef, salt, per 200 lbs.	14.50	14.50	13.00	19.50
Pork, salt, per 200 lbs.	22.50	22.50	22.50	23.25
Flour, Spring patents, per bbl.	8.175%	7.925%	10.05	9.175
Powder, Winter straight, per bbl.	5.90	5.75	7.075	6.075
Lard, Middle Western, per lb.	11.925	11.90	13.2125	10.95
Bacon, short clear sides, per lb.	.425	1.3375	.1575	1.36875
Oats, No. 2 and No. 1 white.	.411875	.400375	.413125	.33475
Beef, fresh, per lb.	.1500	.1450	.1500	.1090
Mutton, dressed, per lb.	.1100	.1150	.1600	.1250
Potatoes, white, per bushel.	.60	.675%	.73	.60
Sheep, wethers, per 100 lbs.	.650	.630	.975	.456
Sugar, refined granulated, per lb.	.06425	.0625	.07	.0550
Codfish, Georges, per lb.	.00	.0025	.0050	.12
Rye flour, special patents, W. St.	4.75	4.875	4.75	9.875
Cormeal, export, per 100 lbs.	1.965	1.965	1.55	1.825
Rice, extra fancy, per lb.	.0725	.0730	.07	.1225
Beans, medium, per bushel.	5.625%	5.625%	5.70	3.90
Apples, extra choice, per lb.	.1875	.1875	.14	.131875
Prunes, 60-70s, per lb.	.1175	.12875	.0875	.1275
Butter, creamery extras, per lb.	.4225	.4325	.4225	.6225
Butter, dairy, per lb.	.4250	.4175	.4250	.3325
Cheese, State, whole milk, per lb.	.2400	.2350	.2400	.1875
Coffee, Rio No. 7, per lb.	.1000	.10125	.111875	.063125

OUR FOREIGN TRADE


	1922	1921	1922	1921	1922	1921
Exports	\$302,000,000	\$366,897,538	\$305,000,000	\$320,708,574	\$2,424,045,754	\$3,226,546,826
Imports	271,000,000	194,768,750	251,000,000	178,656,711	1,942,543,249	1,693,404,235
Excess of exports	\$31,000,000	\$172,118,787	\$54,000,000	\$142,071,862	\$481,502,506	\$1,533,142,591

The Week in the Money and Exchange Market

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC EXCHANGE RATES

	DEMAND	CABLES
Normal Exchgs.	Last Week High. Low. Yr. 1922. Same Wk., 1921. Last Week High. Low. Yr. 1922. Same Wk., 1921.	4.42% 4.39% 4.42% 4.39% 4.51% 4.51% 4.42% 4.39% 4.17% 3.90% 3.72% 4.43% 4.38% 4.42% 4.36% 4.51% 4.17% 3.81% 3.73%
London	19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41	19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41 19.28-19.41
Paris	7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63	7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63 7.56 7.68 7.53 7.63
Brussels	7.15 7.09 7.20 7.10 7.15 7.09 7.15 7.10 7.15 7.09 7.15 7.10 7.15 7.09 7.15 7.10 7.15 7.09 7.15 7.10 7.15	7.15 7.09 7.20 7.10 7.15 7.09 7.15 7.10 7.15 7.09 7.15 7.10 7.15 7.09 7.15 7.10 7.15 7.09 7.15 7.10 7.15
Switzerland	18.73 18.66 18.69 18.64 18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73	18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73 18.66 18.73 18.69 18.73
Italy	4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31	4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31 4.25% 4.30 4.21% 4.31
Holland	38.85 38.62 38.78 38.65 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85	38.85 38.62 38.78 38.65 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85 38.62 38.85
Greece	3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45 3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45 3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45 3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45 3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45	3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45 3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45 3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45 3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45 3.00 2.85 2.72 2.45
Spain	15.23 15.11 15.34 15.06 15.23 15.11 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.11 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.06	15.23 15.11 15.34 15.06 15.23 15.11 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.11 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.06 15.23 15.06
Denmark	20.53 20.23 20.80 20.28 20.53 20.23 20.53 20.28 20.53 20.23 20.53 20.28 20.53 20.23 20.53 20.28 20.53 20.23 20.53 20.28	20.53 20.23 20.80 20.28 20.53 20.23 20.53 20.28 20.53 20.23 20.53 20.28 20.53 20.23 20.53 20.28 20.53 20.23 20.53 20.28
Sweden	26.56 26.38 26.46 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38	26.56 26.38 26.46 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38 26.56 26.38
Norway	17.74 17.24 17.16 17.16 19.01 17.74 17.74 17.24 17.16 19.01 17.74 17.24 17.16 19.01 17.74 17.24 17.16 19.01 17.74 17.24	17.74 17.24 17.16 17.16 19.01 17.74 17.74 17.24 17.16 19.01 17.74 17.24 17.16 19.01 17.74 17.24 17.16

Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly, so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

	Week Ended Saturday, Oct. 7		Bank Clearings		By Telegraph to The Annalist			
	Central Reserve Cities	Last Week	1922	Year to Date	1922	1921	1922	Year to Date
New York	\$4,725,039,063	\$3,810,188,166	\$166,810,408,472	\$149,335,552,162	\$47,984,499	\$36,856,417	\$1,489,503,673	\$1,390,682,042
Chicago	641,211,410	529,346,818	21,125,505,407	19,877,368,042	60,680,000	53,084,805	2,244,532,685	2,154,447,647
Total 2 C. R. cities	\$5,366,250,512	\$4,339,534,984	\$187,935,913,879	\$169,212,920,204	11,006%	10,552,647	557,909,800	517,524,500
Increase	23.0%				22,011,647	20,718,073	750,278,799	709,656,752
Other Federal Reserve Cities					106,709,000	79,782,000	3,808,897,000	3,254,326,000
Atlanta	\$54,697,869	\$50,846,072	\$1,556,927,015	\$1,575,462,297	27,029,514	22,689,077	982,653,879	825,488,557
Boston	386,000,000	281,669,794	12,061,000,000	10,708,637,159	36,471,821	33,607,116	1,176,477,299	1,087,407,427
Cleveland	101,534,990	81,759,117	3,469,362,874	3,709,664,563	45,080,124	34,354,451	1,496,942,185	1,495,542,648
Kansas City, Mo.	146,109,217	145,801,724	5,113,624,123	5,652,476,462	37,840,674	35,979,361	1,213,257,883	1,286,948,754
Minneapolis	80,774,081	78,995,555	2,444,600,007	2,344,451,452	33,626,176	30,285,806	1,249,069,402	1,143,726,528
Philadelphia	484,000,000	402,000,000	16,613,000,000	14,929,356,739				
Richmond	51,822,000	42,839,000	1,665,083,294	1,541,697,000				
Total 7 cities	\$1,303,938,157	\$1,083,911,262	\$42,923,597,313	\$40,761,745,672	18.6%	18.6%	8.03%	\$13,865,750,853
Increase	20.3%		5.3%					
Total 9 cities	\$6,670,188,669	\$5,423,446,246	\$230,859,511,192	\$209,974,865,876	9.9%	9.9%	9.8%	\$223,840,416,731
Increase	22.9%				22.7%	22.7%	9.8%	

Actual Condition	Statements of the Federal Reserve Banks	Oct. 4
Dist. 1. Boston	Dist. 2. New York	Dist. 3. Philadelphia
Gold reserve	\$246,240,000	\$1,030,723,000
Rediscouts	9,379,000	36,520,000
Bills on hand	44,081,000	139,153,000
Due members	126,842,000	702,210,000
Notes in circul'n.	196,347,000	610,763,000
Ratio of reserve	79.5%	80.2%
	76.5%	72.7%
	75.3%	75.3%
	78.9%	86.3%
	67.1%	69.9%
	64.4%	68.2%
		94.7%

Federal Reserve Bank Statement

Consolidated statement of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks compares as follows:

RESOURCES—	Oct. 4, 1922	Sept. 27, 1922	Oct. 5, 1921
Gold and gold certificates	\$270,158,000	\$272,000,000	\$448,472,000
Gold settlement fund—Federal Reserve Board	568,241,000	592,494,000	415,175,000
Total gold held by banks	\$838,399,000	\$864,494,000	\$863,647,000
Gold with Federal Reserve agents	2,194,932,000	2,160,522,000	1,756,582,000
Gold redemption fund	55,949,000	51,927,000	112,370,000
Total gold reserves	\$3,089,260,000	\$3,076,943,000	\$2,732,599,000
Legal tender notes, silver, &c.	123,725,000	126,184,000	150,343,000
Total reserves	\$3,213,005,000	\$3,203,127,000	\$2,882,942,000
Bills discounted: Secured by U. S. Government obligations	156,318,000	139,102,000	485,866,000
All other	277,878,000	281,078,000	902,255,000
Bills bought in open market	235,458,000	238,116,000	42,070,000
Total bills on hand	\$669,654,000	\$658,296,000	\$1,440,191,000
United States bonds and notes	253,042,000	229,158,000	35,433,000
United States certificates of indebtedness: One-year certificates (Pittman act)	48,000,000	50,500,000	167,375,000
All other	182,299,000	171,788,000	19,054,000
Municipal warrants	15,000	15,000	—
Total earning assets	\$1,153,010,000	\$1,109,757,000	\$1,662,053,000
Bank premises	44,522,000	44,473,000	29,501,000
Five per cent. redemption fund against Federal Reserve Bank notes	3,852,000	3,917,000	8,842,000
Uncollected items	631,701,000	593,911,000	558,105,000
All other resources	14,604,000	15,076,000	15,906,000
Total resources	\$5,060,694,000	\$4,970,261,000	\$5,157,349,000
LIABILITIES—			
Capital paid in	\$106,220,000	\$106,172,000	\$103,046,000
Surplus	215,398,000	215,398,000	213,824,000
Deposits: Government	14,901,000	19,945,000	59,004,000
Member banks—reserve account	1,842,508,000	1,797,975,000	1,613,149,000
All other	20,288,000	22,213,000	24,179,000
Total deposits	\$1,877,697,000	\$1,840,133,000	\$1,696,332,000
F. R. Bank notes in circulation—Net liability	2,274,651,000	2,243,384,000	2,482,315,000
Deferred availability items	518,334,000	485,471,000	488,741,000
All other liabilities	23,668,000	23,638,000	73,491,000
Total liabilities	\$5,060,694,000	\$4,970,261,000	\$5,157,349,000
Ratio of total reserves to deposits and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined	77.4%	78.4%	60.0%

Statement of Member Banks

Data for Federal Reserve Cities and in Federal Reserve Branch Cities	New York	Chicago	
Sept. 27	Sept. 20	Sept. 27	
Number of reporting banks	64	50	50
Loans sec. by U. S. Govt. oblig's	\$37,826,000	\$37,728,000	\$31,285,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	1,479,554,000	1,479,008,000	386,874,000
All other loans and discounts	1,942,694,000	1,944,075,000	631,433,000
Total loans and discounts	3,496,074,000	3,500,811,000	1,045,353,000
U. S. bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	491,804,000	497,231,000	59,471,000
U. S. Victory notes	9,908,000	15,070,000	3,616,000
U. S. Treasury notes	373,259,000	382,972,000	50,089,000
U. S. cts. of indebtedness	50,540,000	60,023,000	19,198,000
Other bonds, stocks and sec's.	581,862,000	567,433,000	171,682,000
Loans, discounts, invest., &c.	5,003,447,000	5,023,540,000	1,367,399,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	580,573,000	544,822,000	133,390,000
Cash in vault	74,377,000	73,828,000	29,646,000
Net demand deposits	4,357,471,000	4,347,413,000	990,053,000
Time deposits	551,949,000	557,658,000	328,505,000
Government deposits	46,608,000	46,406,000	11,385,000
Bills payable	10,030,000	6,455,000	2,410,000
Bills rediscounted	13,751,000	19,509,000	7,114,000
All Reserve Cities	Sept. 27	Sept. 20	
Number of reporting banks	287	288	209
Loans sec. by U. S. Govt. oblig's	\$172,374,000	\$177,267,000	\$48,100,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	2,650,764,000	2,619,938,000	491,517,000
All other loans and discounts	4,432,302,000	4,325,708,000	1,406,940,000
Total loans and discounts	7,255,440,000	7,222,373,000	1,934,557,000
U. S. bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	794,963,000	800,803,000	313,015,000
U. S. Victory notes	23,597,000	27,471,000	7,551,000
U. S. Treasury notes	500,107,000	510,957,000	71,231,000
U. S. cts. of indebtedness	114,744,000	134,249,000	49,836,000
Other bonds, stocks and sec's.	1,212,588,000	1,193,526,000	620,713,000
Loans, discounts, invest., &c.	9,901,439,000	9,895,378,000	3,049,566,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	981,906,000	956,647,000	58,880,000
Cash in vault	151,266,000	147,006,000	55,615,000
Net demand deposits	7,704,196,000	7,679,016,000	1,771,304,000
Time deposits	1,758,340,000	1,766,442,000	1,048,754,000
Government deposits	106,687,000	107,174,000	29,046,000
Bills payable	28,306,000	28,378,000	24,649,000
Bills rediscounted	50,779,000	61,263,000	22,418,000
Number of reporting banks	314	313	313
Loans secured by United States Government obligations	\$40,568,000	\$41,271,000	446,441,000
Loans secured by stocks and bonds	447,529,000	446,441,000	1,297,033,000
All other loans and discounts	1,297,033,000	1,294,486,000	1,785,530,000
Total loans and discounts	2,793,025,000	2,73,298,000	3,278,000
United States bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	4,126,000	4,531,000	4,

New York Stock Exchange Transactions

Highest and lowest prices of the year are based on sales of 100 shares. Where prices are used for less than that amount they are marked with an asterisk (*).

Week Ended October 7, 1922

Total Sales 5,866,509 Shares

Yearly High. 1920.	Low. 1921.	Price Ranges. This Year to Date	STOCKS	Amount Capital Stock Listed.	Last Date Paid.	Dividend. Per Cent.	P/c riod.	Last Week's Transactions							
								Date Low.	Date High.	Last Low.	Change.	Sales			
46	22	53%	28%	83 Oct. 6	48 Jan. 12	ADAMS EXPRESS	\$12,000,000	Dec. 1, '17	1	79%	83	79%	82%	+ 2%	9,160
46%	14	19%	10%	23 Aug. 18	10% Jan. 19	Advance Comedy	13,750,000	19%	19	19%	+ 2%	500	
72	52	31%	21%	60% Aug. 18	31% Jan. 22	Advance Realty pf.	12,500,000	Oct. 2, '22	2	5%	56	55	55	+ 1%	500
54	32	50%	30%	60 Jan. 7	45 Jan. 3	Air Reducto (10%)	13,000,000	July 15, '22	\$1	37%	67	64%	73%	+ 7%	8,200
89%	24	30%	15%	154 Apr. 25	95 July 28	Ajax Rubber (sh.)	425,000	Dec. 15, '20	\$1	15%	16%	15%	16%	- 1%	28,100
2%	%	1%	1%	2 May 17	% Jan. 14	Alaska Gold Min. (\$10)	7,500,000	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	1,500	
3	87	84%	84%	84 Aug. 27	107 Feb. 9	Alaska Juneau G. M. (310)	13,967,440	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	1,500	
87	87	84%	84%	84 Aug. 27	107 Feb. 9	Allegheny & Western	2,200,000	July 1, '22	3	SA	x84
100%	103	105%	100	117% Sep. 27	107 Feb. 9	All-American Cables	22,961,400	July 14, '22	1	1%	80%	84%	84%	+ 3%	57,200
78	74	*80	*80	Alliance Realty	2,000,000	July 17, '22	2	1%	112%	112%	112%	- 1%	500
62%	43%	59%	34	91% Sep. 5	55% Jan. 4	Allied Chemical & Dye (sh.)	2,177,843	Aug. 1, '22	\$1	83%	86%	82%	84%	+ 3%	57,200
92%	84%	103%	82	115% Sep. 19	101 Jan. 3	Allied Chemicals Manufacturing	39,251,200	Oct. 2, '22	1	1%	55	55	55	+ 1%	500
53%	26%	39%	28%	50% Sep. 6	37% Jan. 4	Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing pf.	24,305,600	Aug. 15, '22	1	1%	58%	55	55	+ 3%	6,800
92	67	70%	60%	67 Aug. 21	21 Jan. 5	Amalgamated Sugar 1st pf.	15,000,000	May 1, '21	21	1%	102%	102%	102%	- 1%	100
95	51	88%	28%	74 June 1	29% Jan. 3	American Agricultural Chemical	33,322,000	Apr. 15, '21	[2]	38%	38%	36%	38%	+ 3%	2,200
96%	70	84	51	72% Sep. 11	53% Jan. 18	American Agricultural Chemical pf.	28,455,200	Apr. 15, '21	1	1%	67	69%	67	+ 1%	600
48%	39	50%	49%	77% Apr. 7	57% Jan. 5	American Bank Note (\$50)	4,495,700	Aug. 15, '22	1	1%	73	73	73	- 1%	100
45%	40	50%	43%	54 Mar. 3	51% Jan. 6	American Bank Note pf. (\$50)	4,495,650	Oct. 2, '22	7%	1%	53	- 1%	1,500
105%	32%	51	24%	49 June 9	31% Jan. 3	American Beet Sugar Company	15,000,000	Jan. 31, '21	2	1%	44	46	45%	+ 2%	800
93	75	74%	54%	80 Aug. 24	61 Jan. 11	American Beet Sugar pf.	5,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	1	1%	78	78	78	- 1%	100
128%	45%	65%	29%	49 Apr. 11	31% Jan. 31	American Bosch Magneto (sh.)	96,000	Apr. 1, '21	\$1.25	41	43%	41	43%	+ 3%	1,300
60	40	56%	42	88% Sep. 12	51 Jan. 4	American Brake, Shoe & Foundry new (sl.)	152,046,000	Sep. 30, '22	1	1%	78	83%	83%	+ 5%	3,200
90	81%	100	83%	112% Oct. 4	98% Jan. 18	American Brake, Shoe & Foundry pf. new.	9,600,000	112	112%	112	+ 1%	200	
61%	21%	35%	23%	66% Oct. 5	32% Jan. 6	American Can Company	41,233,300	58	60%	57%	+ 5%	72,300	
147%	111	151%	115%	193 Sep. 17	141 Jan. 10	American Car & Foundry	30,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	1	1%	108%	109%	108%	+ 3%	1,000
110%	103%	116%	108	124% Oct. 17	115% Jan. 6	American Car & Foundry pf.	30,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	1	1%	122	122	122	- 1%	3,300
110%	103%	116%	108	124% Oct. 17	115% Jan. 6	American Chicle (sh.)	185,956	Nov. 1, '20	1	1%	8%	8%	8%	+ 1%	800
54%	15%	24%	15%	30% May 21	19% Jan. 10	American Cotton Oil Company	20,237,100	June 1, '20	1	1%	26%	27%	26%	+ 1%	2,800
86	59%	67	35%	61 May 31	41 Jan. 11	American Cotton Oil Company pf.	10,198,600	Dec. 1, '20	3	1%	53	52	52	- 1%	300
15%	6%	8%	4%	7% Aug. 15	4% Jan. 12	American Drug Syndicate (\$10)	5,333,360	Dec. 15, '20	40%	0%	6%	6%	6%	- 1%	500
175	95	137	113	145 Sep. 1	126 June 22	American Express	18,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	\$2	Q	140%	144	140%	+ 6%	2,200
30%	5	16	8	17% Apr. 13	12% Jan. 12	American Hide & Leather Company	11,274,100	13%	13%	13%	+ 1%	500	
122	35	62%	40%	74% Sep. 13	58% Jan. 3	American Hide & Leather Company pf.	12,548,300	Oct. 1, '20	1	1%	68%	72%	68%	+ 3%	1,500
53%	37	83%	42	122 Sep. 8	78 Jan. 12	American Ice	7,161,400	July 25, '22	1	1%	110	115	109	+ 113	6,400
68	53	73%	57	95% Aug. 4	72 Jan. 3	American Ice pf.	15,000,000	July 25, '22	1	1%	90	90	89	- 1%	1,300
120%	53%	21%	50%	50% June 2	33 Aug. 25	American International	49,000,000	Sept. 30, '20	1	1%	33%	38%	33%	+ 3%	20,500
14%	8%	11%	7%	13% May 19	9% Jan. 12	American La F. Fire Engine (\$10)	2,682,800	Aug. 15, '22	25%	Q	12%	13%	12%	+ 1%	1,500
95	42	62%	40%	60% Aug. 4	60% May 10	American Linseed	16,750,000	Mar. 31, '21	2	1%	36%	39%	36%	+ 2%	15,200
99%	88	93	60%	60% June 1	52% Aug. 11	American Linseed pf.	16,750,000	July 1, '21	1	1%	57%	59%	57%	+ 2%	700
100%	74	110%	73%	128% Oct. 5	102% Jan. 5	American Locomotive	25,000,000	Sep. 30, '22	1	1%	125%	128%	123%	+ 5%	45,100
107	90%	115%	92%	121% Sep. 13	112% Jan. 9	American Locomotive pf.	55,000	119	120	120	- 1%	800	
15%	15%	11%	13%	28% Mar. 28	1% June 8	American Malt & Grain, stamped (sh.)	536,000	Sep. 1, '22	1	1%	47%	48%	47%	+ 2%	2,500
11%	11%	11%	11%	44% Sep. 7	44% Aug. 17	American Metal Company (sh.)	5,000,000	Sep. 1, '22	1	1%	100%	111	109%	+ 1%	300
73	64%	91	60%	113% Oct. 4	82 Jan. 30	American Radiator (\$25)	13,806,222	Sep. 30, '22	\$1	12%	128%	122%	127%	+ 5%	9,100
101	101	101	101	119% Sep. 1	119 Aug. 3	American Radiator pf.	12,500,000	Oct. 2, '22	2	1%	140%	143	140%	+ 3%	2,200
17%	6%	10	3%	8% Apr. 6	3% Jan. 26	American Shipping & Commerce (\$25)	14,447,400	Oct. 2, '22	2	1%	7%	6%	7%	- 1%	5,400
20%	14%	14%	14%	26% May 29	15% Jan. 3	American Smelting & Refining Company	662,213	21%	22%	21%	- 1%	300	
72	25%	47%	26%	67% Mar. 18	43% Jan. 5	American Smelting & Refining Company pf.	60,998,600	Mar. 15, '21	1	1%	60	63%	59%	+ 2%	12,000
100%	64%	90%	63%	104% Sep. 6	86% Jan. 5	American Smelters pf. A.	9,451,800	Oct. 2, '22	1	1%	97%	98%	97%	+ 1%	300
83	83	98%	63%	98% Oct. 5	81% Jan. 4	American Smelters pf. A.	6,531,900	53%	53%	53%	+ 6%	9,500	
15%	81%	114%	95	130% Sep. 5	100% Jan. 3	American Snuff	11,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	3	Q	143%	149%	143%	+ 5%	600
80	90	97	100	109% Sep. 13	90% Jan. 23	American Snuff pf.	3,362,800	Oct. 2, '22	1	1%	100	100	100	- 1%	100
50	26	35	18	46% Sep. 11	30% Jan. 25	American Steel Foundries (33-1-3)	20,401,000	July 15, '22	75%	Q	43%	45%	43%	+ 3%	21,100
93%	79%	95%	78	105% May 19	94% Jan. 12	American Steel Foundries pf.	8,381,300	Sep. 30, '22	1	1%	104%	104%	104%	- 1%	400
142%	82%	96%	47%	85% Aug. 21	54% Jan. 4	American Sugar Refining Company	45,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	1	1%	78	81%	80%	+ 2%	5,200
118%	97%	101%	67%	112% Aug. 18	84% Jan. 3	American Sugar Refining Company pf.	45,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	1	1%	109%	110%	109%	- 1%	500
106%	65	88	28%	47% May 29	23% Feb. 14	American Sumatra Tobacco	14,447,400	Aug. 1, '21	2	1%	39%	41%	39%	+ 2%	1,000
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New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

1920.	Yearly Price Ranges.					STOCKS	Amount Capital Stock Listed.	Last Date Paid.	Dividend Per Cent.	Period.	Last Week's Transactions.					
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	This Year to Date.						First.	High.	Last.	Change.	Sales	
14½	6%	9%	6%	10%	May 29	4% Sep. 12	Chicago Great Western	45,246,900	Feb. 15, '21	2	..	68	67	67	+ 1%	2,000
33%	15%	20%	14	24%	May 29	11½ Sep. 12	Chicago Great Western pf.	44,137,400	July 15, '21	1	..	14½	14½	14½	+ 1%	2,000
44%	21	31	17½	36%	Aug. 22	16% Jan. 10	Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul	117,411,300	Sep. 1, '21	2½	..	31½	33%	31	+ 1%	12,900
60	36%	46%	29%	55%	Aug. 22	29% Jan. 10	Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul pf.	116,274,300	Sep. 1, '21	3½	..	49	51½	48%	+ 2%	23,600
91%	50	77	60%	95%	Sep. 11	50% Jan. 9	Chicago & Northwestern	145,165,810	July 16, '21	2½	SA	96½	93%	90½	+ 2%	13,600
12%	9	110	100	100	Aug. 21	100% Jan. 1	Chicago & Northwestern pf.	22,395,160	July 16, '21	3½	SA	122½	122½	122½	+ 1%	300
111%	60	70%	47	80%	Sep. 9	50% Feb. 1	Chicago, Peabody F. tcm. cfs.	75,000,000	July 25, '21	1	Q	79½	81	79½	+ 4	300
4½	21½	35	22%	50%	Sep. 14	30% Jan. 11	Chicago, Peabody F. tcm. cfs.	29,422,100	June 20, '21	3½	SA	100½	100½	100½	+ 1%	2,800
81%	64	89%	68%	103	Sep. 14	83½ Jan. 10	Chicago, R. I. & P. T. 7% pf tcm. cfs.	25,135,800	June 30, '21	3½	SA	86½	85%	85½	+ 1%	3,000
71%	54	77	56%	93%	Sep. 20	70% Jan. 4	Chicago, R. I. & P. 6½% pf. tcm. cfs.	18,556,700	Aug. 21, '21	2½	SA	86½	87	86½	+ 1%	100
72%	58	63	50	90	Sep. 15	51% Jan. 10	Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. & O.	11,259,300	Aug. 21, '21	3½	SA	106	106	106	+ 1%	100
95	89	87	70	107	Sep. 23	83% Feb. 14	Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. & O. pf.	95,000,000	Aug. 21, '21	25%	27	25½	26½	26½	+ 1%	40,100
21%	7%	16%	9	27	Oct. 5	15% Jan. 5	Chile Copper (\$25)	4,349,900	Sep. 30, '20	37½	..	28½	31	28½	+ 1%	4,900
41%	16%	29%	19%	33%	June 1	25% Feb. 27	China Copper (\$5)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
62	31%	57%	32	80%	Sep. 15	54% Jan. 4	Cleveland, C. C. & St. L.	47,056,300	Sep. 1, '21	2	..	78	78	78	+ 1%	200
69	60	75	60	100	Aug. 21	72% Jan. 3	Cleveland, C. C. & St. Louis pf.	10,000,000	July 20, '21	1½	Q	97	97½	97½	+ 3%	400
6%	58%	*62	*60*	*71%	Sep. 22	*45% Feb. 16	Cleveland & Pittsburgh (\$50)	11,237,750	Sep. 1, '21	87½	Q	—	—	—	—	—
100	40%	62%	56%	88%	Aug. 31	43% Jan. 9	Cluett, Peabody & Co. pf.	17,893,400	Sep. 1, '21	50	Q	—	—	—	—	—
104	80	85	62%	103	Sep. 5	87½ Jan. 26	Cooca-Cola Co. pf.	8,482,000	Feb. 1, '21	1½	Q	63½	63½	63½	+ 1%	200
40%	18	43%	18	79%	Sep. 7	57% Jan. 26	Colorado Fuel & Iron	34,235,500	Oct. 1, '21	1½	Q	72½	79½	71½	+ 6%	87,100
44%	22	33%	22	37	Sep. 17	37% Jan. 26	Colorado Fuel & Iron pf.	2,000,000	Aug. 21, '21	2	Q	35	35	35	+ 1%	1,400
105	97%	106	100	106	May 3	101½ Apr. 18	Colorado & Southern	31,000,000	Dec. 31, '21	2	Q	48½	50½	50	+ 1%	1,000
36%	20	46%	27½	53%	Apr. 24	38% Jan. 10	Colorado & Southern 1st pf.	8,500,000	June 30, '21	2	SA	62½	62½	62½	+ 1%	100
54	46	59	49	64	Sep. 26	55% Jan. 16	Colorado & Southern 2d pf.	8,500,000	Dec. 31, '21	4	A	59	59	59	+ 1%	100
47	35	55%	42	60%	Apr. 10	49% Jan. 3	Columbia Gas & Electric	50,000,000	Aug. 15, '21	1½	Q	109½	112	108½	+ 1%	20,800
67	50	67%	52	114%	Sep. 14	64% Jan. 4	Columbia Graphophone (sh.)	1,375,290	Jan. 1, '21	120%	..	31	31	31	+ 1%	6,500
65%	9%	12%	2%	58%	June 5	1% Jan. 3	Columbia Graphophone pf.	10,262,900	Apr. 1, '21	1%	..	12	12½	12	+ 1%	1,100
52%	52%	62%	8%	21	June 3	5% Feb. 9	Comp.-Tab.-Rec. (sh.)	131,033	July 10, '21	1½	Q	71	71	71	+ 1%	3,900
56	34	58%	28%	79%	Apr. 26	55% Jan. 3	Commercial Solvents, Class A (sh.)	40,000	Oct. 1, '21	1	Q	49½	50	48½	+ 3%	3,976
..	50	80%	Sep. 30	48% Oct. 6	Commercial Solvents, Class B (sh.)	40,000	July 20, '21	1	Q	40½	45	45½	+ 1%	800
79%	51%	61	13%	42%	Oct. 5	5% Apr. 18	Consolidated Cigar (sh.)	103,718	Apr. 15, '21	1%	..	36½	42½	30	+ 1%	1,700
89%	70	80	53	81%	Oct. 5	47% Feb. 11	Consolidated Cigar pf.	4,000,000	Dec. 1, '21	1½	..	81½	81½	81½	+ 1%	100
34½	6%	12	½	12%	Sep. 10	12% Mar. 10	Consolidated Distributors	1,484	Jan. 21, '21	*62½	..	—	—	—	—	—
93%	71%	95	77%	145%	Sep. 15	85% Jan. 27	Consolidated Gas Electric Light & P. Ball.	14,610,200	July 15, '21	1½	Q	115	115	115	+ 1%	1,100
85	85	84%	84%	84%	Consolidated Gas	123,748,400	Sept. 15, '21	1½	Q	137	140%	130	+ 3%	44,100
46½	16	21%	12%	15%	Apr. 20	0% July 25	Consolidated Coal, Maryland	40,139,000	July 31, '21	1½	Q	84½	84½	84½	+ 1%	13,000
97%	51%	66	34%	92	Sep. 9	45% Jan. 4	Consolidated Textile (sh.)	961,117	Jan. 15, '21	75%	..	98½	111	111	+ 1%	11,800
102%	97%	100	82%	100	Aug. 29	100% Jan. 3	Continental Can Co.	13,500,000	July 1, '21	1%	..	85½	90%	85½	+ 4%	20,800
85	63%	72%	58%	83%	Aug. 22	66% Jan. 6	Continental Can Co. pf.	4,180,000	Oct. 1, '21	1½	Q	110	110	110	+ 1%	6,500
100%	61	99%	59	126	Oct. 6	91½ Jan. 4	Corn Products Refining Co.	49,784,000	July 10, '21	2½	Q	115	120	124	+ 4%	51,600
43%	24%	44%	23%	53%	Sep. 20	93% July 29	Corn Products Refining Co. pf.	24,827,000	July 15, '21	1½	Q	118½	120	120	+ 1%	6,000
..	102½	102%	Sep. 20	93% July 29	Cosden & Co. pf.	932,756	Aug. 1, '21	62½	Q	49½	50½	49½	+ 1%	631,800
..	1%	1%	Sep. 21	92% Sept. 29	Cosden & Co. rights	6,998,000	Sep. 1, '21	1%	..	101½	101	100	+ 1%	600
64	45%	49%	30	35%	May 18	24% Sept. 29	Cotter, Clark Co.	2,492,600	June 15, '21	1%	..	80½	80½	80½	+ 1%	55,000
27½	70	107%	45	90%	Sep. 5	90% May 18	Crucible Steel Co.	50,000,000	Aug. 30, '21	1	Q	80½	85	85	+ 3%	29,200
100	81%	97	77	100	Sep. 5	90% May 18	Crucible Steel Co. pf.	42,503,000	Sept. 20, '21	2½	Q	91	91	91	+ 1%	500
60%	21%	33%	10%	28	Aug. 4	14% Jan. 3	Cuban-American Sugar (\$10)	10,000,000	Oct. 1, '21	5%	..	22½	24	24	+ 1%	14,600
106	93%	95	68	99	Oct. 6	78% Jan. 17	Cuban-American Sugar pf.	7,808,000	Sep. 30, '21	1%	Q	97	99	97	+ 2%	1,000
59%	16%	16%	19%	19%	Mar. 15	8% Jan. 10	Cuba-Cane Sugar (sh.)	500,000	Oct. 15, '21	2½	Q	130½	140½	130½	+ 1%	6,200
55%	54	67%	13%	41%	July 27	15% Jan. 3	Cuba-Cane Sugar pf.	50,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1%	..	36½	35½	35½	+ 1%	3,800
101	83	75	60%	60%	Aug. 11	57½ Mar. 17	DAVISON CHEMICAL (sh.)	217,257	Nov. 15, '20	81	..	48½	50½	48½	+ 3%	3,800
36%	21	13%	24%	24%	Sep. 6	15% May 15	De Beers Con. M. (sh.)	94,925	Jan. 21, '21	75%	..	21½	22	22	+ 2%	2,000
.01	92	80	59	80	May 8	61 Feb. 9	Deere & Co. pf.	37,828,500	Sep. 1, '21	1%	..	73½	73½	73½	+ 1%	100
108%	83%	110%	90	141%	Sep. 8	106% Jan. 10	Delaware, Lackawanna & Western (\$50)	42,503,000	Sept. 20, '21	2½	Q	133½</td				


New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

	Yearly Price Ranges—						Stock Listed.	Amount Capital Stock Listed.	Last Date Paid.	Dividend Per Cent.	Period.	Last Week's Transactions						
	1920 High.	1920 Low.	1921 High.	1921 Low.	This Year to Date Low.	Date.						First.	High.	Low.	Last.	Change.	Sales.	
60%	57	67%	60	30%	Apr. 25	22	JAN. 3	KANSAS CITY, FT. SCOTT & MEMPHIS pf..	6,232,000	Oct. 1, '22	1	Q	23%	24%	23%	24%	+ 1%	2,000
27%	13%	28%	18%	30%	Apr. 25	22	JAN. 3	Kansas City Southern	30,000,000	July 15, '22	1	Q	55	58	58	58	+ 1%	500
62%	40	55	45%	59%	Apr. 26	23	JAN. 3	Kansas & Gulf (\$10)	21,717,460	July 15, '22	1	Q	4%	4%	3%	3%	+ 1%	4,200
..	..	9	4%	7	JUN. 3	3%	MAY 1	Kayser (Julius) & Co. (sh.)	102,955	41%	47%	43%	46%	+ 3%	8,800
..	48%	48%	Aug. 6	24	MAY 1	Kayser (Julius) & Co. (sh.)	57,676	Oct. 1, '22	2	Q	104%	104%	103	103	+ 1%	400
152%	25%	54%	52%	53%	May 5	34%	JAN. 4	Kelly-Springfield Tire (\$25)	9,006,000	May 15, '22	2	Q	41%	44%	41	42%	+ 2%	18,600
105	75	94	70%	107%	May 9	90%	JAN. 3	Kelly-Springfield Tire 8% pf.	5,444,700	Aug. 15, '22	2	Q	102%	102%	102	102%	+ 1%	200
91	73	80	70	85	Sep. 11	71%	JAN. 3	Kelsey Wheel	3,137,100	Oct. 2, '22	1%	Q	85	85	85	85	+ 2%	100
96	35%	60	35	111	Apr. 6	61	JAN. 16	Kelsey Wheel	10,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	1%	Q	95	103%	95	101	+ 6%	1,000
98%	80	94	75	106	Mar. 31	90%	JAN. 23	Kelsey Wheel pf.	2,000,000	Aug. 1, '22	1%	Q	102	102	102	102	+ 1%	100
33%	14%	27%	16	39%	May 31	25%	JAN. 3	Kennecott Copper (sh.)	2,700,811	Dec. 31, '20	50c	..	34%	35%	34	35	+ 1%	14,500
10	3	6%	4%	4%	JUN. 6	5	JAN. 17	Kirkland & Des Moines	2,600,000
..	25	25	JUN. 3	25	JAN. 9	Kokul & Des Moines pf.	1,524,600
48%	58%	84%	54%	84%	May 4	74	Sep. 27	Keystone Tire & Rubber (\$10)	3,038,360	Oct. 1, '22	30c	..	8%	8%	7%	8%	+ 1%	4,400
120	177	130	180	180	OCT. 4	110	JAN. 9	Krease (S. S.) Company	18,754,200	July 1, '22	3%	SA	170	180	176	185	+ 10%	2,800
102%	93	105%	97%	110%	JAN. 19	106	JAN. 21	Krease (S. S.) Company pf.	2,600,000	Oct. 1, '22	1%	Q
98	95	94	70	105	Aug. 15	105	JAN. 15	Krease (S. H.) Company	2,000,000	Aug. 1, '22	1	Q
100	100%	*101	*101	*109	JAN. 25	*109	JAN. 25	Krease (S. H.) Company pf.	3,322,500	Oct. 2, '22	1%	Q
91%	45	58%	32	83	Sep. 18	49	FEB. 27	LACKAWANNA STEEL	35,106,500	Mar. 31, '21	1%	..	77%	82	77%	81%	+ 4%	9,200
87%	55	57%	40	94%	Aug. 28	45	JAN. 13	Laclede Gas Company	10,700,000	Mar. 15, '19	1%	..	80	90%	80	90%	+ 1%	1,000
24%	14%	10	39%	39%	JUNE 6	10	FEB. 2	Lake Erie & Western	11,840,000	35%	36	35%	35%	+ 1%	2,600	
40%	16	30	17%	76%	JUN. 22	20%	FEB. 8	Lake Erie & Western pf.	11,840,000	JAN. 15, '08	1	Q	76	76	76	76	+ 1%	1,000
38%	15%	30	17%	35%	MAR. 16	24%	SEP. 7	Lee Rubber & Tire (sh.)	150,000	Sep. 1, '22	50c	Q	25%	26%	25	26	+ 1%	1,000
50%	39%	47%	72	72	Sep. 9	56%	JAN. 3	Lee Rubber & Tire (\$10)	200,000	Sep. 1, '22	50c	Q	65%	65%	65	65%	+ 2%	14,100
200%	127%	164	139%	229	Sep. 19	134%	SEP. 18	Liggett & Myers	21,496,400	Sep. 1, '22	3%	Q	210%	210%	210%	210%	+ 1%	100
155%	125	164	137	229	Sep. 20	150	FEB. 1	Liggett & Myers, Class A	11,177,900	Sep. 1, '22	3%	Q	121%	122	121%	122	+ 1%	300
110%	90	110	97	125	Sep. 9	107%	JAN. 3	Liggett & Myers pf.	22,512,900	Oct. 2, '22	1%	Q
..	102	87%	126	90%	Sep. 6	98%	JAN. 13	Lima Locomotive pf.	1,985,300	Sep. 1, '22	21-3	Q
30	14%	21%	10	23%	Sep. 18	11	JAN. 31	Lowe's, Inc. (sh.)	171,275
28	9%	12%	7%	14%	May 3	9	JAN. 4	Loft, Inc. (sh.)	1,660,500	May 1, '21	50c	..	60%	62%	59	60%	+ 2%	18,600
70	25	42	30	67%	Sep. 11	30	JAN. 3	Loose-Wiles Biscuit	7,086,200	Sep. 30, '22	25c	Q	12%	13%	12%	13%	+ 1%	5,300
100	93%	98%	93%	103	AUG. 26	97	JAN. 3	Loose-Wiles Biscuit 2d pf.	2,600,000	OCT. 1, '22	1%	Q
115%	100	100	94%	116	Sep. 29	100%	MAR. 9	Lorillard (P.) Company	24,246,700	OCT. 1, '22	3%	Q	168%	174	168%	170%	+ 3%	800
135%	120%	164%	130	180	Sep. 8	147%	JAN. 3	Lorillard (P.) Company pf.	11,306,700	OCT. 1, '22	1%	Q
120%	97	111	100	118	Sep. 25	105%	JAN. 13	Louisville & Nashville	72,000,000	OCT. 10, '22	3%	SA	128	138	137	138	+ 3	800
121%	94	118	97	141%	Sep. 9	108	JAN. 6	Louisville & Nashville	5,899,200	Sep. 1, '22	13	Q	41%	43%	41%	42%	+ 1%	3,500
33%	10	36%	18	43%	Sep. 30	32	MAR. 6	Manitoba Shirt	3,646,262	Sep. 1, '22	25c	Q	17%	18%	17%	17%	- 2	4,600
20%	56	72	59%	101	Sep. 1	72	JAN. 12	Mackay Companies	41,380,400	OCT. 2, '22	1%	Q	100	100	98	98	- 2	300
64%	66	62	55	69	JUNE 1	3	JAN. 12	Mackay Companies pf.	50,000,000	OCT. 2, '22	1%	Q	69	69	69	69	-	700
..	35%	35%	Sep. 21	32%	Sep. 28	Magma Copper (sh.)	240,000	33%	34%	33%	34	+ 1	5,400	
17%	28	42	25%	61%	Sep. 11	25%	JAN. 6	Mack Trucks	283,108	37%	39%	36%	38%	+ 3%	6,000	
84	68	76	63%	94%	Sep. 11	69%	FEB. 27	Mack Trucks 1st pf.	10,921,800	OCT. 1, '22	1%	Q	90	90	92	92	+ 1%	1,000
71	54%	64%	54	87%	Sep. 10	54	JAN. 6	Mack Trucks 2d pf.	5,331,700	OCT. 1, '22	1%	Q	53	53	53	53	-	1,000
45	8	18	10	40	MAR. 28	15%	JAN. 16	Mallinson (H. R.) Company (sh.)	200,000	33%	33%	33%	33%	-	16,800	
151%	61	89%	21	52%	MAR. 13	30%	JAN. 2	Mallinson (H. R.) Company pf.	3,046,900	OCT. 2, '22	1%	Q	42%	43%	42%	43%	+ 1%	200
60	57	62	60%	84%	Sep. 13	73%	MAR. 13	Manati Sugar	3,500,000	OCT. 1, '22	1%	Q	54	54	54	54	+ 1%	1,000
65%	58%	58%	33	58%	Sep. 19	35	JAN. 6	Manhattan Electric Supply (sh.)	63,859	OCT. 1, '22	1%	Q	54	54	54	54	+ 1%	1,500
..	5%	5%	Sep. 30	55%	JULY 30	Manhattan Elevated guaranteed	48,543,500	51%	53%	51%	52	+ 1%	1,800	
33%	10%	10%	18	43%	Sep. 20	32	MAR. 6	Manhattan Beach	5,899,200
33%	10%	10%	18	43%	Sep. 20	32	MAR. 6	Manhattan Shirt (\$25)	5,800,200	Sep. 1, '22	13	Q	41%	43%	41%	42%	+ 1%	3,500
..	21%	21%	MAR. 23	13%	MAR. 14	Manhattan Shirt 1st pf.	1,600,000	OCT. 2, '22	1%	Q	10%	10%	10%	10%	-	1,200
69	12	19%	5	20%	MAR. 27	54	MAR. 4	Marlin Rockwell (sh.)	81,135	OCT. 1, '22	1%	Q	17	18%	16%	18%	+ 2%	1,200
..	..	30%	12%	40%	JUNE 6	10%	JAN. 6	Marland Oil (sh.)	926,665	Sep. 30, '22	81							

New York Stock Exchange Transactions—Continued

Yearly Price Ranges.										STOCKS.	Amount Capital Stock Listed.	Last Date Paid.	Dividend Per Cent.	Period.	Last Week's Transactions				
1920. High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	This Year Date.	Low.	Date.	First.	High.	Low.	Last.	Change.	Sales						
57%	37	60%	34	74%	Aug. 23	50%	Jan. 6	Pere Marquette pf.	11,200,000	Aug. 1, '22	1%	Q	73	74½	73	74½	+ 1%	1,200	
44	34%	34%	34%	34%	Pettibone-Mulliken	6,995,800		
..	..	*100	100	Pettibone-Mulliken 1st pf.	761,800	Oct. 1, '22	2%	Q	
42%	30%	35%	26%	45%	Sep. 21	31%	Jan. 4	Philadelphia Company (§50)	42,943,000	July 31, '22	7½	Q	42%	44½	42%	44½	+ 1%	4,000	
..	45%	Sep. 16	42	Aug. 18	Philadelphia Co. 6% pf.	14,547,000	May 1, '22	1½	SA	
44%	26%	34%	16	49%	June 7	28%	Jan. 11	Phillips Petroleum (an.)	665,475	Sep. 30, '22	50c	Q	51½	53%	50½	51½	+ 2%	33,800	
65	18%	16%	37%	102%	Jan. 3	75	Aug. 3	Phillips-Jones (an.)	85,000		
82%	64%	90%	67	84%	Oct. 6	88%	Mar. 15	Phillips-Jones pf.	2,350,000	Aug. 1, '22	1%	Q	95	95	95	95	+ 1%	100	
108%	59	88	21	45	Apr. 15	18%	July 24	Pierce-Arrow Motor (an.)	250,000	May 1, '22	1%	Q	13%	15	13%	14½	+ 1%	15,600	
23%	9	14%	54	12	Jan. 13	32	Sep. 27	Pierce-Arrow Motor pf.	10,000,000	Apr. 1, '22	2	..	33	36%	32	35	+ 2	9,800	
98	72	78	30%	71	Jan. 3	32	..	Pierce Oil (§25)	29,000		
..	49%	Jan. 1	39%	July 14	Piggy-Wiggy (sh.)	14,634,000	Feb. 1, '22	2	..	40	55	55	57	+ 3%	45,300		
72%	51%	66	62	72%	Sep. 13	57%	Sep. 27	Pittsburgh Coal of Pennsylvania	200,000	Sep. 1, '22	1%	Q	42	44	42%	44	+ 5%	10,300	
91%	83	93	82%	100%	Sep. 13	90%	Feb. 3	Pittsburgh Coal of Pennsylvania pf.	31,036,700	July 25, '22	1½	Q	60½	61½	59½	60½	+ 3%	4,800	
80%	50	50	75	73%	May 1	73%	Jan. 1	Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis	35,000,000	July 25, '22	1½	Q	100	100	100	100	+ 3	200	
125%	113%	129	118%	*138%	Jan. 27	136%	Jan. 27	Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago pf.	18,022,700	Jan. 26, '22	2	
94%	80	85%	79	97%	Oct. 7	85	Feb. 6	Pittsburgh Steel pf.	19,714,300	Oct. 3, '22	1½	Q	
30%	32	23	41%	Aug. 7	23	Jan. 27	Pittsburgh & West Virginia	10,500,000	Sep. 1, '22	1%	Q	97%	97%	97%	97%	+ 1%	100		
84%	60%	80	52%	Oct. 6	76	Jan. 13	Pittsburgh & West Virginia pf.	30,500,000	Aug. 31, '22	1½	Q	38%	39%	38	38	+ 1%	5,300		
27%	12	16%	12%	25%	June 22	14½	Jan. 25	Piney Creek Coal Co. ctfs. (\$10)	2,129,200	Dec. 2, '22	37½	Q	91	92½	91	92½	+ 1%	500	
..	11%	Oct. 5	6%	Apr. 13	Piston Cereal pf.	200,000	Aug. 1, '22	1%	Q	109	116½	109	113½	+ 5%	1,500		
113%	72%	96	48	95%	Sep. 13	63	Jan. 10	Pressed Steel Car Company	12,500,000	June 8, '22	2	..	110	111½	111	111	+ 1	2,900	
104%	90%	104	83	106%	Sep. 12	91	Feb. 16	Pressed Steel Car Company pf.	12,500,000	Aug. 29, '22	1%	Q	87	91	87	89½	+ 2½	1,300	
..	..	34%	20%	51	Sep. 12	24%	Jan. 10	Producers & Refiners (\$50)	18,162,400	45½	50	45½	47½	+ 4%	300		
..	40	35	49	Sep. 12	36	Feb. 8	Producers & Refiners pf. (\$50)	2,961,950	Aug. 7, '22	87½	Q	44	47	44	47	+ 2	60		
68	53	70%	55	98%	Sep. 15	66	Jan. 4	Public Service Corporation, New Jersey	30,000,000	Sep. 30, '22	1%	Q	92%	93%	92%	94%	+ 4	12,100	
124	85%	114%	114%	124%	Oct. 8	104%	Sep. 23	Public Service Corporation, New Jersey, pf.	18,414,500	Sep. 30, '22	2	..	105	106½	105	106½	+ 1%	1,200	
120	40%	51%	24%	55%	Sep. 12	106%	Jan. 11	Pullman Company	12,000,000	Aug. 15, '22	2	Q	130	133½	128	128	+ 4	18,100	
43%	29%	40%	21%	38%	Jan. 3	30%	Feb. 21	Punter-Algar Sugar (\$50)	16,560,650	Aug. 15, '22	21	..	46	49	46	48½	+ 3%	3,900	
..	..	102%	102%	102%	Aug. 23	94	July 20	Pure Oil Company (\$25)	64,487,525	Sep. 1, '22	50c	Q	31%	32½	31%	32%	+ 1%	19,300	
..	Pure Oil pf.	10,000,000	Oct. 1, '22	2	..	99%	100½	99%	100½	+ 1%	600	
100%	73	99%	67	126%	Sep. 13	94	Jan. 10	RAIL STEEL SPRING COMPANY	13,500,000	Sep. 30, '22	2	Q	118	122	118	122	+ 4%	1,800	
107	94%	107	98	115%	Mar. 17	108%	Jan. 23	Rail Steel Spring Company pt.	13,500,000	Sep. 24, '22	2	Q	90	90	90	90	
29	20%	19	36%	54%	Sep. 7	24	..	Rand Mines (sh.)	45,890	33	34%	33	34%	+ 2%	1,300		
54	49	61	52	71%	Mar. 16	61	Apr. 6	R. H. Sec. I. C. stock ctfs.	8,000,000	July 1, '22	2½	SA	
22%	10	11	19	19	May 31	13	Feb. 27	Ray Con. Copper (\$10)	15,771,790	Dec. 31, '20	2½	..	14%	15½	14½	15½	+ 1	4,400	
103	64%	89%	63	83	Sep. 9	71%	Jan. 8	Reading (\$50)	70,000,000	Aug. 10, '22	2½	Q	77½	78½	76½	78½	+ 2½	2,300	
61	32%	55	36%	57	May 31	43	Mar. 27	Reading 1st pf. (\$50)	28,000,000	Sep. 14, '22	52	52	52	52	+ 1%	1,700	
65%	35%	37%	35%	59%	May 31	45	Mar. 8	Reading 2d pf. (\$50)	42,000,000	July 13, '22	50c	Q	35%	37	35	37	+ 2%	600	
100%	59%	74%	45%	91	Sep. 13	35	Jan. 12	Remington Typewriter 1st pf.	4,000,000	Apr. 1, '21	1%	Q	91	91	91	91	+ 1	100	
80%	85	85	80	89	Sep. 10	50	Jan. 14	Remington Typewriter 2d pf. Series S	1,217,600	Apr. 1, '21	2	..	73	73	73	73	
105	105	114%	114%	114%	Rensselaer & Saratoga	10,000,000	July 1, '22	4	SA	90	90	90	90	
93%	30	39%	18	41	Jan. 20	25%	Jan. 3	Repligal Steel (sh.)	250,000	23	30	28½	32½	+ 2%	48,700		
124%	53%	73%	41%	78%	June 2	46%	Feb. 27	Republic Iron & Steel Company	30,000,000	Feb. 1, '22	1%	Q	56	56	56	56	+ 1%	47,600	
100%	84	96%	75%	95%	June 2	73	Feb. 24	Republic Iron & Steel pf.	25,000,000	Jan. 1, '22	1%	Q	80	80	80	80	+ 1%	600	
55%	16%	24%	5	14%	June 3	2	Sep. 30	Republic Motor Truck (sh.)	93,810	May 15, '20	81	..	2%	3	2	2	2	- 12%	2,300
..	Reynolds Spring (sh.)	10,000,000	
..	Reynolds Spring, Class A (\$25)	4,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	75c	Q	85	85	85	85	+ 1%	100	
..	Reynolds Tobacco pf.	10,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	75c	Q	54%	54%	54%	54%	+ 1%	100	
..	Robt. Reis & Co. (sh.)	50,000,000	Oct. 2, '22	1%	Q	110½	113½	112½	113½	+ 2%	500	
23	7	10	6	21	Apr. 15	18	Mar. 1	Robt. Reis & Co 1st pf.	100,000	
84	65%	56	40%	72	June 15	49	Mar. 1	Royal Dutch New York (sh.)	852,257	Aug. 1, '22	\$2,065	..	57	50½	56½	58½	+ 2%	27,900	
73%	49%	69%	40%																

The Trend of Bond Prices—Average of 40 Listed Issues



Stock Exchange Bond Trading

Week Ended October 7

Total Sales \$65,564,200 Par Value

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAR LOANS

	Range, 1922	Net
High	High	Low Sales
Low	Low	High Low Last Chge
Sales		
100.82 102.2	90 88	1 Am T & T gold 4s, '36..
101.68 94.84	88 79	5 Am W. Va. & E col 5s, '34..
101.40 94.82	88 79	5 Am Writ Large 6s, '30..
101.68 95.70	89 80	4 Ann Arbor 4s, '95.....
100.80 95.50	90 84	7 Armour & Co 4s, '30..
100.54 95.50	92% 86%	75 Armour & Co 4s, '30..
102.00 98.00	95 84	81 At, Top & S F gen 4s, '95.
101.78 96.00	95 84	91% 91% + %
101.40 95.86	96 84	91% 91% + %
101.00 94.68	97 84	92% 92% + %
100.80 95.68	98 84	93% 93% + %
100.50 95.68	99 84	94% 94% + %
102.00 98.00	100 84	95% 95% + %
101.78 96.00	100 84	96% 96% + %
101.40 95.86	100 84	97% 97% + %
101.00 94.68	100 84	98% 98% + %
100.80 95.68	100 84	99% 99% + %
100.50 95.68	100 84	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	100 84	100% 100% + %
101.00 96.74	102.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.86 94.72	103.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.80 95.86	104.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.65 95.70	105.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.50	106.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.54 95.50	107.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	108.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	109.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	110.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	111.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	112.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	113.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	114.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 96.74	115.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.86 94.72	116.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.80 95.86	117.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.65 95.70	118.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.50	119.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.54 95.50	120.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	121.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	122.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	123.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	124.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	125.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	126.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	127.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	128.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	129.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	130.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	131.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	132.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	133.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	134.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	135.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	136.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	137.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	138.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	139.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	140.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	141.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	142.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	143.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	144.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	145.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	146.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	147.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	148.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	149.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	150.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	151.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	152.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	153.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	154.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	155.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	156.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	157.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	158.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	159.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	160.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	161.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	162.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	163.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	164.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	165.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	166.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	167.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	168.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	169.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	170.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	171.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	172.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	173.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	174.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	175.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	176.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	177.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	178.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	179.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	180.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	181.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	182.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	183.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	184.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	185.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	186.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	187.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	188.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	189.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	190.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	191.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	192.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	193.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	194.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	195.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	196.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	197.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	198.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	199.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	200.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	201.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	202.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	203.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	204.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	205.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	206.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	207.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	208.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	209.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	210.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	211.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	212.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	213.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	214.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	215.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	216.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	217.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	218.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	219.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	220.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	221.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	222.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	223.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	224.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	225.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	226.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	227.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	228.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	229.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	230.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	231.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	232.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	233.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	234.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	235.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	236.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	237.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	238.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	239.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	240.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	241.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	242.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	243.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	244.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	245.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.50 95.68	246.5 94	100% 100% + %
102.00 98.00	247.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.78 96.00	248.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.40 95.86	249.5 94	100% 100% + %
101.00 94.68	250.5 94	100% 100% + %
100.80 95.68	251.5 94	100% 100

Stock Exchange Bond Trading—Continued

Range, 1922	High	Low	Sales	Net	Range, 1922	High	Low	Sales	Net	Range, 1922	High	Low	Sales	Net
High	Low	Last	Chg	ge	High	Low	Last	Chg	ge	High	Low	Last	Chg	ge
100%	72%	4	Long Island deb 5s, 1937.	.84%	84	81	-1%	108%	101%	50	N. Y. S. & W gen 5s, '40	.55%	50	-
100%	92%	8	Lorillard 5s, 1951.	.98%	97	98	+ 2	108%	101%	140	N. Y. Tel ref 6s, '49-50	106%	103%	+ 1%
110%	112	2	Lorillard 7s, 1944.	..	118	118	-	108%	102	28	N. Y. Tel s f del 6s, '49	107%	104%	- 1%
95	78	1	Louis & Ark 5s, 1927.	..	93	93	-	97%	88%	41	N. Y. 4s, 1939.	96%	96%	- 1%
85	77	1	L & Jeff Bridge 4s, 1944.	.83%	83%	83%	- 1%	55%	33	27	N. Y. Westch & B 4s, '46	55%	53%	+ 1%
78	72	94	Lou & N W ref 5s, 1935.	.77%	76%	76%	- 1%	101%	91	22	Ning Fals Pow 5s, '32	101	100	- 1%
94	87%	60	Lou & Nash uni 1940.	.94%	92%	93	+ 1%	105	100%	19	Ning Fals P ref 6s, '32	105	104	- 1%
110	100%	12	Lou & Nash 7s, 1930.	.110	105%	110	+ 1%	98%	95	1	Ning Lkgs & O P ref 1st 5s, '54	98%	98%	+ 2%
108	104%	33	Lou & N ref 5s, 2003.	.103	104%	104%	- 1%	95	70%	10	Norf & South 5s, '41	94%	94%	+ 1%
67%	58	2	L & N, A, R & C 4s, 35.	.88	86%	88	+ 1%	71	50	25	Norf & South 5s, '41	94%	94%	+ 1%
123	79	10	L & N, A, R & C 4s, 35.	.88	86	87	+ 1%	67	67	+	Norf & South 5s, '41	94%	94%	+ 1%
123	75	11	MAG COP temp ev 7s, '22.	.117%	113	117%	- 1%	94%	85%	160	Norf & W W cov 4s, '39-40	92%	91%	- 1%
100%	97%	24	Manhattan Sug 1 7s, '42.	.86%	97%	98%	+ 1%	124%	108%	155	Norf & W W cov 4s, '41	121%	119%	+ 1%
23%	59%	28	Manhattan Sug 1 7s, '42.	.86%	97%	98%	+ 1%	91%	84%	2	N. Y. Westch & B 4s, '44	80%	79%	- 1%
80%	64%	1	Manila El Ry 5s, 1938.	.80%	80%	80%	-	89%	84	2	N. W. P. C. & C. 5s, '41	88%	88%	-
70	59	1	Manila R R So L 5s, '39.	.67%	67%	67%	-	97%	95	5	N. Am Eds s f 6s, '42	97%	95%	-
92	81	145	Market St Ry con 5s, '24.	.91	80%	90%	+ 1%	65	60	33	N. Ohio T & L ref 6s, '47	64%	63%	- 1%
97	90%	12	Market St Ry col tr 5s, '24.	.94%	93%	94%	-	93	86	19	Nor Pac ref 5s, '44	98%	98%	+ 2%
120%	97%	16	Marland Oil tpm 7s, '31.	.111%	111%	111%	-	71	50	25	Nor & S 1st ref 6s, '41	94%	94%	+ 1%
106	91%	9	Marland Oil 5s, 1931.	.104	104	104	-	94%	85%	160	Nor & W W cov 4s, '39-40	92%	91%	- 1%
123	96	29	Marland Oil 5s, with war.	.124	119	124	+ 3%	100%	96%	127	N. P. ref 5s, '47	99%	99%	+ 1%
99	80	30	Mexican Pet's 1 8s, 1930.	.107	103%	104%	+ 1%	110%	101%	364	N. P. ref 6s, '48	100%	100%	-
90%	84%	6	Michigan State 5s, 1924.	.99%	99%	99%	-	103	98	1	N. P. ref 6s, '48	100%	100%	-
90%	82%	5	Michigan State 5s, 1924.	.99%	99%	99%	-	95	88	33	N. S. P. 1st & ref 5s, '41	94%	93%	+ 1%
81%	84%	5	Mich. Cent. J. L. S. 3 1/2s, '31.	.81%	81%	81%	-	108%	108	105	N. W. Bell Tel 7s, '41	107%	107%	-
100	100	2	Mich. Cent. 5s, '31.	.100	100	100	-	73%	66	1	OGDEN & LAKEC 4s, '48	74%	74%	+ 1%
122%	82	87	Midvale Steel 5s, 1936.	.90%	89%	90	+ 1%	99	90	11	Ont Pow 1st 5s, '43	97%	97%	- 1%
94%	80%	10	Milwaukee Gas 4s, 1927.	.93%	93%	93%	-	92	29	1	Ont Trans 5s, '45	92%	92%	+ 1%
95	95	8	Mil El Ry & L 5s, 1926.	.98%	98%	98%	-	101	95	34	Ore & Cal 1st 5s, '22	100%	100%	-
90%	79%	5	Mil El Ry & L 5s, 1926.	.98%	98%	98%	-	93%	83	3	Ore & N Con 5s, '46	89%	89%	-
100%	98%	1	MIL L S & W ext 5s, '29.	100%	100%	100%	-	106	97	26	Ore Sh L con gtd 5s, '46	103	104	+ 1%
92%	84%	5	MIL L S & W ext 5s, '29.	.92%	92%	92%	-	93%	86	80	Ore Sh L ref 4s, '49	92%	92%	-
93%	83%	2	MIL S & W 1st 5s, '47.	.91	91	91	-	86%	77	197	Ore-Wash 1st ref 4s, '46	83%	83%	-
83%	69%	12	Minn. & Nor con 4s, '34.	.92%	92%	92%	-	103	96	11	Otis 8s, '41	101%	100%	+ 1%
50	30	7	Minn. & St L con 4s, '34.	.81	80%	80%	-	96%	93	26	Otis Stl 7s, '47	95%	95%	-
50	35%	12	M. & St L 1st & ref 5s, '44.	.44	43%	44	+ 1	83%	73	4	PACIFIC COAST 5s, '46	85%	85%	-
107	100%	22	M. & St P & S S 5s, '31.	.104	103%	104%	+ 1%	95	87	58	Pac Gas & El 5s, '42	94%	94%	-
91%	85%	5	M. St P & S M con 5s, '38.	.90	89%	90	-	98	92	1	Pacific & M. Co. 5s, '40	97%	97%	-
88%	88%	1	Mo. K. & Okla. 5s, cfs.	.88%	88%	88%	-	95%	86	6	Pacific & I. & L. 5s, '40	93%	93%	-
84%	58%	4	Mo. K. & T 1st 5s, '1900.	.83	83	83	-	100	91	25	Pac T & T 5s, '52	103%	103%	-
84%	73%	2	Mo. K. & T 1st 5s, '1900.	.83	83	83	-	88%	88	8	Packard M Car 8s, '31	107%	107%	-
89	76%	76	M. K. & T 5s, A. W. 1, '62	.84	85%	86%	-	103	94	33	Pan Am P & T eq 5s, '30	101	102	+ 1%
65	63%	12	M. K. & T 5s, B. W. 1, '62	.72	71%	71	-	83	72	2	Penn Co 3ds, '43	81%	82%	-
90	83%	45	M. K. & T 5s, B. W. 1, '62	.72	71%	71	-	93	91	1	Penn Co 3ds, '43	81%	82%	-
66	42%	118	M. K. & T adj 5s, '21.	.87	86%	87	+ 1%	83	72	2	Penn Co 3ds, '43	81%	82%	-
103%	96%	217	Mo Pac con 5s, '49.	.102	101	101	-	93	91	1	Penn Gas & El 5s, '48	95%	95%	-
69%	59%	193	Mo Pac gen 4s, 1973.	.62	63%	63%	+ 1%	103	95	26	Penn Gas & El 5s, '48	95%	95%	-
100%	95%	3	Mo Pac 1st ref 5s, '36.	.92	92%	92%	-	93	85	6	Penn Gas & El 5s, '48	95%	95%	-
95%	95%	5	Mobile & Birn 5s, '45.	.95%	95%	95%	-	103	92	2	Penn gas 4s, '60	100%	100%	-
77	73%	1	Mobile & Birn 5s, '45.	.77	77	77	+ 2%	112%	103	117	Penn gas 4s, '60	110%	111%	- 1%
78%	67%	2	Mobile & Birn 5s, '45.	.78	78	78	+ 1%	103%	98	98	Penn gas 4s, '60	109%	109%	- 1%
90%	80%	8	M. & O. St L 5s, '27.	.90%	90%	90%	-	87%	80	188	READING gen 5s, '37	85%	85%	-
96%	80%	5	M. & O. St L 5s, '27.	.90%	90%	90%	-	90%	81	1	READING gen 5s, '37	85%	85%	-
96%	87%	6	M. & O. St L 5s, '27.	.90%	90%	90%	-	97%	88	1	READING gen 5s, '37	85%	85%	-
105	101%	3	M. & O. New 5s, '27.	.105	105	105	-	103%	93	1	READING gen 5s, '37	85%	85%	-
99%	93%	48	Montana Pow 5s, 1943.	.90	90	90	-	101	88	45	READING gen 5s, '37	85%	85%	-
92%	83%	1	Mont Tram 1st ref 5s, '41.	.90	90	90	-	50	413	8	Philippine Ry 4s, '37	85%	85%	-
65	27	1	NASS ELEC RY 4s, 1951.	.63	63	63	+ 1%	102%	94%	188	Philippines ref 5s, '42	101%	101%	-
101%	94%	55	National Tube 5s, 1932.	.101%	100%	101%	+ 1%	101%	90	12	P.C. CASTL 4d 4s, '40	96%	95%	+ 1%
100	97%	300	N. E. Tel & Tel 1st 5s.	.temp	ccts	1852	100%	99%	99%	P.C. CASTL 4d 4s, '40	100%	99%	-
96%	70	13	NO & E ref 5s, '42.	.84	84	84	-	101%	97	55	VANDALIA CON 4s, SERIES B, '37	86	86	-
82	70%	1	New Or Term 4s, 1953.	.78%	78%	78%	-	105%	102	1	VAN-CAR Chem 1st 5s, '35	23.100%	100%	+ 1%
101%	95%	1	N O T. 5s, 1925.	.101	101	101	-	104	90	1	VAN-CAR Chem 1st 5s, '35	100%	100%	-
80%	62%	88	N O T. & M ins 5s, 1935.	.77	77	77	-	106	99	30	VAN-CAR Chem 1st 5s, '35	100%	100%	-
84%	80%	8												

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets

Boston

Sales	MINING
150 Adventure	
93 Ahmeek	
700 Algonquian	
115 Allouez	
23 Anaconda	
1,245 Arcadian	
160 Arizona Commercial	
160 Bingham	
360 Calumet & Arizona	
349 Calumet & Hecla	
1,380 Carson Hill	
10 Centennial	
395 Copper Range	
1,630 Davis-Daly	
660 East Butte	
155 Franklin	
100 Helvetia	
933 Island Creek Coal	
153 Island Creek Coal pf.	
225 Isle Royale	
530 Keweenaw	
28 Lake Copper	
67 Mass Consol	
60 Mayflower Old Colony	
39 Michigan	
202 Mohawk	
73 Nevada Consol Copper	
800 New Consol	
100 New Idria	
679 Nipissing	
1,042 North Butte	
43 Ojibway	
75 Osceola	
105 Old Dominion	
20 Park City Mining	
100 Park Creek Coal	
171 Quincy	
100 Ray Con Copper	
20 Seneca Copper	
10 St. Mary's Land	
1,260 Shannon	
245 Superior & Boston	
210 Superior Copper	
1,310 Trinity	
550 Tuolumne	
602 U S Smelting	
429 U S Smelting pf.	
25 Utah Apex	
390 Utah Consol	
1,825 Utah Metals	
250 Winona	
28 Wolverine	

RAILROADS

170	Boston & Albany
540	Boston Elevated
177	Boston Elevated pf.
36	Boston Elevated 1st pf.
126	Boston Elevated 2d pf.
222	Boston & Maine
3	Boston & Maine pf.
10	Conn & Pass.
20	Chi Jctn & S Y pt
630	Chester Mass Ry
51	East Mass pf.
80	East Mass pf B.
553	East Mass Ry adj.
196	East Mass Ry adj cfrs
15	Maine Central
18	Maine Central pf.
23	Northern N H
33	New Bedford Worlton
169	New York, N H & H
56	Old Colony
1	Rutland pf.
2	Vermont & Mass
MISCELLANEOUS	
50	Am Agri Chemical
19	Am Agri Chemical pf.
200	Am Oil & Eng.
436	Am Pneu Service
318	Am Pneu Service 2d pf.
15	Am Sugar pf.
5,300	Am Tel & Tel
50	Am Woolen
285	Am Woolen pf.
168	Amoskeag
40	Art Metal Construction
300	Atlas Tack
200	Century Steel
615	Eastern Mfg
100	East Boston Land
2,200	Eastern Steamship
1,006	Edison Electric
710	Elder Corp.
75	Fairbanks Co

125	Weston-Houston	Elec.	31	30	30%
115	Gardner Motor	15%	10%	10%	
15	General Electric	170%	110%	110%	
160	Gray & Davis	21%	10	21%	
484	Hood Rubber	48	40%	48	
577	International Cement	32%	31%	32%	
25	Intl Buttonhole	4	4	4	
7	Intl Cotton Mills pf.	80	80	80	
465	Intl Prods	3	2%	3	
911	Libby, McNeil & Libby	25	24%	24%	
250	Loew's Theatre	9%	7%	14%	
60	Mass Gas	80	80%	80	
189	Mass Gas pf.	72	71	72	
180	Mergenthaler Linotype	176	157	175	
1,120	Mexican Investment	164	134	164	
54	Mathieson Alkali	49%	49%	49%	
190	Miss River Power	32%	30%	31	
210	Miss River Power pf.	85%	84%	84%	
5,702	National Leather	10%	7%	9%	
222	New England Telephone	117%	110	118	
800	New England Oil	2%	1%	1%	
4,763	Orpheum Circuit	28	25	25	
417	Pacific Mills	157	154%	157	
14	Plant (T G) pf.	90	90	90	
35	Reece Buttonhole Mach	15%	15	15%	
335	Simms Magneto	4	3%	4	
55	Southern Phosphate	7	7	7	
560	Swift & Co.	109	106%	109	
583	Swift International	23%	22%	23%	
691	Swingline	42	41	42	
52	United Drug	83	80%	83	
493	United Drug 1st pf.	51	48	51	
252	United Fruit	157%	149	155	
6,255	United Shoe Machine	44%	43%	43%	
435	United Shoe Mach pf	27%	26%	27%	
3,693	Ventura Oil	28%	27%	28%	
669	Waldorf	32%	31%	32%	
1,900	Waltham Watch	7%	6%	7%	
10	Waltham Watch pf.	30	30	30	
290	Western Mfg.	116	11%	11%	
570	Warren Brothers	33%	33%	33%	
102	Warren Bros 1st pf.	38%	37%	37%	
6	Warren Bros 2d pf.	40	39	39	
361	Willis & Baumer	17%	17%	17%	
BONDS					
\$14,000	A G & W I 5s.	55%	54%	55	
2,000	C Junction & Stock Y.	84	84	84	
5,000	C Junction & Stock Y. 5s	95%	95	95	
1,000	East Mass Se.	73%	73%	73%	
16,000	Hood River 7s.	101	100%	100%	
5,000	International Cement	8s. 107	107	107	
1,000	K C M & B 4s.	88%	88%	88%	
3,000	Mass Gas 4%.	95%	95%	95%	
8,000	Miss River Power 5s.	93%	94%	94%	
5,000	New Eng Telephone 5s.	98%	97%	98%	
11,000	North Western 7s.	116	115%	115%	
92,000	Western Tel. 7s.	97%	96%	97	

Pittsburgh

STOCKS						
Sales			High	Low	Last	
940 Am Window Glass Ma	\$87	81%	86			
175 Am Window Glass Ma pf	92	91%	92			
35 Am W G Mch	86	83	83			
5,109 Arkansas Gas	10%	9%	10%			
730 Carnegie Lead & Zinc	6%	5%	5%			
390 Cessna Inc pf	26	24	28			
370 Independent Brewing	7	6	6			
510 Independent Brewing Pf	15%	13%	15%			
35 Lone Star Gas	27	26	26			
1,135 Mfrs Light & Heat	56%	55	56%			
100 National Fireproofing	8%	8	8			
410 Nati Fireproofing pf	19%	19	19%			
235 Ohio Fuel Oil	18%	16%	18			
315 Oklahoma Gas Supply	58%	52%	53%			
490 Oklahoma Natl Gas	44	42	44			
883 Pittsburgh Banking	4	4	4			
825 Pittsburgh Brewing pf	9%	9%	9%			
10 Pittsburgh Coal	60%	60%	60%			
28,000 Pittsburgh-Mt Shasta	.29	.24	.26			
270 Pittsburgh Oil & Gas	9	8%	8%			
55 Pittsburgh Plate Glass	174	173%	174			
2,675 Salt Creek Con	12%	11	11%			
78 Tide Beverage	145	135	135			
35 Union Carbide	150	140	140			
20 U S Glass	50	50	50			
360 West P Tr & W P	35%	23	33%			
75 West P Tr & W P pf	74%	74	74			
205 Westinghouse Air Brake	102	100	100%			
300 Westinghouse Electric	62%	62%	62%			
20 West Penn pf	74	74	74			
BONDS						
\$2,000 Pitts Brew Is		81	81	81		
2,000 Indep Brew Is		77	77	77		

Baltimore

<i>Baltimore</i>		STOCKS
Sales		High
7 Ala Co 1st pf.		81
35 At Coast Line of Conn	115	
1,118 Arundel Corp.	40	
10 Arundel Corp pf.	98	
276 Baltimore Tube.	20	
100 Balt Brick pf.	30	
2 Benesch (1) pf.	26	
10 Citizens Bank.	45	
120 Cent Teresa Sugar	11	
800 Cent Teresa Sugar pf.	10	
49 Chesapeake & Pot T	100	
173 Com Credit	76	
40 Com Credit pf.	76	
177 Con Coal.	91	
352 Con Gaa E L & P.	116	
117 Con Power 8% pf.	116	
74 Con Power 7% pf.	107	
20 Coaden & Co pf.	54	
55 East Roll Mills.	21	
18 Finance Co of Am	33	
30 Finance Service "A"	10	
26 Fidelity Trust.	29	
110 Fidelity & Deposit.	112	
150 Home Oil pf.	61	
50 Maryland Casualty.		
06 Mfrs Finance 2d pf	27	
973 Merch & Min Bank.	213	
49 Mount Vernon C M pf	56	
32 New Amsterdam Cas.	32	
200 Northern Central.	79	
73 Nat Bank Baltimore.	183	
4 Norfolk Ry & Light.	25	
153 Pa W P.	116	
2,490 Un Railways & Elec	22	
72 Union Trust.	102	
72 U S Fidelity & Gty.	141	
30 Wash, Balt & A pf	32	
25 Wash Ry & Power.	73	
6 Western Bank.	32	

Chicago

STOCKS

Sales		High	Low	Last
580 Am Shipbuilding	78	75	78	
1,764 Armour pf.	100 $\frac{1}{4}$	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	100 $\frac{1}{4}$	
577 Armour Leather	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	
30 Armour Leather pf	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	87	87	
35 Booth Fisheries pf.	46	46	46	
92 Cen Ill Pub Serv pf.	87	85	87	
125 Chicago City & Connect	6	6	6	
25 Cent Pub Serv pf.	87	85	87	
30 Chicago Conn pf.	6	6	6	
210 Chicago Elevated	8	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	
1,713 Com Edison	140	130 $\frac{1}{2}$	130 $\frac{1}{2}$	
28,435 Continental Motor	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	
2,155 Consumers Co.	9	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	
330 Consumers Co pf	71 $\frac{1}{4}$	67	71 $\frac{1}{4}$	
75 Cudahy	64	62	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	
215 Diamond Match	117	116	117	
270 Deere & Co pf.	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	73	74	
1,015 Earl Motors	2	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	
160 Great Lakes D & D	88	86	86	
160 Godchaux Sugar	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	14	
1,394 Gossard (H W)	28	26	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	
8,860 Gossard Motor	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	
200 Holland St Louis Sugar	6	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	
110 Hart Shaffner & Marx	85	80	83	
100 Hartman Corp	85	85	85	
135 Illinois Brick	75	74	75	
600 Inland Steel	48	48	48	
3,986 Libby McNeil & Libby	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	
415 Lindsay Light	6	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	
894 Midwest Utilities	48	47	48	
245 Midwest Utilities pf	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	85	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	
772 Midwest Utilities pr pf	98	96	98	
350 Mitchell Motor	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1,879 Montgomery Ward	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	
10,194 Montgomery Ward pf.	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	
315 Pick (A) & Co	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	21	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	
3,970 Phillipson	45	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	
9,475 Piggy-Wiggly	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	
483 Public Service	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	
185 Public Service pf	95	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	95	
507 Quaker Oats pf	99	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	
2,860 Reo Motor	14	13	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	
345 Standard Gas & Elec	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	21	
800 Standard Gas Elec pf	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	48 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	
22,780 Stewart-Warner	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	50 $\frac{1}{2}$	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	
2,877 Swift & Co	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	
31,160 Standard International	24	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	24	
675 Thompson (J R)	40	40	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	
25,019 Union Carbide & Carbon	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	
186 U S Gypsum	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	58 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	
20 U S Gypsum pf.	104	104	104	
960 United Iron Works	8	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	
820 United Light & Railway	71 $\frac{1}{2}$	68	70	
340 United Light & Ry pf	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	
75 United Light & Ry	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	81	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	
20 Vesta Battery	25	25	25	
2,070 Wahl Co	59	57 $\frac{1}{2}$	59	
6,445 Western Knitting Mills	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1,000 Western Stone	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	
200 Wolff Mfg	284 $\frac{1}{2}$	284 $\frac{1}{2}$	284 $\frac{1}{2}$	
895 Wrigley	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	107	108 $\frac{1}{2}$	
8,875 Yellow Mfg	300	198	196	
10,565 Yellow Taxi	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	75	

ADVERTISEMENTS

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The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

Continued from Page 357

CANADA'S FOREIGN TRADE.

Exports

	1902	1922
Vegetable products	38,066	317,814
Animal products	75,320	135,798
Fibres and textiles	1,841	4,585
Wood and paper	35,450	179,925
Iron and its products	6,044	28,312
Non-ferrous metals	26,960	27,885
Non-metal minerals	7,421	22,616
Chemical and allied prod.	1,063	9,271
Miscellaneous	3,922	14,630
Total	196,016	740,236

Imports

	1902	1922
Vegetable products	35,882	173,274
Animal products	16,406	46,645
Fibres and textiles	42,636	139,997
Wood and paper	9,244	35,791
Iron and its products	36,332	119,210
Non-ferrous metals	8,586	29,53
Non-metal minerals	22,538	137,412
Chemical products	6,243	24,033
Miscellaneous	18,825	50,483
Total	190,732	747,800

It is interesting that the two categories of exports which show the greatest increase are the vegetable products and the wood products, both obviously due to the tremendous development of agricultural resources. The opening up of the Canadian West and the greater progress shown by the Eastern part of the Dominion have contributed principally to this expansion. On the import side, the greatest increases are shown by the fibre and textile category, due, undoubtedly, to the rapid growth of Canada's population, and the iron and minerals category, which is expressive of the country's industrial progress. The two branches of trade are excellently balanced, so far as value is concerned, with a very slight excess of imports over exports.

In France there is a considerable discussion over proposed modification of the warehouse surtax, which has existed for thirty years, since its establishment by the law of Jan. 11, 1892. Senator Mario Roustan, in the *Exportateur Français* (Aug. 21), summarizes the history of the tax and its application. According to this matter, the warehouse tax succeeded the so-called flag tax, which was abolished in 1886. The flag tax was an attempt to protect the French merchant marine by subjecting goods brought into French ports in foreign bottoms to a special tax. If the flag happened to be changed en route, the tax was diminished in proportion to the distance at which such change was made.

The warehouse tax, introduced six years after the abolition of the flag tax, provided for a special levy on goods discharged or warehoused in a foreign European port en route to a French port. The existence of this special tax has been considered responsible for making French ports the great clearing houses for such products as coffee, American cotton, felt, etc. Wool is cited as a classical example of the sort of protection that can be afforded to French commerce by a surtax of this kind. As a result of a commercial treaty with Great Britain, that country had been granted exemption from the surtax on Australian, South African, and Indian wool, as a result of which the British ports remained the great clearing houses for such wool intended for France. On the other hand, La Plata wool did not enjoy the exemption, and a great distribution market for it has become established in France.

The modifications proposed now would abolish the tax on all extra-European goods which cannot be imported direct through the French ports, owing to a lack of shipping facilities between the country of the origin of such goods and France. This modification is opposed, however, on the ground that it would destroy an important incentive for the development of a French mercantile marine.

The statistics just published, for the foreign trade of France in the first six months of 1922, as compared with the corresponding period of 1921, show a much greater decrease in the value of French exports than of imports. The following table shows this (in francs):

1922 1921 Decrease

Exports 9,368,000,000 10,068,586,000 699,926,000

Imports 10,671,592,000 10,695,017,000 23,425,000

In the first six months of 1922, France imported more food and raw raw materials than in the corresponding months of 1921, and less manufactured goods, and, at the same time, her exports showed a decrease in all three of these categories.

Germany's foreign trade situation in the first six months of 1922 shows a total import of 171.6 million metric quintals, worth 142.9 billion marks, and a total export of 120.8 million metric quintals, worth 130.8 billion marks. Thus the value of her imports exceeded that of her exports by 12 billion marks.

The question of unemployment seems to be the least of Germany's difficulties. The London Economic Review (Sept. 15), in discussing the labor market in Germany, says:

The number of unemployed is now smaller than ever before. In the whole empire only 15,000 persons are really destitute, and these are confined to a small number of cities, mainly Berlin. Only members of certain branches of food and luxury produce, e. g., hotel employees, as well as independent workers as musicians, actors, and painters are unemployed. From every part of Germany complaints of labor shortage come in unskilled as well as skilled. Important migration from one industry to another are going on. For instance, miners are going in mass into the building industry. But it is also stated that builders are enticed into factories. The emigration of German miners to Rumania and Spitzbergen has apparently ceased.

Agriculture is embarrassed for want of labor by reason of the low wages paid. A slight slackening is noticeable here and there, however, employment in the metallurgical industry of Western Germany, for instance, falling off. The manufacturing boom has now undoubtedly passed.

The *Exportateur Français* (Aug. 21) reports that shipments of steel from the great German metallurgical centre of Solingen in June aggregated 630,000 kilograms, as against 480,000 kilograms in May, and 513,000 in April. The value of the total

shipments from the district in the first six months of 1922 is 1,049.7 million marks. Starting with Aug. 1, the price of steel intended for export is being adjusted to meet the exchange depreciation, 100 per cent. being added in the case of Austria and Hungary, and 150 per cent. in the case of Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Baltic States, etc.

The economic situation in Germany has a very close effect upon that of her immediate neighbor, Holland. In the same issue of the *Exportateur Français* as above we find a discussion of conditions in Holland, which are termed very unsatisfactory. For example, the railways in Holland suffered, in 1921, a deficit of 32 million florins, due to the price of fuel and the increase of personnel because of the introduction of the eight-hour day. The country's foreign trade is affected by the conditions existing in other parts of Europe.

But Holland's greatest difficulty and concern at the present time is in the loss of her foreign investments. A well-known Dutch financial writer, in analyzing the situation in this regard in the *Gazette de Hollande*, says:

Holland's war profits, which were huge in size, have now been largely neutralized by losses on Russian, Austrian, Hungarian, Turkish, and other foreign securities. The Russian problem concerns not only the great powers, but Holland also, and to a very considerable extent, because the Dutch capitalists have been accustomed to place large amounts in foreign investments. After the breakdown of Russian finance, the President of the Bank of Netherlands undertook a survey of the Dutch holdings in Russian State Railways bonds. He discovered that our investors held, at the outbreak of the war, at least a billion florins worth of Russian securities, which represented 10 per cent. of Holland's total capital. There is no doubt that the actual Dutch investment in Russia is much greater than that figure, since we purchased large amounts of Russian war paper. Moreover, there are important Dutch industrial investments in Russia, such as those of the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company in the Baku fields. Holland also has large commercial interests in Russia, especially in connection with the shipment of grain, large amounts of which normally go to Germany through Rotterdam. Attempts have been made recently to re-establish trade relations with Russia, but they have failed, because the Soviets are not recognized by our Government, and this hampers free intercourse. Our banks have also had considerable interest in the Russian banks, but these have been swept away by the nationalization of banks in Russia.

All these conditions, coupled with the general world situation, caused an economic crisis in Holland two years ago, and the country has not recovered from it yet. The Dutch hoped to have been able to capture a considerable part of the German trade with the Allies, acting as an intermediary, but have not succeeded very markedly. The shipping situation is rather serious, due to the return of Germany to the shipping field. The latter's recovery, which is now proceeding very rapidly, has caused the collapse of ambitious plans entertained by the Dutch shipping interests. As a result, the Holland Lloyd has been forced to sell some of its finest ships to enable it to carry on its operations. Lately, however, there has been some improvement in the situation. The banks, with a few exceptions, have succeeded in surviving the crisis, and are now in a sound, though restricted, position.

Soviet Russia is still struggling with the problem of her flood of paper currency, running into incredibly large numbers or trillions of rubles. The Government is now anxious to find some means of establishing a flow of the currency from the country back to the State Treasury, as this return has been very slow. A rather interesting proposal dealing with this question was made by a writer in the Moscow *Ekonomiceskaya Zhizn* (Aug. 31):

It would be highly desirable to issue a special State lottery loan, which would serve the purpose of extracting from circulation widespread small accumulations of paper currency. The price of bonds should be fixed in such a way that they would be available for the less wealthy population in towns and villages. For convenience, the loan should bear no interest, but instead of that certain amounts of jewelry or valuable objects now in the possession of the State should be raffled off four or five times a year. Besides the lottery loan, it would be well to issue an interest-bearing loan in gold currency, which would bring back into the Treasury large sums of money now in the hands of persons seeking long-term investment.

The same periodical for Sept. 7 contains an interesting discussion of the cotton situation in Russia. It is estimated that the textile industry of Soviet Russia requires at the present time a little more than seven million pounds (a pood=36.07 pounds) of raw cotton, as against the pre-war requirements of about twenty-five million pounds a year. On Aug. 1, the stocks of raw cotton at the disposal of the State cotton Commission amounted to two million pounds, while the stocks in possession of the various mills were one and one-half million. The crop in Turkestan is estimated at 700,000 pounds, and it is expected that 600,000 pounds will be obtained from Persia and other localities. Thus, at best, the amount of raw cotton available is four and one-half million pounds, and a very large portion of this amount still has to be transported from Asia to the textile centres of European Russia.

This means that at least three million pounds of raw cotton have to be imported from abroad. This is not a large amount, considering the fact that before the war Russia used to import about twelve million pounds a year. But the purchase of this amount will require nearly ninety million rubles in gold currency, and that is a very large amount, indeed, for the Soviet Government to handle in its present condition.

The economic situation in Turkey, in view of the recent developments there, presents very considerable interest. The Commissariat of National Economy at Angora has recently proposed a scheme for establishing a monopoly of all internal and external commerce in Anatolia, in an attempt to exclude all intermediaries, especially Constantinople. A National Export and Import Association is to be founded, with headquarters in Angora and branches in all parts of the

world. Its membership should be entirely Turkish, and none but its members should be permitted to engage in actual trade operations. The plan is considered in some quarters as a continuation of the situation which existed in Constantinople during the war, when an association, known as the Djemiet, was similarly functioning there, under the auspices of the Committee of Union and Progress, and mainly for the purpose of providing profits for the members and adherents of the Young Turk party.

As for the general situation in Anatolia, the following statement issued in Paris by the Turkish representative there sheds a very interesting light upon it:

At the present time our exports and imports amount to nothing, owing mainly to the political situation. But we have large stocks of raw materials. Our agriculture is very prosperous, but our merchants are unwilling to sell the stocks they have on hand because of the depreciation of the exchange. The Government has made efforts to prevent monetary inflation, and has raised customs barriers shutting out of Turkey everything that may be considered as luxuries. The financial situation is sound. The amount of paper in circulation is 156 million Turkish livres. The public debt is only 90 million livres, which is equivalent to 630 million French francs. Gold coins are still in circulation throughout the realm.

The London Statist (Sept. 21) presents some important data on the mining situation in Chile. With regard to copper, Chile has now become the second largest producer in the world. In 1920 she exported 85,000 tons of fine copper and 24,000 tons of copper ore. Most of the industry is in the hands of Americans, whose investment in the various copper companies is more than one hundred and fifty million dollars. Coal mining had never been developed sufficiently in Chile, and fuel had to be imported regularly from England and less regularly from the United States. During the boom following the war four coal companies were organized in Chile, but, when the boom passed away and prices began to drop, these companies were forced to cut down their wages, which caused widespread strikes, which have not been settled satisfactorily to the present day.

However, the hardships caused by the irregularity of the coal situation have led to the development of water power, which is now projected on a large scale. It is estimated that the electrification of the first zone of the State railways will result in a saving of 100,000 tons of coal a year. Other plans call for the electrification of the Iquique Nitrate Railway and of the Chilean portion of the Transandean Railway, as well as for the construction of a large power station to supply the needs of the various industries in the central part of Chile.

The Statist for Sept. 2 gives the first fiscal statement of the new government of the Irish Free State. The principal receipts of the Irish Exchequer between April 1 and Aug. 26 were as follows: Customs, £847,000; excise tax, £6,434,000; estate duty, £371,000; stamps, £135,000; property and income tax, £1,017,000; profits tax, £163,000. The balance in the Exchequer on Aug. 26 was £3,583,765.

Stocks

THE upturn in the stock market last week was a definite index to the position of securities. It was undoubtedly founded upon the better character of European news, but this alone would not have caused an advance had it not been that confidence in the course of prices was still the underlying factor of the situation. It was evident from the outset that stocks were not in supply and that those who wished to get back their securities had to bid for them. The reaction of the preceding week was of such substantial proportions that it corrected the technical position of the market, cut down the long interest, which was top-heavy, and supplied a short interest upon which to build an advance, with the result that many issues touched new high levels for the year. In some particular issues which had been under heavy pressure there was a sharp running in of the shorts with rises that were more rapid and greater in the aggregate than any that had been seen in some time.

On several days the leadership of the market lay with the Standard Oil issues. This is something that could not be said of the markets of the past, for in those the Standard Oils were not listed upon the big board and the action of these stocks was quite apart from anything that took place with relation to other securities. Now there has been something of a welding together of the open market and the big board through the Standard Oil issues, and there was no question that the upturn in such issues as Standard of New Jersey and Standard of California imparted a degree of strength that was a direct influence on the entire stock market list and particularly upon its upturn.

The situation with relation to the Standard Oils is, however, quite different from that which obtains with the other oil companies. The rise in the "Standards" all along has been predicated upon the possibility or the probability that the common stockholders would receive some measure of compensation with relation to their holdings that was far in excess of the value of the cash dividends. Some time ago the Standard Oil Company of Kentucky declared a stock dividend, and last week an increase in capital was proposed for the Standard Oil Company of California, and it appears that this company will now declare a 100 per cent. stock dividend.

The declaration toward the close of the week of a 200 per cent. dividend by the Standard Oil Company of New York was further evidence of the influences which are working in the Standard Oil group. This company some months ago sent out notices to stockholders calling for a meeting and the consideration of a stock dividend. At that time the meeting was not held for the reason that a quorum was lacking. So far as the Street was concerned, it believed that some powerful interests in the company had set their hands against the stock dividend, but it was considered that the holding back of such a distribution was only a temporary measure. The action of the Directors on Friday in again taking up this subject and

the declaration of such a dividend showed beyond peradventure that the prices for Standard Oil stocks have been more than justified.

Of course, per se, a stock dividend can be argued as being no particular distribution of tangible worth to the shareholders. It means simply a division of the interests of the stockholders in the company and, on the basis of the Supreme Court decision with relation to stock dividends, this cannot be looked upon as an increase in the value of their holdings. On the other hand, it is generally true nearly always true, in fact, that in the case of a stock dividend the basis is provided for a greater interest return on capital. In other words, if the old interest rate were 20 per cent., it is probable that the interest rate on the new shares in the aggregate would greatly exceed 20 per cent. It is on this basis, then, that stock dividends have a tangible market value even though they have no taxable value so far as the Government is concerned.

The above is merely an instance of a situation that obtains with relation to nearly all of the Standard Oil stocks. The possibility of stock dividends with relation to many of them is considered as one of the developments that may be counted upon as a real market factor in operations covering the not far distant future. Already many of them have made large gains and, while it is unlikely that the dividends will come in any short period of time, with relation to the entire group of companies, it does appear to many market observers that most of the companies, over a period of time, will change their capital and make stock distributions to their shareholders. There was no reason for a demonstration in last week's stock market so far as domestic companies were concerned.

Undoubtedly the market is still discounting the business improvement which is in progress, and it may be to a certain extent true that the market has more than anticipated this improvement by some of the price advances which have taken place. In any consideration of the present market attention must be directed to the operations of pools. The price upturn which has taken place has been mainly one in which pool manipulation was an outstanding factor. There has been a fairly well diversified and wide public interest, but the market has been under the control of pools and professional operators. Actually, it is hard to find very much of a distinction between the two. As was pointed out last week, the position of the market has been such that pools, in putting prices up, found they could not distribute without causing sharp declines, and it was therefore to be inferred that the market was in strong hands. Either this conclusion had to be arrived at or one had to take the view that the market was over and that the pools were prepared to admit failure and liquidate their holdings. This was hardly conceivable, since the market has progressed so favorably and since there has probably been some fairly good distribution of stocks. It was therefore to the advantage of the pools to uphold their stocks, except in the case of excessive liquidation of long holdings, and with the foreign news improving there was a distinctly better feeling on the part of the speculative public, so that there had to be sharp bidding for stocks in the upturn.

The underlying factors of the market continue the same as they have been all along. There is some flow of money to the West, but this is by no means great, and a surplus of funds is available for stock market operations. It was significant that in the rise of stocks last week the money rate held between 4 and 5 per cent. This may be taken only as an indication of an easy money market and a fairly low position as to brokers' loans in their relation to the banking machinery.

A forced liquidation of stocks can hardly be expected until there is a tightening of credit for stock market purposes or until definitely unfavorable news sweeps over the market, just as it did a week ago when there was imminent danger of a conflagration in Asia Minor which might spread to many of the other countries of Europe. If the European situation again takes an unfavorable turn it is probable that the market will once more reflect such circumstances. Aside from the European question, however, there seems to be no particular cloud on the horizon, so that developments, aside from this, can be watched from the market position alone. Any upturn such as that of last week, of course, tends to undermine the technical position and leaves the market vulnerable to professional attack.

The rise which the market has had has been of large proportion and, naturally, no such continuation can be expected before another setback is witnessed. Just how far the rise can continue is, of course, one of the questions which no man can answer; but, at any rate, the view is justified which was expressed last week that no bull market could come to an end with only one sharp recession. From now on the money market will be watched closely, and also the position of stocks as related to pool activities. When the pools have distributed there may be an end to the present market and probably not before. Some pools have been forced to close out at a loss, others are still intact and, having successfully tided over the first break and with the rising prices last week, they are in a fairly favorable position provided public interest in the market continues.

Bonds

LAST week indicated a well-pronounced market of appreciating bond values. Even though Friday proved to be reactionary, the net results of the week were substantial gains in the list taken as a whole. Up to the last session the situation in the Far East was represented as having been one in which both sides were adopting a conciliatory attitude, and the promise of a settlement added the elements required to furnish something like a bull market. Foreign bonds in particular were affected. Speeches at the American Bankers' Association convention advocating the adoption by the Government of a liberal attitude toward allied indebtedness seemingly added impetus to the already increasing values. Toward the close of the week rates in the local money market

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The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

showed signs of tightening, the renewal rate being increased to 5 per cent. Ninety-day accommodation on prime bills was 4½ per cent., which compares with the week previous of 4¾ per cent. Responding to unfavorable news from the Near East on Friday bond quotations became irregular and reactionary. There were visible signs that Liberty bonds were marking time, awaiting the announcement of the form that the contemplated Government financing will assume. The uncertainty surrounding this situation has influenced high-grade railroad bonds, especially those in the legal class, and apparently diverted demand into the more speculative issues.

The volume of new flotations during the week did not assume the proportions of the week before. A substantial portion of the total amount was represented in public utilities. Bankers are disinclined to take on new foreign business, and reports are to the effect that several issues involving the refinancing of foreign industrial companies have been turned down, for the time at least. The noteworthy issues brought out during the week were: \$6,132,000 Ohio Power first and refunding 5s, series B, due 1952, at 93%; yielding 5.45 per cent.; \$7,500,000 American Gas and Electric debenture 6s, American series, due 2014, at par; \$2,000,000 Southern California Gas first and refunding mortgage 5½s, series B, due 1952, at 98½, yielding 5.60 per cent.; \$1,230,000 Virginia Railway and Power-Norfolk and Portsmouth Traction first mortgage sinking fund 5s, due 1936, at 93, to yield 5.75 per cent.; \$5,495,000 Wisconsin Public Service first lien and refunding 6s, series A, due 1952, at 99½, to yield about 6.03 per cent.; \$600,000 Dayton Public Service first 7s, due 1942, at 100, yielding 7 per cent.; \$12,500,000 Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light refunding and first mortgage 5s, series B, due 1961, at 92½, to yield 5.50 per cent.; \$2,900,000 City of Boston registered 4s, due 1923 to 1967, at prices yielding 3.60 per cent. to 3.90 per cent., according to maturity; \$385,000 City of Cortland (N. Y.) 4½ per cent. school bonds, due 1923 to 1942, at prices yielding 4 per cent. to 4.10 per cent.; \$5,000,000 State of Bahia (Brazil) 8 per cent. sinking fund preference loan, due 1942, at 99½ for the first \$2,000,000 and 100% for the balance of \$3,000,000; \$1,520,000 City of Los Angeles (Cal.) harbor improvement 4½s, due 1924 to 1961, at 4.20 per cent. to 4.30 per cent.; \$400,000 City of Charlottesville (Va.) municipal improvement 5s, optional 1942, due 1962, at 106%, yielding about 4.50 per cent.; \$10,000,000 Brer Hill Steel first 5s, due 1912, at 100, to yield 5.50 per cent.; \$2,500,000 Spiegel-May-Stern sinking fund debenture 6½s, due 1932, at 96½, yielding 7 per cent.; \$1,000,000 Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Association ninety-day secured loans, offered at a 5 per cent. discount; \$1,000,000 1,000 Park Avenue Apartment Building first mortgage serial 6s, due 1924 to 1932, at par, yielding 6 per cent.; \$500,000 John Thomson Press and Manufacturing first and refunding 7s, due 1932, at 100, yielding 7 per cent.; \$500,000 Sibley

Manufacturing Company (of Augusta, Ga.) first mortgage sinking fund 7s, due 1942, at par, yielding 7 per cent. Negotiations are said to have been completed for the issuance in the not distant future of \$2,000,000 State of Ceara (Brazil) 8s, due 1947, while the Cuba Northern Railroad is negotiating with local bankers for a loan of from \$10,000,000 to \$15,000,000.

The undertone of the municipal bond market was strong and prices were firm. The amount of municipals floated during the week was small compared with the dimensions of those issued the previous week. Dealers are eagerly awaiting the decision of the Treasury Department on the proposed loan and do not appear disposed to take on large issues except on a very attractive basis. The \$75,000,000 of Federal Farm Loan bonds offered the week before last absorbed a good deal of funds which ordinarily would have gone into municipals except for the fact that this new form of investment returns a more liberal yield as compared with the high-grade municipal bonds.

Railroad bonds were traded in large volume, with demand concentrated on the semi-investment and speculative issues. This preference is an absolute reversal of that shown the week before, when high-grade obligations were those particularly sought. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe general 4s lost a half, to 91; Baltimore & Ohio issues were in prominence, the 6s gained ½, to 102, the convertible 4½s gained a like amount, to 85½, and the prior lien 3½s were up a point; Canadian Pacific perpetual 4s were up ½, at 83; at 98½ Chesapeake & Ohio convertible 5s gained 2 points, while the convertible 4½s rose ½, to 89½; Chicago & Alton occupied a good deal of attention; the refunding 3s rose ½, to 95%; and the first lien 3½s gained a fraction, to 33½; St. Paul issues showed substantial gains, Denver & Rio Grande first and refunding 5s stood out with a gain of 5½, to 52; Great Northern general 7s were up ½, to 112½; Missouri, Kansas & Texas adjustments closed at 63½, up 1%; Missouri Pacific generals were up one point, to 66½; New York Central 6s closed 1½ higher, at 106½; the refunding 5s were up a point and the consolidation 4s rose ½, to 84; Pennsylvania general 4½s climbed ½, to 93½; Frisco prior liens were up fractions, the adjustments off ½, to 82, and the incomes off ½, having gone ex the \$6 annual interest payment; Seaboard Air Line 6s, at 69, were up 3 points, the adjustments up 2, to 28, and the refundings up 2, to 44%; Southern Pacific refunding 4s were unchanged; Southern Railway 6½s were 1½ higher, at 103½; Erie general 4s were up ½, to 54, and the Consolidation 4s up 2%, to 66½.

The utilities evidenced considerable strength and the large offerings of the week were taken up with alacrity. American Telephone and Telegraph convertible 6s rose 3½, to 117½. There was singular activity in Commonwealth Power 6s, which rose 1%, to 91½; American Water Works and Electric collateral 5s, at 86, was an increase of 1½;

at 108½ Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania gained a point; Duquesne Light first and collateral 6s were up ½, to 101; General Electric displayed a gain of 1½ when it closed at 107; Pacific Telephone and Telegraph first and refunding 5s gained 1½, to 93½; Lacklade Gas refunding and extension 5s were up a point, to 93½; New England Telephone first is received marked attention and at 90½ was up a fraction.

Industrials followed the general trend of the market, but did not report the net gains shown in the other sections of the market. American Smelting 5s were up ½, at 94½; American Sugar 6s gained ½, to 103; at 124 Cerro de Pasco Copper 7s showed a rise of 2 points; Chile Copper 7s were up 1½, at 110; Consolidation Coal first and refunding 5s appreciated 2%, to 92½, due no doubt to the resumption of work at the mines; the convertible 8s of Invincible Oil went to 104, gaining 5%; Marland Oil 8s, with warrants at 124, were up 3%; Sinclair 7½s, called but still convertible, rose to 110, being a gain of 4 points; the first 7s of the company were up 1½, to 102; United States Rubber 5s declined ½, to 89½; United States Steel 5s declined ½, to 103.

The tractions responded well. Brooklyn Rapid Transit 7s showed a point gain, at 95; Chicago Railways first 5s, at 81½, were up ½; Hudson & Manhattan issues were up by fractions; Interborough 5s gave a good account of themselves at 73½, a gain of 2½ for the week.

The activity of foreign securities was a feature of the market. French 7½s closed at 97, representing a gain of 1%; French Cities 6s were up 2½, to 81½; Department of the Selma 7s gained 24, to 98, while Paris, Lyons and Mediterranean 6s went up 1½, to 75; United Kingdom of Great Britain 5½s of 1929 indicated a gain of 1%, at 107½; the 5½s of 1937 gained 2 points, at 103½; Argentine 7s of 1927 closed at 102, a gain of ½; the 5s of 1945, at 81½, were up ½; Belgian 8s reflected the situation in the French bonds; they gained 1% at the close, to 103½; Brazil 8s were up a point, to 97; Brazil 8s increased fractionally, to 102; Canadian obligations were strong, the 5½s of 1929, at 101½, were up 1%, and the 5s of 1952 increased fractionally, to 99½; Chile 8s gained a point, to 104½; Czechoslovak 8s appreciated 2%, to 94; Dutch East Indies 6s were in good demand and the 1947 issue went up 1%, to 95%; Uruguay 8s gained a point, to 107; Mexican debts were weak; the 5s fell 1%, to 53½, and the 4s were off 1½, to 39.

Textiles

THE upward trend to textiles prices, which had been becoming more and more noticeable for some time, became marked last week. Not only did it manifest itself openly in the cotton and woolen goods trades, but evidences of it were seen in silks as well. Buying at the advances, especially in the

cotton goods, was active, and in connection with it a notable thing was the advice given retailers by one of the most prominent wholesale dry goods concerns in the country. This concern, which had maintained an almost super-bearish attitude for some time, openly asserted that now was the time to buy.

The outstanding feature of the week in the cotton goods trade was the pricing of practically all lines of Eastern and Southern ginghams, chambrays, seersuckers and kindred cloths for Spring. First action came from a leading Eastern concern on Monday, when it marked its lines half a cent to a cent a yard above the prices which previously prevailed. With the exception of the leading producer of ginghams in the East, whose looms are still unoccupied as a result of labor trouble, other makers of the goods in question followed suit. In the Southern clothings little change was seen. Some lines were advanced slightly and some lowered a bit. Little trouble in selling up was experienced in most cases. In fact, at least one of the big Eastern concern's goods had been sold tentatively before the quotations were issued, and the orders were promptly confirmed.

Not much difference was seen in bleached cottons last week, but a significant thing in the heavy colored goods was the pricing of 220-yard indigo denims at 20½ cents by one concern for delivery in November and December. This figure is well above the one quoted on similar goods by the largest denim producer at the time it recently withdrew its lines for the remainder of the year. In the gray goods there was little change visible on the face of the market, but in a quiet way sellers let out both printcloths and sheetings for deliveries running well through the early months of 1923. This was presumably done at prices the same as those asked for goods for near-by shipment.

Advances of 2½ to 3½ cents a yard on men's wear woolens and worsteds by the largest maker of these goods in the country constituted the week's chief happening in that field. They were received with mixed feelings by buyers, although they had been looked for for some time. No reason for the increases was given officially, but it was estimated that they resulted from the exhaustion of stocks of wool purchased at prices lower than those now current. Whether the new tariff had a hand in them or not is open to question.

In the silk trade the soaring prices of raw silk are again the principal topic of discussion. With the promise of almost wartime levels again if something does not happen to check the rise, manufacturers made haste slowly during the week so far as booking Spring business was concerned. Taking orders now for goods to be delivered some months hence, in the face of a rising market, is not the most attractive thing in the world. In the sales of goods for the nearer deliveries there was a noticeable turning away from crepes on the part of many buyers, who are now going in more strongly for brocaded

Continued on Page 375



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**New England Securities
Bought—Sold—Quoted
WITHINGTON & CO.,
27 State St., Boston.**Denver Gas & Elect. 5%, 1949
Metropolitan Edison 6%, 1952
Lehigh P. R. secured 6%, 1927
American Ry. Issues**McCown & Co.**
Land Title Bldg., Philadelphia, Pa.
Members Philadelphia Stock ExchangeSouthern Ry. Con. 5s, 1994
Louisville & Nash. Unif. 4s, 1940
Western Pac. 1st 5s, 1946**VILAS & HICKEY**Members of New York Stock Exchange
49 Wall St., New York. Tel. Hanover 8061.Kansas Gas & Electric Pfd.
Newport News & Hampton Ry. G. &
E. 5s, 1944
Yadkin River Power 1st 5s, 1941John Nickerson, Jr.
61 Broadway, New York. Bow. Green 8840Guaranteed Railroad Stocks
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Open Security Market — Bonds

UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES

	Hld	Offered	
Consol. 2s, April, 1930	102%	103%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Conversion 3s, 30 days from date of issue	93%	95%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
OH 1st 1940	100%	100%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Liberty 2d 4%, 1927-42	99.82	99.98	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Liberty 1st 3%, 1932-47	100.50	100.60	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Liberty 1st 4%, 1932-47	100.06	100.12	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Liberty 1st-2d 4%, 1932-47	100.50	101.30	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Liberty 2d 4%, 1921-42	99.82	99.98	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Liberty 3d 4%, 1928	100.82	100.98	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Liberty 4th 4%, 1933-38	100.08	100.14	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Victory 4%, 1923	100.42	100.44	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Victory 4%, 1922	102.12	100.16	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Panama 2s	102%	103%	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Hawaiian 5%	99.61		C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Philippine 4%	Quot. on req.		G. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731
Philippine 5%, 1941	107%	108%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Puerto Rico 5%	Quot. on req.		C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6731

FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES

GOVERNMENT ISSUES

AUSTRIA:

Austrian 6s, Treasury	2	2%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Austrian 6s, Treasury	1%	3%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C. Whitehall 500
Austrian 6s, Treasury	1%	2%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300

ARGENTINA:

Argentine Recession 4s	63%	64%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Argentine 4s, 1886-1900	64	64%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1886-1900	64	65	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1897	59%	60%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Argentine 4s, 1897	58%	59%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Argentine 4s, 1897	59%	60%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1897	59%	60%	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1943 (large)	78%	79%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1943 (large)	78	79	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1945 (20 pieces)	76%	76%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Argentine 5s, 1945 (large)	78%	79%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Argentine 5s, 1945 (small)	76	77	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Argentine 5s, 1946 (small)	76%	77%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Argentine 5s, 1946 (small)	76%	77%	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Argentine 5s, 1945 (listed)	80%	82%	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Argentine 5s, 1945 (listed)	81	82%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813

BELGIUM:

Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919	62%	64	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919	62	64	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919	62%	64	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
Belgian Restoration 5s, 1919	62	65	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Belgian Premium 3s, 1920	60	72	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Belgian Premium 3s, 1920	60%	71%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Belgian Premium 3s, 1920	60	71	A. A. Housman & Co., 29 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Belgian Premium 3s, 1920	60	72	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 813
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Belgian Premium 3s, 1920	60	72	A. A. Housman & Co., 29

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Open Security Market—Bonds

FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES—Continued

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA:

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Czechoslovakia 4½%	23	24	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Czechoslovakia 4½%	18	19	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Czechoslovakia 6%	22	29	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Czechoslovakia 6%	24	30	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Royal Bank of Bohemia 4½%	23	27	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300

DENMARK:

	15	17	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Denmark 3½%	15%	16%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Denmark 8s, 1945	110	111	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Denmark 8s	110	111	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Danish Govt. Municipal 8s	107%	108%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813

FINLAND:

	17	20	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Finnish 5½%			

FRANCE:

	47½	48½	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
French 4s, 1917	40%	47%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
French 4s, 1917	47%	47%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
French 4s, 1917	47%	48½	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
French 4s, 1917	47%	48½	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
French 4s, 1918	46	46	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
French 4s, 1918	49%	47%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
French Victory 5s, 1931	58	59	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
French Victory 5s	58	59	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
French Victory 5s	59%	59%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
French Victory 5s	58%	58%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
French Victory 5s	57	58	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
French Premium 5s, 1920	67%	60	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
French Premium 5s, 1920	68	60	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
French Premium 5s, 1920	67	60	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
French Premium 5s, 1920	67%	60	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
French 5½%, 1917	75	72	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
French 6s, 1921	68	70	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
French 6s, 1921	67½	60	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
French 6s, 1920	68%	60%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
French 6s, 1920	67½	60	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
French 6s, 1920	67%	60	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
French 6s, 1920	68	60	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
French 7½s, 1941	97%	97%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
French 8s, 1945	101%	101%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
French 8s, 1945	100%	101%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300

GERMANY:

	35	42	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
German Govt. 5s	%	%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
German Govt. 5s	%	%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300

GREECE:

	50	58	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Greek 5s, 1914	53	58	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Greek 5s, 1914	53	56	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300

GREAT BRITAIN:

	247	237	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
British Consol. 2½%	304	374	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
British Funding 4s	73	75	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
British Handing 4s	72%	74%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
British Victory 4s	78%	78%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
British Victory 4s	78%	78%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
British Victory 4s	382	392	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
British 5s, 1922	461	471	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
British 5s, 1922	88%	90%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
British 5s, 1922	92%	94%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
British 5s, 1922	92	94	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
British 5s, 1922	461	471	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
British 5s, 1922	87%	88%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
British 5s, 1922	87%	88%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
British Govt. Exchequer 5s	91	93	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
British Govt. Exchequer 5s	456	466	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Creat Britain & Ireland 5½%	103	104	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330

ITALY:

	35	35½	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1920	34%	35%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1920	35	35½	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1920	34%	35%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1920	35%	35%	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C... Broad 7130
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
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Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C... Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C... Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Pynchos & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C... Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C... Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1925	42%	43%	C. B. Richard & Co

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Open Security Market—Bonds

PUBLIC UTILITIES—Continued

	Bld Offered		
Ohio Valley Elec. 5s, 1948..	74	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Ohio Pub. Serv. 7s, '41 Ser. H..	108 105	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Ohio Public Service 7s, 1947..	109% ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Ohio State Tel. 5s, 1944..	94% ..	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Oklia. G. & E. 1st & ref. 7½%, '41..	102 104	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Ohio State Tel. 5s, 1944..	94% ..	Viles & Hickey, 49 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 4245	
Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. 1st 5s, '28..	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Ontario Pow. Co. 1st 5s, 1948..	97% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Ozark Pow. & Lt. 1st 5s, 1952..	W. O.	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6840	
Pa.-Ohio Pow. & Lt. 7½%, 1940..	105	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Pa.-Ohio Pow. & Lt. 8s, 1939..	101	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Pacific Pow. & Lt. Co. 1st 5s, '30..	94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Pa. & Ohio Pow. & Lt. 1st 8s, '30..	101½ 103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Pa. & Ohio Pow. & Lt. 1st 7½%, '40..	104	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Pa. & Ohio Pow. & Lt. 7s, '40..	105% ..	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6840	
Tenn-Tel. Hill 5s, 1928..	92	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Pa. Pow. & Lt. 1st 7s, 1951..	101 103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Portland Gas & Coke 1st 5s, '40..	92	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Provincial Gas. & P. 1st 5s, '46..	92 95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Publ. Serv. of N. O. 6s, 1940..	75	Viles & Hickey, 49 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 4245	
Puget Sound Elec. 5s, 1932..	86 89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Puget Sound Pow. & Lt. 7s, '41..	105 107	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
R'lo de Janeiro Tr. Lt.&P. 5s, '35..	89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Rio de Janeiro Tr. Lt.&P. 5s, '35..	86 87	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 73 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 1551	
Rio de Janeiro Tr. Lt.&P. 5s, '35..	86 87	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6840	
Richmond Lt. & R. 1s, 1952..	62	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4279	
Roanoke Water Wks. 1st 5s, '36..	85	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Rockford Elec. Co. 1st 5½%, '39..	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Pa. Paul G. Light 3s, 1944..	98	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
St. Paul City Ry. Cable 3s, '37..	92 95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
S. Paul City Ry. Cable 3s, '37..	98	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Santiago Elec. Lt. & P. 5s, '39..	94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Salmon River Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '32..	96	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
San Antonio Pub. Serv. 6s, '32..	98½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Sicotra Val. Trac. 1st 5s, 1923..	101% ..	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 73 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 1551	
Schenectady Ry. 1s, 1946..	74 76	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6840	
Seattle Electric 5s, 1930..	98 99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Seattle Electric 5s, 1929..	92% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Seattle-Everett 1st 5s, 1939..	89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Seattle Litg. 5s, 1949..	87	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6840	
Seattle Lighting 5s, 1949..	83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Shawinigan W. & P. 1st 5½%, '50..	101 103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Shawinigan W. & P. 1st 5s, '34..	99	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Shawinigan W. & P. 1st 6s, '34..	104 105½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Southern Canada Pow. 5s, 1944..	92	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Southern Public Utility 6s, 1942..	92 94%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Southern Wls. Pow. 1st 5s, 1938..	76 78	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 73 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 1551	
Toronto Power 5s, 1924..	97 98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Texan Pow. & Lt. 1st 5s, 1937..	93 94%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Toledo Edison 1st 5s, 1947..	94	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 73 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 1551	
Terre Haute Elec. 5s, 1929..	88	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Terre Haute Trac. & Lt. 5s, '44..	85	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Toronto Pow. Co. Ltd. gen. 5s, '24..	97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Tri-City Ry. & Lt. 1st 5½%, '30..	91 93	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Tri-State Tel. & Tel. 5%, '42..	95 97	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Union Elec. Lt. & Pow. ref. & ext. 5s, M. & N. 1933..	93 95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
United Lt. & Ry. Co. 1st 5s, '32..	87% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
United Lt. & Ry. Co. 8s, '32..	95% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Utah Lt. & Trac. 5s, 1944..	89% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
United States Tel. 7s, 1941..	102 103	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Utah Lt. & P. prior 1st 5s, 1930 W. O..	West Pa. Trac. 1st 5s, 1930..	83 86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
West Pa. Trac. 1st 5s, 1930..	83 86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
West Virginia Utilities 6s, 1935..	74 76	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Wash. Balt. & Annap. 5s, 1941..	80 81	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330	
Wisconsin Edison Co. 6s, 1924..	90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Wis. Elect. Pow. 7½%, 1945..	106½ 108½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Wm. River Pow. 1st 5s, 1941..	80 88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313	
Yadkin River Pow. 1st 5s, '41..	90 92	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6840	

RAILROADS

Ala., Tenn. & North. 1st 5s, '20..	20 25	A. S. H. Jones, 56 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 0006
Atlanta Terminal 6s, 1935..	103½ W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Atlantic Coast Line deb., 1939..	88 89	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Augusta & W. 1st 5s, 1947..	102½ 105	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Austin & W. N. 5s, 1941..	96½ 97	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
B. & O. P. L. & W. Va. 1st 5s, '41..	81% 83½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Buffalo & S. W. 6s, 1928..	100 102	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Bennington & Rutland 4½%, '27..	75 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
B. & O. Tol. & Cin. 4s, '59..	69% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Buff. & Susq. 1st 4s, 1963..	78 80	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Burlington, C. R. & N. 5s, 1934..	99% 101½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Butte, Anaconda & Pac. 5s, '44..	94% 97½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Can. Atlantic 4s, 1955..	71 72½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Can. Northern Ry. 5s, 1930..	80 89%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Can. Northern 5s, 1924..	100 100%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Can. Northwestern 4s, 1948..	87 88½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Carolina Central 1st 4s, 1949..	71% 73%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C. Rector 6330
Central Argentine 6s, 1927..	93 95½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Cent. of Ga. Ch. Div. 5s, '31..	82 85	Dunham & Co., 45 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Cent. of Ga. Mobile 5s, 1946..	87 88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Cent. Ark. of E. 1st 5s, J. & J. 40..	82 83½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. P. European 4s, M. & S. '46..	87% 88½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. & O. North Ry. Ja. A.-D. 45..	97 98½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Central Pacific 4s, 1946..	68 69½	Dunham & Co., 45 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. Hanover 8300
Central Vermont Ry. ref. 4s, '30..	87 89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Central Pacific 4s..	67% 68½	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C. Broad 7130
Central Vermont 5s, 1930..	87 89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Chattanooga 4s, J. & J. '37..	82 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Chi. & Erie 1st 5s, M. & N. '32..	97% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Chi. Ind. & L. ref. 4s, 1947..	85 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Chi. Ind. & L. gen. 5s, M. & N. '66..	85% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. M. & St. P. Elec. 4s, J. & J. 25..	82 84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Chi. M. & P. 5s, '44-49..	72½ 73½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Chi. M. & P. 5s, '50-54..	86% 88%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. T. H. & S. E. Inc. 5s, '60..	68 71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. T. H. & S. E. Inc. 5s, '60..	71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Choctaw-Memphis 5s, J. & J. '40..	86 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Cin. Leb. & N. 1st 4s, M. & N. '42..	86 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Cin. San. & Cleve 1st 5s, 1928..	96% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
Cleve. & Mahon Val. 5s, J. & J. '38..	94 W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. C. C. & St. L. Springfield & Col. 1st 5s, '40..	87 90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. C. C. & St. L. Cairo 4s, J. & J. 1939..	88 90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. C. C. & St. L. Cin. Wab. & Mich. 4s, J. & J. 91..	81 83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '41..	82% ..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '42..	83 85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '43..	85 87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '44..	86 88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '45..	87 89	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '46..	88 90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '47..	89 91	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '48..	90 92	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '49..	91 93	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '50..	92 94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 6313
C. I. & E. 1st 5s, M. & N. '51..	93 95	Pynchon &

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INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS—Continued

Bid Offered

Two Rector St. Corp. 1st mtg.	99	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 811
Union Steel 1st m. f. 5% 1952..	103	105	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Rector 6330
U. S. Light & Heat 1st m. 1935..	74	79	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Utah Fuel Co. 1st m. 1951..	90	90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Van Camp Packing 8% 1941..	101%	103%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Rector 6330
Ward Packing 7% 1949..	105%	105%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Wayne Coal & C. f. 6% 1937..	95	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
West India Sugar Financ. 7% 20 104%..	100	103	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Rector 6330
Welch Grape Juice 8%, 1931..	100	103	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6423
West India Sugar Finance 7% 20 105%..	105	105%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Webster Coal & Coke 5% 1942..	92	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Woodward L. Co. 1st m. 1952..	84	87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813

Open Security Market—Stocks

RAILROADS

Bid Offered

Alt. Gt. Southern ordinary..	51	63	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Alt. Gt. Southern pf..	51%	60	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Albany & Susquehanna..	193	202	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Beech Creek R. R..	53%	41%	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Canada Southern..	53	55	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Cleveland & Pittsburgh 7%..	71	..	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Cleveland & Pittsburgh 4%..	40%	..	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Port Wayne & Jackson pf..	100	105	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Illinois Central leased line..	76	78	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Great Northern, Alaska & G. R..	108	115	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Kan. City, Ft. Scott & Mem. pf..	75	..	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Nobles & Birmingham pf..	65	68	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Minn. St. P. & S.S.M. leased line..	67%	69%	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Morris & Essex..	70%	81	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
New York & Harlem..	120	130	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
New York, Lack. & West..	100%	102%	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Northern Central..	78	79%	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & C. pf..	141	142%	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Renault, Samson & Co. pf..	124	125	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Southern Valley Nav. & R. R..	45	50	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
St. Louis Bridge 1st pf..	119	115	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
St. Louis Bridge 20 pf..	53	56	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
Tunnel R. R. of St. Louis..	110	115	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370
United N. J. R. R. & Canal..	190	202	Bennett M. Minton, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4370

STANDARD OIL SECURITIES

Bid Offered

Anglo-Am. Oil Co., Ltd..	22	22%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Atlantic Refining Co..	1225	1275	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Atlantic Refining Co. pf..	116	118	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Horne-Scrimger Co..	420	435	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Huckeye Pipe Line Co..	97	98	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
*Chessbrough Mfg. Co. Con..	225	250	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
*Continental Oil Co..	147	157	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Crescent Pipe Line..	35	37	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Cumberland Pipe Line..	150	160	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Petroleum Pipe Line..	99	100	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Gaienna Signal Oil Co. pf., new..	103	106	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Gaienna Signal Oil Co. pf., old..	106	112	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Illinois Pipe Line..	152	176	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Indiana Pipe Line..	97	98	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
International Pet. Co. Ltd..	22%	22%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
National Transit Co..	26	27	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
New York Transit Co..	171	173	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Northern Pipe Line..	110	113	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Ohio Oil Co..	385	390	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Quin.-Met. Fuel Co..	30	35	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Prairie Pipe Line..	273	280	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
*Solar Refining	375	385	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Southern Pipe Line Co..	97	99	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
South Penn. Oil Co..	220	225	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Southwest Penn. P. L..	60	64	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Standard Oil of Cal. 125 par..	129%	130%	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Standard Oil of Ind. 125 par..	132%	133	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
*Standard Oil of Kansas..	610	620	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
*Standard Oil of Kentucky..	115	117	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Standard Oil of Nebraska..	210	220	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Standard Oil of New York..	635	650	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Standard Oil of Ohio..	540	560	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Standard Oil of Ohio pf..	119	120	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Swartwout F. Co..	110	115	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
*Union Tank Car Co..	100	112	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Vacuum Oil Co..	360	605	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500
Washington Oil..	22	25	Charles E. Doyle & Co., 44 Wall St., N.Y.C.	John 4500

*Ex dividend.

PUBLIC UTILITIES

Bid Offered

Adirondack P. & L. Co. com..	25	27	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Adirondack P. & L. Co. 7% pf..	94	97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Am. G. & E. 10% com..	173	176	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Am. G. & E. Co. com..	173	175	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Am. G. & E. pf..	45	46%	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Am. Pow. & Lt. Co. com..	140	144	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Am. Pow. & Lt. pf..	68	69	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Am. Gas & Elec. 8% pf..	13%	14%	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Am. Lt. & Trac. 8% com..	140	143	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Am. Lt. & Trac. 8% pf..	140	143	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6% pf..	85	87	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Am. Pow. & Lt. Co. 4% com..	138	142	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Appalachian Power Co. com..	26	27	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Appalachian Power Co. 7% pf..	26	28	MacQuold & Coady, 29 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 7654
Ark. Lt. & Pow. pf..	27	John Nickerson Jr., 61 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Bowl. Gr. 6440	
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. com..	23	26	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Ark. Lt. & Pow. 7% pf..	73	78	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
California Elec. gen. 6% pf..	87	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Carolina Pow. & Lt. Co. 7% pf..	56	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Carolina Power & Light..	52	53	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Central Maine Pow. Co. com..	38	42	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Central Maine Pow. Co. 7% pf..	84%	87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Central Maine Pow. Co. 7% pf..	96	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Central States Elec. Corp. com..	9	10	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Central States Elec. Corp. 7% pf..	69	72	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Central States Elec. Corp. 7% pf..	70	70%	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Rector 6330
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. com..	120	130	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. 8% pf..	111	112%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Colorado Pow. Co. 7% pf..	90	94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Colorado Pow. Co. com..	22%	23%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Commonwealth Edison Co. com..	138	139	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 813
Commonwealth Ry. & Lt. Co. 6				

The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

Continued from Page 309

effects and other novelty silks suitable for Fall and Winter use. Figures compiled by the Silk Association of America show a slight falling off in the raw silks consumed in the country during September, as compared with August, but with this exception the September consumption was the largest of the year to date. Raw silk prices continued very bullish. Sinshu No. 1 was quoted at \$8.10, a rise of 40 cents a pound for the week.

late reports from the other side indicated an easier raw materials situation for the linen manufacturers than has been the case for several years. Not only is Russian flax coming in more freely than had been expected, but the Irish crop is showing up well. Belgian and French flax crops, however, are not so good, due to the shortness of the straw. Buying of linens in the primary markets, as here, is cautious. Buyers are showing little disposition to rush things.

Both light and heavy burlaps were easier in this market last week, due to holding off tactics of buyers. The former lost about 30 points during the week while the latter dropped about 25. Buyers, apparently are looking for still further declines and are acting accordingly.

Money

THERE was little in the money market last week to make for close attention. So far as the call money rate was concerned, it ranged between 4 and 5 per cent., which was likewise the range for the preceding week. There is nothing to indicate that the supply of money, so far as the call market is concerned, is not ample for the needs of the moment. It may be that in the next several weeks there will be some hardening but it will probably not be of any serious character, for no one studying the situation can come to any other conclusion than that funds are decidedly easy and that the demands of business have not been making heavy enough inroads to deplete the available supply of money for stock market purposes.

Time money for all maturities was lending at 4% per cent. So far as the long-term maturities are concerned, four to six months—this was an easing of 1/4 of 1 per cent. as compared with the preceding week. As a matter of fact, the business in this direction

was decidedly light, with renewals still making up the bulk of the market's activities.

The noteworthy happening so far as the commercial credit market was concerned was the disappearance of 4% per cent. commercial paper, lenders discounting at not less than 4% per cent. and in a few instances the rate was 4% per cent. to 5 per cent.

The commercial paper market showed distinct signs of stiffening. Acceptances were somewhat firmer, in keeping with the hardening in the commercial paper rate, the buyers' and sellers' rates moving up proportionately.

There is no denying the fact that the trend of funds has been for some time steadily away from New York, but the demands have not been particularly heavy and there has been such a surplus at the New York point that the withdrawal even of some substantial amounts has thus far had little effect so far as rates are concerned.

It remains to be seen what effect the expansion of business will have on the money market. Thus far there has been a large quantity of idle money in New York.

With the European situation clearing somewhat, and with improvement in business, the expansion of production may be expected to continue and hence use idle funds to a greater extent, with an increasingly heavier drain at the money centers. However, there can be a progressive increase in the use of funds for some time to come without seriously interfering with rates.

One of the factors in the business situation making for this increased use of money is the steadily expanding demand for goods. There is apparently coming to be a belief on the part of many people that prices are destined to go much higher. In fact, the purchase of goods has been advised by many of those who are in position to judge accurately and business houses to a large extent are following this lead. Furthermore, it must be remembered that there is nothing which stimulates business as purchasing in a rising market, the effect being somewhat cumulative. Those who feared to buy on the decline have been eager purchasers on the rise. There is something psychological in this for one believes that he can never guess the bottom but often believes he can guess the opportune moment to make a purchase on the rise so that he will not get the top price.

Foreign Exchange

THE foreign exchange market showed strength last week as a result of the better condition of events in Asia Minor. During the preceding week exchange rates were weak, reflecting the unsettled conditions in that quarter and the possibility that an open break might come between the English and Turkish Nationals in the vicinity of the Straits. Diplomatic recourse has, however, paved the way to an amicable settlement, or at least this was the opinion during most of last week, and the exchange market firms up so far as all the leading rates were concerned.

Sterling held within what might now be called a relatively narrow range, but touched a high of 4.42%, as compared with a low of 4.35%. French francs went as high as 7.63 lire climbed to 4.31 and exchange on Amsterdam went to 38.82. Marks at their high sold at 5% hundredths of a cent, and touched a low of 4% hundredths of a cent, which is a new low record for all time. Weakness in marks was the one outstanding instance of this character. So much has been said as to the position of the mark as related to paper currency that there is little that can be added at this time.

It savored somewhat of the ridiculous, however, when cables from abroad last week told of the increased efficiency which had been attained by the Reichsbank in turning out paper marks. The printing of so many billion per day was considered apparently something of an achievement—possibly it may be from the mechanical point of view—but at least it emphasizes the disaster which has overtaken German currency as a result of the war. Increased production is something to be desired so far as manufacturing is concerned, but when it is applied to the turning out of note circulation it apparently means that Germany has relinquished all hope of ever re-establishing the mark in the international exchanges.

Exchange on South American points weakened somewhat, Brazilian, Chilean and Uruguayan remittances showing losses. So far as Canadian exchange is concerned the dollar was at a discount at Montreal for the first time since the war. Canadian exchange on New York showed a premium of 1.32.

Stocks—Transactions—Bonds

STOCKS, SHARES

	Week Ended Oct. 7, 1922	1921	1920
Monday	663,263	544,043	805,611
Tuesday	921,432	509,752	806,501
Wednesday	1,130,399	527,470	817,429
Thursday	1,343,939	494,972	754,506
Friday	1,289,715	521,905	678,207
Saturday	517,661	279,573	274,020
Total week	5,861,500	2,877,719	4,316,454
Year to date	196,300,822	128,754,378	170,116,931

BONDS (PAR VALUE)

Monday	\$8,574,200	\$16,907,000	\$17,286,050
Tuesday	11,028,550	17,110,550	20,271,550
Wednesday	12,286,600	17,863,500	16,114,700
Thursday	11,764,200	20,185,550	14,459,850
Friday	12,910,200	17,878,750	15,877,800
Saturday	9,020,450	9,073,500	6,713,700

Total week \$45,564,200 \$99,019,450 \$90,723,450
Year to date 3,305,704,237 2,453,548,495 2,859,462,850

In detail the bond dealings compare as follows with the corresponding week last year:

Oct. 7, '22	Oct. 8, '21	Changes
Corporations... \$34,621,500	\$19,104,500	+\$15,517,000
Liberty..... 21,007,200	71,565,750	-50,458,550
Foreign.... 9,790,500	8,336,500	+ 1,444,030
City..... 55,000	22,000	+ 33,000
Total, all... \$85,564,200	\$99,019,450	-\$33,455,250

Stocks—Averages—Bonds

TWENTY-FIVE RAILROADS

	High	Low	Last	Net Same Day	Chgs Last Yr.
Oct. 2....	67.63	66.67	67.42	+1.76	76.11
Oct. 3....	68.55	67.77	68.33	+ .91	54.65
Oct. 4....	68.82	68.22	68.46	+ .13	64.27
Oct. 5....	68.91	68.38	68.51	+ .05	54.14
Oct. 6....	68.90	68.04	68.43	-.06	54.35
Oct. 7....	68.46	68.11	68.33	-.08	54.58

TWENTY-FIVE INDUSTRIALS

Oct. 2....	106.47	104.94	106.06	+1.76	76.11
Oct. 3....	88.24	86.94	88.04	+1.80	65.05
Oct. 4....	89.20	88.00	88.64	+ .60	64.37
Oct. 5....	89.65	88.23	89.05	+ .41	64.12
Oct. 6....	89.72	88.08	88.85	-.20	64.40
Oct. 7....	89.13	88.50	88.88	+ .03	64.67

BONDS—FORTY ISSUES

	Net	Day	Close	Change
Oct. 2....	81.41	81.41	81.41	+ .15
Oct. 3....	81.58	81.58	81.58	+ .17
Oct. 4....	81.85	81.85	81.85	+ .37
Oct. 5....	82.05	82.05	82.05	+ .20
Oct. 6....	81.98	81.98	81.98	-.07
Oct. 7....	81.91	81.91	81.91	-.07

Stocks—Yearly Highs and Lows—Bonds

	50 STOCKS	40 BONDS
High	76.31	82.54
Low	60.23	75.01
May	65.35	75.01
June	70.31	75.01
July	65.57	75.01
Aug.	67.50	75.01
Sept.	69.73	75.01
Oct.	64.12	75.01
Nov.	62.38	75.01
Dec.	69.48	74.24
Jan.	60.91	74.24
Feb.	64.49	74.24
Mar.	64.13	74.24
Apr.	58.99	74.24
May	67.62	74.24
June	61.51	74.24
July	57.41	74.24
Aug.	60.42	74.24
Sept.	62.42	74.24
Oct.	67.62	74.24
Nov.	69.42	74.24
Dec.	64.49	74.24
Jan.	60.57	74.24
Feb.	62.31	74.24
Mar.	65.45	74.24

*To date.

from the railroads just as it did in the pre-war years.

It has been frequently said that the volume of steel buying as related to the railroads was approximately 30 per cent. of the total business of the steel companies. This figure may have been somewhat out of line, but at any rate, at the present time a figure of 30 per cent. hardly approximates that which is actually in effect with regard to railroad purchases.

So far as prices of steel are concerned the trend continues to be upward and will probably be so for some time to come. There has been nothing in the position of the steel companies with reference to labor, which would make for other than an increase in labor costs. In many instances the mills have been obliged to raise wages in order to hold their employees and under such circumstances the increased cost in the manufacture of steel products is distinctly heavy, and has to be passed on to the public, so that there may be a margin of profit on invested capital.

The Iron Age quotes finished steel at 2.47 cents per pound, an advance from 2.43 cents per pound, which is a new high point for the movement. This compares with a figure of 2.236 cents a year ago, and according to this publication, is the highest recorded since July 12, 1921. On the other hand, the composite price in pig iron fell during last week to \$32.11 from \$32.54 per gross ton, which is the first recession since July 11.

Just at the moment the industry is generally concerned with the car shortage and the backlog of finished products at the point of production. Naturally, if this situation was accentuated it might lead to a slowing down of operations and even to a shutting down of some plants. Already there has been some curtailment in certain steel-producing centres, but nothing of serious proportions.

Apparently, this congestion has been caused in part by the embargo placed upon the shipments by the Pennsylvania Railroad and with the lifting of that embargo the congestion will be absorbed by traffic facilities.

There is no serious impairment in the industry as the result of a fuel shortage. There was, of course, danger of this when the coal strike was at its height, and had it continued for any great time longer, it might have seriously crippled the industry during the winter. However, danger from this source seems to have been eliminated now and it may be expected that production will go in proportion to the demands of the moment, limited only by the position of the industry regarding available cars.

In its report on pig iron production for September, The Iron Age shows a figure of 2,033,720 tons, or an average of 67,791 tons per day. This compares with 1,816,170 tons in August, or an average of 58,586 tons per day. The output for September was larger than that of January and February and nearly equal to production in March. Likewise, it is worthy of note that it was more than double the production of September, 1921. The September figure of this year, however, is well below the 3,129,323 tons reported for September, 1920.

Shipping

THERE will be no marked change in traffic conditions on the transatlantic general cargo services before the first of next year. The Continental Conference, composed of nearly all the steamship lines operating from the North Atlantic to European ports, voted last week to continue the period of open rates until February on about twelve of the principal commodities. There was a strong minority fight to cut all rates to the bone, this course being advocated as a means of bringing the companies which are underquoting the conference lines to terms.

Had the Continental Conference ordered a finish rate war, it would doubtless have cost the steamship lines millions in revenues. However, some of the oldest and best known lines insisted upon this drastic step, believing that sooner or later such a step would have to be taken to run the line of British tramp steamers out of the trades. The operators of this line justify their position by stating that the conference members refuse to grant a differential to allow for slower speed and higher rates of insurance.

The United Kingdom Conference, which is the bulwark of all such groups, is holding to the course it has been following.


The traffic outlook is not at all promising. With the exception of the transpacific, inter-

coastal and East Coast of South America trades, ocean traffic managers report the freight market to be dull. The passenger traffic offers no means of recouping for the low freight rates and the paucity of interchangeable commodities, as the American laws restricting immigration have reduced the volume of third-class travel to less than one-half of its normal flow. The passenger liners are being withdrawn from the regular runs, as is the common custom during the winter months, for special cruises.

Announcement has been made that the Shipping Board has been awarded a year's contract to move approximately 2,000,000 cases of oil to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and other South American ports on the East Coast by the Standard Oil Company. It is understood that the International Freight Corporation of New York will be designated by the Emergency Fleet Corporation

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WAR DEPARTMENT

OCT

9. 1922